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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Purpose of this Article
The purpose of this article is to prompt the United States Congress to hold open,
transparent and substantive public hearings to discuss, evaluate and explain to the
American people the significant environmental regulatory and judicial enforcement
aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
before that treaty is submitted to the full Senate for a vote of accession.'
This article hopefully accomplishes this objective by identifying and examining
how U.S. UNCLOS accession could be used by both external and internal
constituencies of the United States to facilitate the adoption as U.S. law of
Europe's "'standard-of-proof diminishing,' 'burden of proof-reversing,' 'guilty-
until-proven-innocent,' 'I fear, therefore I shall ban,' 'hazard-not-risk-based,'
2
Roman civil law-not-common law,3  extra-WTO Precautionary Principle
(hereinafter "Europe's Precautionary Principle").4 "Generally speaking, the
precautionary principle says that in dubio pro natura. "If in doubt, decide in
favour of the environment . . . Ennaltavarautumisen periaate or
varovaisuusperiaate (in Finnish), fdrsiktighetsprincip (in Swedish),
Vorsorgeprinzip (in German), principe de pr&aution (in French), principio de
precauci6n (in Spanish)."5 In other words,
I. Accession has the same legal effect as ratification. Accession is a synonym for ratification
for treaties already negotiated and signed by other states, like UNCLOS. See United
NATIONS, TREATY REFERENCE GUIDE (1999), http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.pdf.
2. Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-WTO Precautionary Principle: One European 'Fashion'
Export the United States Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. (Spring
2008), http://www.itssd.org/Kogan%20 1 7%5BI %5D.2.pdf.
3. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Effort to expand 'Authentic Acts' in Europe Imperils Economic
Freedom, 24 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 6 (Washington Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Feb.
2009, available at http://itssd.org/2-13-09KoganLegalBackgrounder/ 020-%20FINAL.pdf.
4. GARY ELVIN MARCHANT & KENNETH L. MOSSMAN, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS: THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COURTS, (2004); Jonathan Adler,
Dangerous Precaution, Nat'l Rev. Online (Sept. 13, 2002),
http://www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler091302.asp.
5. See Marko Ahteensuu, IN DUBIO PRO NATURA? A Philosophical Analysis of the
Precautionary Principle in Environmental and Health Risk Governance, 20 Rep. from the
Dept of Phil, University of Turku, Finland (2008) at 1, available at
https:/oa.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/38158/diss2008ahteensuu.pdfsequence= I; See
ROLANDO CASTRO, PROTECTION OF SEA TURTLES: PUTTING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICE, CARIBBEAN CONSERVATION CORPORATION (2005) (The civil
law precautionary principle is often referred to as "in dubio pro natura, a Roman law
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[T]he Precautionary Principle . . . entails a radical change in outlook: a reliance on
progress and a basically favourable attitude to technology are here replaced by a need for
caution. The principle of in dubio pro natura has been called into play: reversing the
burden of proof, it is up to those undertaking any activity likely to transform the
environment to demonstrate the absence of negative effects.
6
Thus, Congress can no longer ignore that "[t]he concept of the precautionary
principle is different in civil law and common law, which have different
approaches to the relationship between science and law. In the USA the regulation
is 'science-based,' meanwhile, in Europe the rule of science is determined through
a 'policy - related' way."
7
Pathways for external constituencies would consist, in part, of UNCLOS (and
its related Protocol) Secretariat-level treaty amendments, regulations and
resolutions incorporated within federal law by U.S. government agencies charged
with implementing the environmental and natural resource obligations that our
nation assumed upon acceding to UNCLOS Parts V, VII and XII. Such pathways
would also include compulsory and binding international tribunal decisions
resulting from legal actions initiated by foreign nations. Foreign nations will likely
challenge U.S. interpretation and implementation of its UNCLOS environmental
obligations as inconsistent with Europe's Precautionary Principle. And they will
insist that U.S. federal and state courts recognize and enforce those judgments,
consistent with our nation's accepted obligations under UNCLOS Part XV and
Annexes VI-VIII.
Pathways for internal constituencies would consist of proposed congressional
amendments to current federal environmental legislation, as well as federal
agency-initiated reinterpretations or amendments of current administrative
regulations. In addition, executive office directives may be used to secure
administrative amendments to or reinterpretations of current environmental
regulations, consistent with Europe's Precautionary Principle. Another such
principle for environmental protection that asserts that in case of doubt, any decision should
favour the protection of nature.")
http://www.cccturtle.org/pdf/PrecautionaryPrinciplelnCostaRicaTurtleBan.pdf.
6. See FRANCOIS OST, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN
EXCURSION BEYOND DESCARTES, FACULTtS UNIVERSITAIRES SAINT-LouIs, BRUXELLES,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE (Oct. 2001),
http://www.dhdi. free. fr/recherches/environnement/articles/ostenvlaw.pdf.
7. See MARIA VITTORIA LUMETTI, PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL
LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC SAFETY, (2006),
http://www.icems.eu/docs/Lumetti.pdf.
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pathway would include the use of executive office directives or congressional
action to ensure U.S. federal court recognition and enforcement of adverse foreign
tribunal judgments instructing the U.S. government to fulfill its UNCLOS
environmental law obligations, consistent with Europe's Precautionary Principle.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the issues concerning the
relationship between the UNCLOS, Europe's Precautionary Principle and
international environmental law. Part I1 discusses the external pathways. Part III
discusses the internal pathways. Part IV sets forth the article's conclusion and
surmises why the U.S. Congress has thus far failed to hold public and transparent
substantive hearings to examine the environmental dimensions of the UNCLOS.
B. Overview of the Issues
UNCLOS is a comprehensive framework agreement with 45 'self-adjusting'
environmental articles that reflect the current state of international environmental
law. Upon UNCLOS ratification, the U.S., as a coastal state, would be expected to
fulfill its international legal responsibility to protect the marine environment and
natural living resources against all pollution generated from land-based,
atmospheric, and ocean sources within U.S. jurisdiction and control. UNCLOS'
unique compulsory and binding dispute settlement mechanism would afford state
parties and the International Seabed Authority the opportunity to invoke UNCLOS
tribunal or arbitral jurisdiction to hear disputes grounded on the U.S. failure to
satisfy its UNCLOS environmental duties. UNCLOS tribunals and arbitral panels
could apply UNCLOS' environmental and natural resource provisions and the
rules, principles and standards of other relevant international environmental
treaties to compel the U.S. to adopt, implement and enforce strict environmental
and wildlife laws, regulations and practices that incorporate Europe's
Precautionary Principle.
Sometime during 2009, as newly confirmed U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton recently declared,8 President Barack Obama will have the dubious honor of
8. See Hillary Clinton, Senate Confirmation Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, JAN. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/l3/us/politics/I 3text-
clinton.html? r=l&pagewanted=print, ("MURKOWSKI: Will ratification of the Law of the
Sea Treaty be a priority for you? CLINTON: Yes, it will be, and it will be because it is long
overdue, Senator. The Law of the Sea Treaty is supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
environmental, energy, and business interests. I have spoken with some of our -- our naval
leaders, and they consider themselves to be somewhat disadvantaged by our not having
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submitting the UNCLOS to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) of
the 1 1 Ith Congress along with an accompanying resolution of accession. As
history strongly suggests, the treaty and resolution will likely receive favorable
committee consideration and then be forwarded to the floor of the full U.S. Senate
for a vote of accession. However, should this be permitted to occur without any of
the other House and Senate Committees possessing oversight jurisdiction 9 having
first convened open and transparent public hearings to substantively review the
environmental regulatory and judicial enforcement dimensions of this most
complex and comprehensive instrument?
Indeed, this is what had transpired from September to October 2007. The SFRC
of the I 1 0 th Congress held what can best be described as perfunctory UNCLOS
accession hearings, with administration officials and treaty proponents dominating
much of the 'air time' and their obscurantist testimonies receiving the most
minimal of examinations from Majority members.'° Following a favorable 17-4
outcome in the SFRC, the treaty was subsequently transferred to the full Senate for
become a party to the Law of the Sea.")
9. Arguably, given the sheer number and scope of UNCLOS environmental regulatory and
judicial enforcement provisions, their potential impact on court proceedings, interstate and
foreign commerce and military subcontractors, as well as, their potential to trigger new or
amended U.S. legislation and/or federal agency regulations, these provisions should be
reviewed by more than just the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In the Senate, by:
(1) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources; (2) the Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation; (3) the Committee on Intelligence; (4) the Committee on
Finance; (5) the Committee on Environment and Public Works; and (6) the Committee on
Judiciary. In the House, by: (1) the Committee on Energy; (2) the Committee on Foreign
Affairs; (3) the Committee on Intelligence; (4) the Committee on the Judiciary; (5) the
Committee on Natural Resources; (6) the Committee on Science; (7) the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure; and (8) the Committee on Ways and Means.
10. See, e.g., Senate Panel Approves 'Law of the Sea' Treaty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31,
2007), http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/31 /america/NA-GEN-US-Law-of-the-
Sea.php?WT.mc_id=rssamerica; Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senate Panel Backs Law of the
Sea Treaty, Reuters (Oct. 31, 2007),
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN31335584; See Vitter on Law of the Sea
Treaty. Part I , YouTube, (Republican Senators David Vitter (LA) and James DeMint (SC)
led the only penetrating cross examination during the October 7, 2007 hearings convened
by the Committee on Senate Foreign Relations to 'review' the UNCLOS),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dtv6eBZR I k&feature=related; Round 2: Vitter on Law
of the Sea Treaty, YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-lJ9YIqaFHZw&feature=channel; DeMint on Law of the
Sea Treaty: Part 1, YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v='OGrlzJfZhlo&feature=related; DeMint on Law of the
Sea Treaty: Part 2, YouTube,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h7LF6NyYkbM&feature=related.
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a floor vote, which ultimately never took place. Why? Because the SFRC and
other committees failed to heed many Americans' demands that the Congress hold
substantive public hearings. The treaty languished in the Senate during the
remainder of the 1 1 0 th Congress with the Majority unable to muster the 67 Senate
votes necessary to secure its passage."
Arguably, had the Congress chosen to undertake a due diligence review and
entertain an extensive public debate which "is written into the very structure of our
congressional system,"' 2 befitting its oath of office,' 3 and in fulfillment of its
constitutional obligation to provide all Americans with due process of law' 4 before
the UNCLOS had been voted on by the SFRC, Congress would have been able to
discover and explain the treaty's numerous environmental regulatory, enforcement
and revenue-raising provisions. Surely, such an investigation, which would have
also disclosed how new controls and imposts could be introduced to the general
public, was justified given the sheer length of the UNCLOS (over 200 pages) and
the multiple subject matters that it covers?
11. James Watkins, Admiral, Strange Bedfellows: The Law of the Sea and Its Stakeholders,
Statements at the Council on Foreign Relations Meeting (March 20, 2008),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/15813/strangebedfellows.html. ("We're still pounding on
Law of the Sea Convention and acceding to it. We are up seeing members of Congress, and
they all just shake their heads. And they say, we're not going to be able to get it to the floor,
because it won't pass. And the leader says, I need 75 votes. And so I hope one of the
questions tonight is, what can the council do?") (emphasis added).
12. Lee H. Hamilton, Debate Good for the System, THE WASHINGTON TIMES COMMENTARY
(Oct. 31, 2007),
http://www.washingtontimes.comi/article/2007103 I/COMMENTARY/110310012/1028/ele
ction.
13. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned...shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support the Constitution)"; United States Senate and
House of Representatives Oath of Office,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/OathOffice.htm (", (name
of Member), do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on
which I am about to enter. So help me God").
14. The obligation imposed on U.S. congressional representatives and senators to 'support the
U.S. Constitution' and its accompanying Bill of Rights serves to safeguard Americans
against the inclinations of a wanton and arbitrary U.S. government. Since the time-honored
notion of due process of law (comprising substantive and procedural rights) is found within
the penumbra of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Bill of Rights, senators'
failure to take such rights into account by heeding Americans' requests for thorough public
hearings to vet the UNCLOS is arguably tantamount to a violation of Americans' U.S.
constitutional rights.
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Interestingly, pre-2007 congressional hearing transcripts reveal that relatively
little examination and discussion were devoted to this aspect of the treaty. These
transcripts contained no discussion of the complex relationship between the
UNCLOS framework and the evolving and expanding dynamic body of
substantive and procedural international environmental law; the ability of other
treaty parties to utilize the unique UNCLOS dispute settlement mechanism to
ensure that the U.S. adopts, implements and enforces strict non-science-based
international environmental law rules, principles and standards at the U.S. national
and state levels premised on the European Precautionary Principle; or the efforts
by U.S. environmentalists to use UNCLOS accession as a legitimating cover to
secure long sought after substantive amendments to U.S. federal environmental
law (legislation, regulations and jurisprudence). To the contrary, prior hearings
focused primarily on the U.S. national security and the deep-sea mining
dimensions of the treaty:
The issues raised in the 1982-1994 period dealt primarily with the regime and international
organization associated with the deep seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. Much of
the debate during and since the October 2003 hearings related to more traditional law of
the sea topics. They included use of the military activities exemption in application of the
mandatory dispute settlement machinery; protection of U.S. security interests in the face of
current terrorist threats; delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles;
and a concern that continued absence by the United States in the bodies . . . The
International Seabed Authority and its Councils, the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Due to The
Complex Structure of the UNCLOS's Ocean Management Provisions . .. set up by the
Convention and Agreement will act negatively against the interests of the United States. 
15
The I 10 th Congress' failure to publicly evaluate the environmental regulatory
and judicial enforcement dimensions of UNCLOS is all the more curious in light
of the ongoing battle between the Republican and Democratic parties over the
growing intrusiveness of U.S. federal, state and local environmental laws and
regulations. 16
15. Marjorie Ann Browne, The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and the United States:
Developments Since October 2003, CRS Report For Congress #RS21890 (Updated Oct. 31.
2007) at p. CRS-2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21890.pdf (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Stephen Dinan and S.A. Miller, Democrats Abandon Drilling Ban, Washington
Times (Sept. 24, 2008) at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/24/democrats-
abandon-drilling-ban; The Coastal Zone Management Act, Nicholas Institute for
Environmental Policy Solutions website (6/24/08),
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/nioceans/dispatches/whats-the-coastal-zone-management-
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The flurry of environmental bills introduced and co-sponsored by the Majority
members of the 110th Congress, especially the omnibus oceans bill, is eerily
reminiscent of the environmental evangelism of congresses past. 7 Then, as now,
the ostensible goal of enlightened environmentalism has been to 'update' U.S.
federal environmental laws in order to ensure public health and safety and a
cleaner environment for American families; however, it has often been at the
expense of free enterprise and private property rights.'8 But what if, in today's era
act-czma; Harry Reid, The Failed Bush-Republican Environmental Record, Democratic
Caucus's Senate Journal (April 22, 2008),
http://democrats.senate.gov/journal/entry.cfm?id=296529; Adrienne Froelich Sponberg,
Republicans Wrangle over Environmental Legislation, Washington Watch American
Institute for Biological Sciences (July 2006), http://www.aibs.org/washington-
watch/washington watch 2006_07.html; Daily Mojo, Mother Jones (July 11, 2003),
http://www.motherjones.connews/dailymojo/2003/07/we 477 05.html; Clean Water Bill
May Lead to Massive Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction Say Committee GOP Leaders,
Press Release Office of John L. Mica, Ranking Republican, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure (July 17, 2007),
http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewslD= 199;
Republicans in Ohio Could Teach Capitol Hill a Lot About the Oceans - Voters believe U.S.
Congress responsible for protecting the Flipper and Friends, Oceana Press Release (June
29, 2006),
http://www.pollingcompany.com/cms/files/MMPA%2OPoll%2ONews%20Release%20NAT
IONAL%20FINAL.pdf; US Update on Western Land Grab, Planet Ark (Nov. 22, 2005),
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=1931; Joel Gay, Seeing Green, THE
NEW MEXICO INDEPENDENT (June, 2 2008),
http://newmexicoindependent.com/view/enviros-want-to-win; Paul D. Thacker, Hidden
ties: Big Environmental Changes Backed by Big Industry, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (March 8, 2006), http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/joumals/esthag-
w/2006/mar/policy/ptbigindustry.html; J.R. Pegg, U.S. House Votes to Lift Offshore Oil
Drilling Ban, Environmental News Service (June 30, 2006), http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/j un2006/2006-06-30- I 0.asp; Forrest Laws, Pombo Introduces Rewrite of
Endangered Species Act, Western Farm Press (Sept. 26 2005),
http://westernfarmpress.com/news/9-26-05-Pombo-Endangered-Species-Act; Pombo Bill
Would Rip the Heart Out of the Endangered Species Act - Thirty Years of Progress
Threatened by Industry Wish List Bill, SEA SHEPHERD NEWS (Sept. 22, 2005),
http://www.seashepherd.org/news/media_050922_2.html.
17. See NEPA and CAA Extension, 91 s r U.S. Cong. (1969-1971); MMPA and CZMA, 92"d
U.S. Congress (1971-1973); ESA, 93rd U.S. Congress (1973-1975); TSCA and MSFCMA,
941h U.S. Congress (1975-1977); CWA, 95 h U.S. Congress (1977-1979).
18. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Brazil's IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private Property Rights,
38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 103-113 (2006)(discussing the American conception of
property rights through the lens of constitutional guarantees and the idea of natural rights in
the context of intellectual property); Lawrence A. Kogan, Closing Address: U.S. Private
Property Rights Under International Assault, (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://prfamerica.org/speeches/ Oth/USPrivatePropertyRightsUnderlntlAssault.html;
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of globalization marked by increased cross-border travel, trade and investment, not
to mention political correctness and solidarity, the new congress' and
administration's calls to enlist the U.S. as a party to the UNCLOS and other related
multilateral environmental treaties are intended to serve the grander purpose of
facilitating greater global environmental governance?' 9 Does Washington truly
wish to be the groom at this bride's wedding before it closely examines the bride
and her family?
Apparently, the greater good served by global greenism was one of five key
selling points highlighted during the early- to mid-1990's to secure nations'
ratification of both the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1994 Implementing Agreement.
According to one legal scholar intimately behind this effort,
Global ratification would unite the nations of the world in the most comprehensive and
far-reaching treaty for protection of the global environment yet achieved, establishing a
clear and inexorable link between the rule of law in international affairs and the
preoccupation of people everywhere to ensure that their children inherit a safe and healthy
home... [and] global ratification would commit the nations of the world to accept the
submission to international arbitration or adjudication of most disputes arising under the
Law of the Sea Convention that are not settled by other means.
2
0
Can Do Without, supra note 2, 530-532, 598-604.
19. Kogan, The Extra- WTO Precautionary Principle: One European 'Fashion' Export The U.S.
Can Do Without, supra note 2 (What if such multilateral posturing masks a long term
transatlantic effort to establish a more communitarian global environmental regulatory
governance structure anchored by mostly interventionist national governments and
unaccountable UN and Brussels-based institutions steeped in civil law rather than common
law traditions, that mandate harmonization (arguably homogenization) and enforcement of
all national environmental and health laws consistent with universally accepted UN and EU
sustainable development principles, including Europe's Precautionary Principle?); Ken
Geiser, A Talk to the First National Conference on Precaution, Lowell Center for
Sustainable Production: Precaution in "Old Europe" and New America I (June 9, 2006),
http://www.chej.org/BESAFE/precconfproceedings/KenGeiserTalk I.pdf; John R.
Bolton, One world? Obama's on a Different Planet, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 26, 2008),
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-bolton26-2008ju126,0,4549608.story; J.
William Middendorf 11 and Lawrence A. Kogan, The 'LOST 45' UN Environmental
Restrictions on US. Sovereignty, ITSSD JOURNAL ON THE UN LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION (Sept. 2007), http://itssdjournalunclos-lost.blogspot.com/2008/0 I /itssd-
lost-45-un-environmental.html; see The Global Agenda 2009, World Economic Forum 29,
224, http://www.weforum.org/pdf/globalagenda.pdf, ("Global governance exemplifies
challenges to the sustainability of industrial society and the survival of the world's peoples.
In some areas effective solutions to address these challenges exist .... Existing institutions
and processes of global governance have not completely broken down: the Law of the Sea,
for example, has earned the acceptance and compliance of the major stakeholders").
20. See Bernard Oxman, The Rule of Law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
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Given the heavy hand of the U.N. Secretariat, the U.N. Secretary General's
Offices and the U.N. General Assembly in shaping, monitoring and reporting on
state practice in the implementation of the evolving UNCLOS legal regime,
including its many environmental provisions, protocols, regulations and
appendices,2' it is incumbent upon the Congress to elucidate whether the intention
all along was to bring U.S. national environmental legislation, rulemaking and
judicial enforcement under global auspices.
Evidently, a number of UNCLOS conferees were well aware at that time of the
emerging notion of the Precautionary Principle, at least as expressed within
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which had been discussed ad nauseum during
the1992 United Nations Rio Conference on Sustainable Development ("Earth
Summit"). In fact, it can now be confirmed that the UNCLOS was intended to tap
into the growing "'grass roots' environmental movement - the first truly global
political party''2 2 _ that had emerged from this Earth Summit. "The global
consciousness that, insofar as the environment is concerned, we are all affected by
what happens in remote parts of the globe . . . [which] is particularly strong with
respect to global environmental issues such as climate change and protection of the
marine environment . . . is [also] central to the idea of the rule of law in
international affairs. The link between strengthening the rule of law in
international affairs and strengthening the protection of the global environment is
inescapable. This fact is nowhere more apparent than in the Law of the Sea
Convention."
23
As previously noted, the Precautionary Principle is arguably the most
contentious of all the sustainable development principles that arose from the 1992
Rio Conference. Yet, the environmental activist community and many
academicians are committed to ensuring that the Majority of the 1 I th Congress
and members of the new Obama administration incorporate Europe's version of
the principle within an updated and amended corpus of U.S. federal environmental
Sea, 7 EUROJ INT LAW 353, at p. 355 (1996).
21. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Arctic Escapades: Can The Precautionary Principle Be Invoked
via UNCLOS to Undermine U.S. Polar Interests?, Address at the National Defense
University and Forces Transformation and Resources Seminar Transforming National
Security Unfrozen Treasures National Security, Climate Change and the Arctic Frontier
Laws of the Sea: Changing Air Land and Sea Routes, 175-179,
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/NCWcourse/Arctic%20Security/2OCompilation.pdf.
22. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 363-364 (emphasis added).
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law and regulations 24 incident to or following U.S. UNCLOS accession. 25 Given
the public pressures this constituency has imposed on government regulators and
policymakers, the Congress and the public must carefully monitor the President's
future administrator of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)'s
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).2 6 Although he is ostensibly
on record as opposing Europe's Precautionary Principle (much to the dismay of
environmentalists 27 ), he nevertheless has designs to redefine and employ it in
certain instances, along with an economic cost-benefit approach to risk regulation
that creatively utilizes psychological tools to generate less public resistance to new
rules.28 Additionally, despite being recognized as "one of the few intellectuals that
24. The environmental community that supported the candidacies of President Obama and the
new members of the congressional majority have developed a U.S. environmental law
paradigm shift report for the Obama administration's first 100 days in office. It contains a
'wish list' that not only details specifics for UNCLOS accession but also for adoption of
Europe's precautionary principle as U.S. law. See Transition to Green: Leading the Way to
a Healthy Environment, A Green Economy and a Sustainable Future, ENVIRONMENTAL
TRANSITION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (NOV.
2008), pp. 1-3, 1-10, 1-12 to 1-13, 9-28, 14-21 and 15-4 to 15-5,at:
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/citizensinterestpage/EnergylssuesAndPolicies/CommentsRece
ived2ndRequest/Sierra%20Club%20Attachment%2ONo.%202%20to%2012-01 -
08%20Comments.pdf.
25. See Hillary Clinton, supra note 8, (John Kerry: "Let me just say to you and to others
interested that we are already -- I have talked to Senator Lugar about this, and I've talked to
Senator Clinton about it. We will be -- we are now laying the groundwork for and expect to
try to take up the Law of the Sea Treaty. So that will be one of the priorities of -- of the
committee, and the key here is just timing, how we proceed.").
26. See Michael D. Shear, Obama to Name Lawyer Friend To Regulatory Affairs Position,
Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 2009, ( Document how President Obama has nominated Harvard Law
Professor Cass Sunstein as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) within the Executive Office of Management and Budget. "In his new
position, Sunstein will oversee reform of regulations, seeking to find smarter approaches
and better results in health, environment and other domestic areas"),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/07/AR200901070431 I.html.
27. See Aaron Lovell, Obama Regulatory Review Nominee Draws 'Groan' From Activists,
Risk Policy Report, Precaution.org. (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.precaution.org/lib/09/pmgroans for sunstein.090113.htm.
28. See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, at pp. 15 and 18
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) (illustrating that Although Professor Sunstein is on
record as being opposed to Europe's precautionary principle, he has indicated that he
believes there are limits to economic cost-benefit analysis and has expressed an interest in
refining the European Precautionary and incorporating an American version of it within
U.S. federal regulations),
http://books.google.com/books?id=C I IjGlk5 I NwC&dq=cass+sunstein+fear&printsec=fron
tcover&source=bl&ots=XlWvow8EZ&sig--4DXHisypwUekJrEmsSiPoCliZ7s&hl=en&sa
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embraces both a strong regulatory state and rigorous use of cost-benefit
analysis," 9 several academics have criticized his cost-benefit approach as masking
important cultural differences and opposing world views that are actually "the
product of an ongoing political debate about the ideal society., 3 °
Furthermore, as this article will show, many that served in prior congresses
seemed to favor the implied adoption of Europe's Precautionary Principle. 31 Even
today, many, including Senator John Kerry, new Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, remain convinced that since said principle has
already become a widely accepted general principle of international environmental
law, it should now be expressly incorporated within U.S. federal environmental
laws,32 notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement among legal experts. 3 3
=X&oi=book result&resnum=4&ct-result#; see also Abstract available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=721562; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The
Laws of Fear, U. CHIC. L. & ECON. No. 128, 33-35, (June 2001),
http://ssm.com/abstract=274190; Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Better
Choices - Libertarian Paternalism Gives You Options While Achieving Society's Goals, L.
A. Times (April 2, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-
thalerandsunstein2apr02,0,3730262.story; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser,
Overreaction to Fearsome Risks, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Number RWP08-
079 (Dec. 2008) 2, 12-13, http://ksgnotesi.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-
079/$File/rwp08 079_zeckhauser.pdf.
29. See Michael A. Livermore, Should Environmentalists Fear Cass Sunstein?, THE NEW
REPUBLIC VINE (Jan. 12, 2009)
http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/environmentandenergy/archive/2009/01/12/should-
environmentalists-fear-cass-sunstein.aspx.
30. Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1080-1083 at 1096, (2006)("Although
Sunstein purports to be reconciling risk regulation with 'deliberative democracy,' his
proposed regulatory reforms are neither particularly deliberative nor particularly
democratic. Sunstein's central prescription is to redirect risk regulation from 'highly
representative institutions' to 'more insulated' experts. Rather than try to inject
scientifically sound information into public discourse, government officials should
endeavor to '[cihange the subject' - 'to discuss something else' in order to divert public
attention away from 'facts that will predictably cause high levels of alarm' (pp. 123-25).
The cultural-evaluator model, in contrast, supports an approach to risk regulation that is
much more consistent with participatory and deliberative visions of democracy."),
http://ssm.com/abstract=801964.
31. See discussion infra.
32. See John Kerry, Teresa Heinz Kerry, This Moment on Earth: Today's New
Environmentalists and Their Vision for the Future (Public Affairs © 2007) at pp. 48-5 1, at
http://books.google.com/books?id=DSgVX-
5slEoC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq=john+kerry+%2B+precautionary+principle&source=bl
&ots=6GVyQtT2v&sig=4HZE-
X8owcW5uGWpKvYD66QJfu4&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book result&resnum=I &ct=result#PP
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Consequently, academics argue that the continuing international debate over the
applicability of the Precautionary Principle concerns only the specific elements
(different formulations) of it that are still being developed through state practice,
court decisions and treaty provisions, and not the 'superficial' (semantic)
distinction between an approach and a principle.34 Nevertheless, U.S. law has, for
approximately 25 years, employed mostly risk-based precaution, which more or
less balances environmental protection against other considerations, namely
empirical risk assessment and economic costs, while EU law, which employs
hazard-based precaution, does not. 35  In the view of one international legal
commentator, the Precautionary Principle:
sets an unprecedented low threshold for environmental action, by providing that merely
'reasonable grounds for concerns... [which introduces 'extremely subjective elements
into the definition of the precautionary principle'] ... of a hazard' suffice as a threshold
for action in comparison to 'threats of serious or irreversible damage' required by some
other formulations .... It is also worth noting that the precautionary principle is not
subject to cost-effectiveness.
36
In effect, whenever the Precautionary Approach (risk-based precaution)
A51,MI.
33. See, e.g., Rabbi Elamparo Deloso, The Precautionary Principle: Relevance in International
Law and Climate Change (Master's Thesis, Lund University Sweden Dec. 2005),
http://www.lumes.lu.se/database/alumni/04.05/theses/rabbideloso.pdf (citing the
longstanding debate among international law scholars over the status of the precautionary
principle as customary international law, and positing the author's own conclusions with
respect to climate change). Cf McGinnis, John 0., The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global
Multilateralism and Customary International Law: An Example from the WTO,
Northwestern Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-09 (2003),
http://ssm.com/abstract=421661 ("Some have suggested that the precautionary principle
can be used to supplement - indeed to override - otherwise applicable principles of the
WTO. But the process from which the WTO emerges has advantages over the customary
law process from which the precautionary principle emerges ... ").
34. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford, The Legacy of the Precautionary Principle In US. Law: The
Rise of Cost Benefit Analysis and Risk Assessment as Undermining Factors in Health,
Safety and Environmental Protection, (2007) 352-378, at 354-355,
http://web.mit.edu/ctpid/www/tl/docs/LegacyOfPrecaution_ 19.pdf.
35. Id. at 354, citing APPLEGATE, J. S. (2000) The Precautionary Preference: An American
Perspective on the Precautionary Principle in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT, vol. 6, no. 3, 413-443.
36. See SIMON MARR, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, (2003) at p.
61,
http://books.google.com/books?id=ynGLz I FqgvYC&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=unep+pre
cautionary+principle&source=web&ots=zGhHxtuwp4&sig=mdilegqklTpaKzqhPpVCoxS6
7Gc#PPA62,M 1.
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language appears within a multilateral environmental agreement, 37 the European
Union and its member states have simply read and interpreted it as if it were the
(hazard-based) Precautionary Principle.
38
Furthermore, transatlantic proponents of Europe's Precautionary Principle argue
that the debate over the Precautionary Principle has not merely been attributable to
the cultural differences between the American and European peoples per se, but
has also been a consequence of the successful political opposition led by the
former Bush administration and the powerful grassroots movement of the
conservative right.39 However, by demonizing the U.S. conservative movement
this objection fails to address the true source of its discontent - a traditional
distrust and disdain for big, centralized, interventionist and unaccountable
government, which is enshrined in U.S. law and shared generally by most
Americans.4 °
U.S. law reflects a traditional suspicion of government regulation, requiring extensive
factual records proving 'significant risks' to justify regulation aimed at protecting public
health from environmental contaminants. This fundamental norm of the U.S. legal culture,
sometimes called the 'principal of legality,' makes precautionary environmental health
regulation difficult because government must assemble a factual record to support its
actions . . . . When Europeans today call for decisions based on 'the precautionary
principle' in international forums, they are challenging a core premise of the American
37. Risk-based 'Precautionary Measures' language also appears in several such agreements
although it is frequently interpreted by European treaty parties consistent with Europe's
hazard-based Precautionary Principle.
38. See, e.g, Lawrence A. Kogan, World Trade Organization Biotech Decision Clarifies
Central Role of Science in Evaluating Health and Environmental Risks for Regulation
Purposes, 2 GLOBARL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J. 149, 153-155 (2007), available at
http://www.itssd.org/Publications/GTCJ_04-offprintsKogan%5B2%5D.pdf; Lawrence A.
Kogan, 'Unscientific' Precaution: Europe's Erection of New Foreign Trade Barriers,
National Foreign Trade Council, Washington Legal Foundation (Sept. 2003), 57-65,
http://www.itssd.org/White%20Papers/WLFKoganArticle2.pdf; Lawrence A. Kogan, The
Precautionary Principle and WTO Law: Divergent Views toward the Role of Science in
Accessing and Managing Risk, 77 SEATON HALL J. OF Dip. & INT'L REL. (Winter/ Spring,
2004), 90-92, available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v2 108747&lng=en&click53 = 108747&v33 = 1
06395&id=29789; The Precautionary Principle in the European Union & its Impact on
International Trade Relations, EurActiv.com (Oct. 24, 2002),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/environment/precautionary-principle-european-union-impact-
intemational-trade-relations/article- 110071.
39. See Ken Geiser, A Talk to the First National Conference on Precaution, Precaution in 'Old
Europe and New America, at 5-6
http://www.besafenet.comprec-conf-proceedings/Ken-Geiser-Talk I .pdf.
40. See discussion infra at 2-3.
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legal culture that requires an extensive factual record to justify government regulatory
action. U.S. tradition holds the deep belief that the risks of arbitrary government action
are so great that it is better to pay the costs of procedural delay and elaborate legality than
to run the risk of unjustified government actions.
4 1
These advocates ignore, at our nation's peril, the longstanding advantages of
inherent strength and stability of American individualism, and entrepreneurialism
and sovereignty at an extremely vulnerable and uncertain moment in history.
42
Indeed, the European Union and its member states have devoted considerable
time and effort to incorporating Precautionary Principle language in a number of
multilateral environmental agreements, bilateral, regional and multilateral trade
agreements and the national laws of its developing country trading partners.43
41. See Gail Chamley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and
Public Health Protection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10363, 10363-64 (2002), available at
http://www.healthriskstrategies.com/pdfs/rvp.pdf; See also Augustin Landier, David
Thesmar, & Mathias Thoenig, Comparative Capitalism - What Accounts for Europe's and
America's Different Attitudes Toward the Free Market?, STERN Bus. (Fall/Winter, 2007),
available at http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/sternbusiness/fall12007/comparativeCapitalism.html
("Compared with countries whose systems derive from French civic law, countries whose
systems derive from British common law have a stronger propensity to protect debtholders
and shareholders, have lower job protection, and facilitate entry by making business
creation easier. When we ran the numbers, we found that legal origin has a significant
impact. Notably, French legal origin was strongly related to competition aversion, and
British common law was related to a strong preference for owner control.")
42. See Edmund S. Phelps, Dynamic Capitalism - Entrepreneurship is Lucrative--and Just,
Opinion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2006) avaliable at
http://www.opinionjoumal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=l 10009068 (Comparing Anglo-
American entrepreneurial capitalism with European Continental social market capitalism.
"Several nations--including the U.S., Canada and the U.K--have a private-ownership
system marked by great openness to the implementation of new commercial ideas coming
from entrepreneurs, and by a pluralism of views among the financiers who select the ideas
to nurture by providing the capital and incentives necessary for their development.. This is
free enterprise, a k a capitalism. The other system--in Western Continental Europe--though
also based on private ownership, has been modified by the introduction of institutions
aimed at protecting the interests of "stakeholders" and "social partners.. .The system
operates to discourage changes such as relocations and the entry of new firms, and its
performance depends on established companies in cooperation with local and national
banks .... So different is this system that it has its own name: the 'social market economy'
in Germany, 'social democracy' in France and 'concertazione' in Italy.")
43. See Claudia Saladin, The LRTAP POPs Protocol and its Relevance to the Global POPs
Negotiations, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1999) at 6-8,
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/LRTAPPOPsProtocolGlobal.pdf; Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Persistent Organic Pollutants
and Amending Directives 79/117/EEC and 96/59/EC, COM (2003) 331, 2003/0119 (COD);
Clifton Curtis and Cynthia Palmer Olsen, New Stockholm Convention to Protect Wildlife
and People from POPs, World Wide Fund for Nature / World Wildlife Fund (WWF),
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Transatlanticists have also lent considerable conceptual and emotional support to
and have virtually laid the foundation for America's adoption of Europe's
Precautionary Principle as U.S. environmental law. 4 Consequently, U.S. political
leaders, policymakers and industry officials must quickly acquire a greater
intellectual understanding of the legal and political significance of this principle, a
deep pragmatic appreciation for the likely economic and technological
consequences of adopting it,45 and a healthy skepticism toward the almost faith-
based reliance on U.S. UNCLOS accession to reestablish America as a global
environmental citizen46 that embraces Europe's Precautionary Principle as a central
tenet of both U.S. and international law.
Considering that UNCLOS "establishes unqualified obligations for all states to
protect and preserve the entire marine environment, subject to compulsory binding
dispute settlement, '47 and might "one day become a mechanism to confront
climate change ...[because of] its broad definition of pollution to the marine
environment, '48 the Congress' failure to adequately vet what is perhaps "the most
comprehensive and progressive international environmental law of any modem
international agreement,, 49 potentially places U.S. national sovereignty and U.S.
Wash. DC (2002), cited in Sustainable Development International, p. 155; Kogan, The
Precautionary Principle and WTO Law: Divergent Views toward the Role of Science in
Accessing and Managing Risk, supra note 38 at pp. 93-95; Kogan, 'Unscientific'
Precaution: Europe's Erection of New Foreign Trade Barriers, supra note 38; Lawrence A.
Kogan, Looking Behind the Curtain: The Growth of Trade Barriers that Ignore Sound
Science, National Foreign Trade Council, Inc (Wash., DC, May 2003)
http://www.wto.org/englishforums-e/ngo_e/posp47_nftc lookingbehinde.pdf,
44. Kogan, supra note 2.
45. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Precaution: How Europe's Risk-Free Regulatory
Agenda Threatens American Free Enterprise, Washington Legal Foundation Monograph
(Nov. 2005), 17-35, 75-80 available at www.wlf.org/upload/ll0405MONOKogan.pdf;
Precautionary Preference: How Europe Employs Disguised Regulatory Protectionism to
Weaken American Free Enterprise, 7 INT'L J. ECON. DEV. (Dec. 2005), 2-3, 211-222, 241-
291, available at www.spaef.com/lJEDPUB/index.html.
46. See Obama Seeks Stronger Europe Ties, BBC News (July 25, 2008)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7522738.stm.
47. See Senate Executive Report 108-10, 10 8"h Cong. (March 11, 2004) at 166-168 ("Prepared
Statement of World Wildlife Fund, Brooks B. Yeager, Vice President, Global Threats
Program"), http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/UNCLOS-Sen-Exec-Rpt- 108-10.pdf.
48. See William C. G. Bums, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in
International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, INT'L J. OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 27-51 ( 2006) at pp. 1 and 50-51,
http://policy.miis.edu/programs/BumsFT.pdf.
49. See Tim Stephens, The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in International
Environmental Law, University of Sidney eScholarship Repository (2005) citing Patricia
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national security at risk.
As the most directly accountable representative political body of the American
people, the U.S. Congress bears the unique constitutional burden and responsibility
of ensuring that the international treaties it recommends to the President for
accession or ratification do not subsequently impair U.S. national interests or
citizen rights. In the case of UNCLOS, the many committees of Congress should
pose and answer at least the following questions: How extensive are the
UNCLOS' environmental regulatory provisions and how could the legal norms
they incorporate apply within U.S. sovereign borders? Is any form of the
Precautionary Principle present, in letter and/or spirit, within the broad UNCLOS
legal framework? How could UNCLOS ratification be used to herald Europe's
Precautionary Principle as U.S. law? Is the UNCLOS really an environmental
"Trojan Horse"? 50
II. EXTERNAL PATHWAYS TO U.S. ADOPTION OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE VIA THE UNCLOS
A. The Comprehensive UNCLOS Legal Framework Subdivides the Oceans into
Distinct Zones of Functional as Well as Territorial Jurisdiction and Control
The UNCLOS legal framework subdivides the oceans into five distinct legal
zones of jurisdiction and control (high seas; exclusive economic zone (EEZ);
continental shelf; contiguous zone; and territorial sea). Each of the UNCLOS
zones vests coastal and flag state nations with legally specified freedoms and
obligations. UNCLOS recognizes the existence of six freedoms on the high seas
that are beyond national control.
51
Within the EEZ, which can extend outward 200 nautical miles from the
W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2d Ed. 2002) 348 at
36,
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/706/2/adt-NU20060309.02243102whole.pdf,
Jonathan 1. Charney, 'The Marine Environment and the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1994), 28 International Lawyer 879,882.
50. See Doug Bandow, LOST Crosscurrents, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (July 27, 2008),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jul27/lost-crosscurrents.
51. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87(l)(a)-(f, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397) (recognizing six freedoms in the high seas: "(a) freedom of navigation, (b)
freedom of overflight, (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines , (d) freedom to
construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, (e)
freedom of fishing, [and] (f) freedom of scientific research") [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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coastline,52 coastal nations may exercise sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage natural living and nonliving resources in the waters, seabed
and subsoil, to oversee marine research and to exploit the EEZ economically. 53 As
concerns the continental shelf, the UNCLOS departs from the general definition
provided by geologists: the continental margin between the shoreline and the shelf
break or, where there is no noticeable slope, between the shoreline and the point
where the depth of the superjacent water is approximately between 100 and 200
metres." 54 Instead, it sets forth a juridical definition: it extends from the shoreline
"through 'the natural prolongation of a coastal state's land territory to the outer
edge of the continental margin, or [generally] a distance of 200 miles' 55 (unless it
can establish via scientific evidence that it extends beyond 200 miles).56 Coastal
nations hold "'the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling for all
purposes, 57 subject to the rights of other nations to lay cables and pipes over the
shelf."' 58 Within the contiguous zone, which extends up to 24 miles from shore,59
coastal states may "enforce laws relating to activities in the territorial sea."60 And
within the territorial sea extending up to 12 miles from shore, coastal states are
vested with total sovereignty "over the waters, airspace, seabed and subsoil therein,
subject to peaceful ship's right of 'innocent passage. ' ' 6 1
Chief among coastal and flag state responsibilities is the self-adjusting legal
duty to protect and preserve the marine environment, which effectively qualifies
and conditions the right to freedom of navigation. All nations, but especially
coastal states, have a comprehensive legal duty to individually and jointly protect
and preserve the marine environment by adopting, implementing and enforcing
laws and policies domestically that ensure against marine pollution arising from
52. See Id. art. 55, 57.
53. See Id. art. 56(l).
54. See The Definition of the Continental Shef and Criteria for the Establishment of its Outer
Limits, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) - The Continental Shelf,
United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea website,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs new/continental_shelfdescription.htm.
55. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 76.
56. See Id. art. 76(4)(4)-(6); Id., Annex 11, art. 4-7.
57. See Id. art. 81, 77(I)-(2).
58. See Id. art.79(2).
59. See Id. art. 33(2).
60. See Id. art. 33(I).
61. See Id. art. 2; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Sustaining the Unknown Seas: Changes in U.S.
Ocean Policy and Regulation Since Rio '92, at 10193, (citing UNCLOS Articles),
http://papers.ssm.consol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=922508.
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any and all sources within their sovereign jurisdiction and control. UNCLOS also
recognizes and upholds the legal obligations imposed by all other international
agreements regarding protection of the marine environment.
62
The imposition on coastal states of such a broad and comprehensive legal duty
is substantiated by various United Nations findings that marine pollution is
generated primarily from land-based sources. According to one study, 82% of all
marine pollution load (by mass) are derived from land-based sources, including
sewage outfalls, industrial discharges, urban storm water and agricultural runoff,
river borne and airborne pollution, litter and even vehicle emissions. 63 Another
study concluded that "land-based pollution" accounts for approximately 70% of all
marine pollution, and it defines 'land-based pollution' as "pollution of maritime
zones due to discharges by coastal establishments or coming from any other source
situated on land or artificial structures, including pollution transported from rivers
to the sea. '64 A third study laments that "some 80 percent of the pollution load in
the oceans originates from land-based activities, includ[ing] municipal, industrial
and agricultural wastes and runoff, as well as atmospheric deposition. 65
Consistent therewith, the UNCLOS oceans zoning framework recognizes that
coastal states, including the U.S., bear total legal responsibility for arresting and
otherwise preventing in advance all land-based sources of marine pollution. This
includes pollution generated from a coastal state's physical landmass, internal and
ocean waters and the atmosphere above, over which it is deemed to possess and
expected to exercise, complete sovereignty and control.66
Sovereignty, however, is viewed today as being multi-dimensional (more than
territorial)67 and can be complex in the case of the United States, given its
62. Robin Kundis Craig, Sustaining the Unknown Seas: Changes in U.S. Ocean Policy and
Regulation Since Rio '92, at 10194.
63. See Lal Krukulasuriya and Nicholas A. Robinson, Training Manual on International
Environmental Law, United Nations Environment Programme (2005) 147 at par. 7, and 150
at par. 21, http://www.unep.org/law/PDF/lawtrainingManual.pdf.
64. Dinah Shelton and Alexandre Kiss, Judicial Handbook on Environmental Law, United
Nations Environment Programme (2005) at pp. 71-72,
http://www.unep.org/law/PDF/JUDICIALHBOOK ENV_LAW.pdf.
65. The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-
Based Activities, United Nations Environment Program, http://www.gpa.unep.org.
66. See Oxman, supra note 20 at 835.
67. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY, (Princeton University
Press, 1999) at 3-4, 10,
http://books.google.com/books?id=TkrfTZlyUogC&dq=Sovereignty:+Organized+Hypocris
y&pg=PP I &ots=Q5qrjlElbP&sig=SyAKEtz6cbVD3dsSsMhWiZq5EAO&hl=en&sa-X&oi
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68federalist system. It is also widely acknowledged that traditional notions of
national sovereignty are being eroded by globalization 69 and rendering once
independent nation-states more susceptible to foreign state or even international
organizational influences as the consequence of entering into binding international
treaty commitments. 70 For example:
international [treaty] commitments that concern [a state's] internal affairs [can not only]
directly violate its sovereignty [but] can also imply further indirect violations of...
sovereignty [such that I... government decisions that are not the subject of international
negotiation are nevertheless distorted away from the... domestic ... decisions that would
normally have been made."
7 1
This becomes all the more apparent if one considers the notion of sovereignty in
more modern terms of functionality.
Functional sovereignty ... distinguishes jurisdiction over specific uses from sovereignty
over geographic space. . . This would permit the interweaving of national jurisdiction and
international competencies within the same territorial space and open the possibility of
applying the concept of 'common heritage of mankind' both beyond and within the limits
of national jurisdiction.
72
In effect, it would be possible for the U.S. to claim that its domestic
environmental laws, customs and norms premised on scientific risk assessment and
economic cost-benefit analysis apply without limitation within each of the various
=book result&resnum= 1 &ct=result.
68. Craig, supra note 62 ("[T]he U.S. system of federalism divides regulatory power between
the federal government and the 50 state governments, and this division of regulatory
authority extends to the oceans. The history of ocean regulatory authority in the United
States is convoluted").
69. See Krasner, supra note 67 at 12; Robert J. Samuelson, Globalization's Achilles Heel,
NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2008) at 53, http://www.newsweek.com/id/145864 (noting how the
"[c]onnections among countries have deepened and become more contradictory . . .
[c]ountries are growing more economically interdependent and politically more
nationalistic. This is a combustible combination").
70. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, National Sovereignty in an Interdependent World,
(Aug. 2004) at 3,
http://www.stanford.edu/-rstaiger/sovereignty. I22903.revisioncopy.082304.pdf.
71. Id. at4.
72. See Jan Tinbergen, RIO (Reshaping the International Order)(1976) at 172; See also, Brent
Jessop, 'Functional' Sovereignty and the Common Heritage of Mankind - Reshaping the
International Order Part 3 (April 21, 2008) (citing the Club of Rome's Report to the UN),
http://www.knowledgedrivenrevolution.com/Articles/200804/2008042 I_RIO_3_Common.
htm.; Oxman, supra note 20, at 836, ("Three zones of functional jurisdiction extend
seaward from the outer limit of the territorial sea, and therefore overlap to some extent: the
contiguous zone ... the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) ... and the continental shelf").
What Goes Around Comes Around
ocean zones established by the UNCLOS. 73  Yet, it would also be possible,
simultaneously, for its interpretation, implementation and enforcement of those
laws, customs and norms (i.e., its risk-based Precautionary Approach) to be
influenced and/or challenged by a competing hazard-based interpretation applied
within the same legal and physical space by other UNCLOS parties - namely those
from Europe - and perhaps even by like-minded U.N. arbitral, tribunal and
secretariat bodies. As a matter of logic, such a scenario would necessarily entail
competing UNCLOS Party interpretations of the term "high seas.
' 74
The U.S. Navy encountered this issue in the case of Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Department of the Navy.75 In that case, "the court and all parties agreed
that [U.S. Endangered Species Act] jurisdiction extends [through the U.S. EEZ and
the high seas] to at least the foreign exclusive economic zone." One legal
commentator has referred to this decision as significant because it implies that the
U.S. recognizes how different law applies in the U.S. exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), on the high seas and within foreign EEZs. 76 It thus acknowledges the
potential for these different laws to be in conflict with each other on the high seas,
as well as at points where there are overlapping state EEZs or opposite or adjacent
coasts. 77
73. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1333, ("SEC. 4. LAWS APPLICABLE TO
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF.- (a)(l) The Constitution and laws and civil and
political jurisdiction of the United States are hereby extended to the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed which may be erected thereon
for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such
installation or other device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such
resources, to the same extent as if the outer Continental shelf were an area of exclusive
Federal jurisdiction located within a state")(emphasis added),
http://epw.senate.gov/ocsla.pdf.
74. See Keith S. Gibel, Defined by the Law of the Sea: 'High Seas' in the Marine Mammal
Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, 54 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 1, 26-27 (2007),
http://www.jag.navy.mil/FieldOffices/NJS3Courses.htm.
75. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Department of the Navy, No. CV-01-07781 CAS
(RZx), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26360 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002).
76. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 2, 15, 47, 51, 53, 55, 63, 74, 83.
77. Gibel, supra note 74 at 26-27 ("[T]he court's recognition of U.S. sovereign control in its
EEZ evidences implicit U.S. recognition of the difference between the EEZ and high seas
for all sovereign States in the natural resource context. Once again, if the United States has
control over the natural resources in its EEZ, then other countries have the same authority in
their EEZs. Because the United States has sovereign rights to regulate within its EEZ, it is
not difficult to conceive why the ESA and the MMPA would apply in the U.S. EEZ. Due to
a conflict with foreign sovereign rights, however, it is not necessarily easy to understand
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The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Charming Betsy78 and The Paquete
Habana7 9 also recognize the potential for conflicting laws operating within the
same jurisdictional space. These cases hold: (1) "an Act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains" 80; and (2) "[Customary] International law is part of our law" subject, of
course, to the caveat that this rule is only given effect where there is no "treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision. ' 82 According to one
legal commentator, "this understanding of customary international law suggests..
. that the President, as well as Congress, may override a customary international
law obligation as a matter of domestic law." 83 This rule of statutory interpretation
has since been incorporated within U.S. foreign relations law. 84 Thus, it would
seem that the U.S. government would be required to interpret the Endangered
Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and other U.S.
environmental statutes within these 'zones' not inconsistent with prevailing
international treaty or customary international law and practice (e.g., Europe's
Precautionary Principle), irrespective of the U.S. government's application of a
Precautionary Approach for domestic law purposes.85
The UNCLOS protocol known as the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement
(MFSA) 86 also engenders the ethic reflected in these two U.S. Supreme Court
why the ESA and the MMPA would apply in a FEEZ. While a FEEZ is not the sovereign
territory of a State, it is within the rights of a foreign sovereign to regulate that area. This
explains why we can have different answers concerning the applicability of the two statutes
in the EEZ: the MMPA and the ESA apply in the U.S. EEZ due to U.S. control over natural
resources and the statutes don't apply in the FEEZ due to foreign control over natural
resources.").
78. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
79. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
80. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
82. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
83. See Julian Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (2006) at 143, http://ssm.com/abstract=879237.
84. Id. at 47; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114
(2005)("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict
with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.").
85. See discussion infra about the enforceability of UNCLOS Annex VI, Article 39 ITLOS
Seabed Dispute Chamber Decisions.
86. See AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER
1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS, UN G. A.
A/CONF. 164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995),
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decisions. It well recognizes the potential for a conflict between the national
conservation and management laws applicable to fish stocks within a coastal
state's EEZ and analogous laws applicable on the high seas within the global
commons. For example, it encourages UNCLOS parties to work together to
harmonize their laws, first amongst themselves and then with the laws of the
commons. MFSA Article 7(2)(a) provides that "[c]onservation and management
measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national
jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management
of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety."87
A third potential conflict scenario may arise over the future treatment of marine
genetic resources located within the U.S. EEZ and the global commons. For
example, during a 2006 meeting of a UN General Assembly Working Group on
marine biological diversity, the "EU had proposed a new UNCLOS
implementation agreement" on fisheries to control deep sea bottom trawling
activities "and the creation of marine protected areas, invoking the Precautionary
Principle" to ensure "the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction." Not unexpectedly, the U.S. and
Japan had strenuously objected.88 The disagreement reflected the apparently
different regional and national conceptions of how the benefits of marine genetic
resources should be shared with developing countries. Whereas Europe called for
the expanded jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority over the global
commons and new international regulations to protect such resources as the
common heritage of mankind, the U.S. and Japan argued that such resources
should instead fall subject to the freedom of the high seas principle.89
International law experts have characterized the possibility of distinct and
competing national and regional laws crossing and influencing otherwise distinct
sovereign spaces as "creeping jurisdiction." 90 It may also occur in reverse (i.e.,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdf?OpenElement
87. Id. art. 7(2)(a) (emphasis added).
88. See Legal Status of Marine Genetic Resources in Question, BRIDGES TRADE BIORES VOL.
6, NO. 4 (March 3, 2006) http://www.ictsd.org/biores/06-03-03/inbrief.htm.
89. Id.
90. Erik Francxk, The 200 Mile Limit: Between Creeping Jurisdiction and Creeping Common
Heritage?, 39 George Washington Law Review 3, p. 467-498 (2007) ("The EEZ grants
specific sovereign rights and jurisdiction to the coastal State and is today usually
categorized as a sui generis zone (not to be assimilated with the well-known concepts of the
territorial sea or the high seas."), http://www.allbusiness.com/environment-natural-
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"creeping common heritage") in the event the interests of the international
community,9' as represented by the International Seabed Authority (ISBA), 92
become more proactive and are reflected within more stringent environmental
regulations based on Europe's Precautionary Principle, that are adopted and
enforced in and around the Area. 93 This is made all the more possible because of
the ISBA's legal capacity, 94 and its ability to sue or respond to suit in order to
enforce UNCLOS party compliance with its regulations at an UNCLOS tribunal.95
B. There is a Complex Interrelationship Between the UNCLOS Framework
and International Environmental Law, Including Europe's Precautionary
Principle
Legal commentators generally agree that the 1982 UNCLOS oceans
management framework served as a source of inspiration for a number of
international environmental agreements and voluntary initiatives, including the
resources/ecology-environmental/8896189-I .html;
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa5433/is 200705/ai n25137635/pg_4.
91. Id. ("Creeping can be carried out either by the coastal State, in which case the widely used
term 'creeping jurisdiction' is normally relied upon, or by the international community, a
process referred to by the term 'creeping common heritage.' Creeping jurisdiction can
further be subdivided into creeping 'qualitatively' inside the 200mile limit and spatially
beyond that limit.").
92. The International Sea-Bed Authority was established under Article 156 of the UNCLOS Ill.
93. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 145; See also ISA Council Begins Substantive Work on
Draft Regulations On Sulphides, INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY PRESS RELEASE
SB/13/5 (July 10, 2007) http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Press/Press2007/SB- 13-
5.pdf; IUCN (2004) TEN- YEAR HIGH SEAS MARINE PROTECTED AREA STRATEGY. A
Ten-year Strategy to Promote the Development of a Global Representative System of High
Seas Marine Protected Area Networks, Executive Summary (Sept. 2003), Toolbox I at 13,
http://www.iucn.org/THEMES/MARINE/pdf/10-
Year HSMPA_StrategySummaryVersion.pdf; Ambassador Satya N. Nandan, Secretary
General of the Int'l Seabed Authority, Benthic Biodiversity and the Work of the
International Seabed Authority, Statement to the 5Ih meeting of the United Nations Informal
Consultative Process on the Law of the Sea (June 7-11, 2004) at I, citing Regulation 31(3),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultativeprocess/documents/5s nandan.pdf.
94. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 176 (giving the International Seabed Authority (ISBA)
legal personality and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulfillment of its purposes").
95. Article 3, Legal Personality of the Authority, Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of
the International Seabed Authority (opened for signature Aug. 28, 1998) ("The Authority
shall possess legal personality. It shall have the legal capacity: (a) to contract; (b) to acquire
and dispose of immovable and movable property; (c) to be a party in legal proceedings")
http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/seabed2_eng.htm.
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nonbinding 1985 Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine
Environment Against Pollution from Land-Based Sources.96  These voluntary
guidelines spoke of the need for coastal states to harmonize their domestic
environmental laws with the rules of bilateral, regional and multilateral
environmental conventions to address land-based sources of pollution.
97
Because the Montreal guidelines were later found at the 1992 Rio Summit on
Sustainable Development to be inadequate since "control of land-based sources of
marine pollution [had been] failing," Governments looked instead to UNEP's more
detailed Agenda 2198 as providing the necessary basis for an update of the
Montreal Guidelines "drawn from international agreements such as the UN Law of
the Sea Convention.""
The Rio Conference also revealed the quite extensive and interdependent
relationship between the UNEP's Agenda 21 and the UNCLOS.
International law recognizing coastal nations' jurisdiction over the ocean and its resources
is an important precedent to sustainable development, particularly in light of the historical
tradition of freedom of the seas. For this international regulatory structure, Chapter 17
depends heavily upon the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS I1), which came into force on November 16, 1994 ... [Indeed,] UNCLOS Ill
provides a foundation for Chapter 17 of Agenda 21.100
[T]he United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets out the legal
framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out. Chapter
17 of Agenda 21, adopted in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, remains the fundamental programme of action for achieving sustainable
development in respect of oceans and seas. 1
0 1
96. See Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution
from Land-Based Sources, Decision 13/18/11 of the Governing Council of UNEP (May 24,
1985), http://www.unep.org/law/PDF/UNEPEnv-LawGuide&PrincNO7.pdf.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3 - 14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, (paragraph if there is one), U.N. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.
I)(Aug. 12, 1992) available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl5l/aconfl5l26-
lannexl.htm and Conference on Environment and Development, June 3 - 14, 1992,
Statements of Principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests, U.N. A/CONF. 151/26
(Vol.111)(Aug. 14, 1992) available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/aconfl5126-3annex3.htm [collectively, "Agenda
21].
99. See Krukulasuriya & Robinson, supra note 63 at 150 para. 22.
100. See Craig, supra note 63 at 10193-94 (emphasis added).
101. See United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of
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In effect, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 became the primary roadmap for achieving
the environmental objectives of the UNCLOS.
Three years later, in 1995, world leaders adopted the Washington Declaration
on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. This
political declaration articulated an intergovernmental action plan ("Global Program
of Action") that called for better management of land-based sources of marine
pollution internationally, regionally and nationally.'0 2 Interestingly, the Global
Program of Action more broadly defined the phrase "marine environment"' 3 and
more closely related the international legal obligation to prevent, control and
reduce land-based sources of marine pollution at the national, regional and
international levels to achieving sustainable development via the application of
Europe's Precautionary Principle. t'
Thus, commentators have since had good reason to conclude that the hazard-
based Precautionary Principle is integral to maintaining the close relationship
between the UNCLOS oceans management framework and the U.N. Agenda 21
Chapter 17, which builds upon it. As one commentator has emphasized,
Agenda 21 . . . Chapter 17['s] . . . overall goal is to develop 'new approaches to marine
and coastal areas management and development, at the national, sub regional, regional,
and global levels. .that are integrated in content and are precautionary and anticipatory in
ambit' - i.e, to transform countries' use of oceans and seas into a precautionary
approach. If successfully applied to ocean resources, the precautionary approach would
be a profound shift in historical paradigms ... To achieve an international precautionary
approach to and sustainable use of the oceans and seas, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 outlines
seven programs, the first four of which are the most applicable to the United States. '
05
This close interrelationship was confirmed more recently during the 2006
UNEP review of governments' implementation of the Global Program of Action,
which was then reported in the Beijing Declaration. This declaration set forth an
ambitious timetable (2007-2011) within which nations would commit to further
implement the Global Plan of Action by, among other things, "applying ecosystem
the Sea, (Background)
http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative-process/consultative-process-background.htm
(emphasis added).
102. See Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities (Nov. I, 1995) at 1,
http://www.gpa.unep.org/documents/washingtondeclaration_english.pdf.
103. See discussion infra.
104. Id. at 7-8 para. 4-5, 9.
105. See Craig, supra note 64 at 10191-10192.
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approaches" and "mainstreaming the Global Programme of Action into national
development planning and budgetary mechanisms."' 10 6 Such commitments were to
be undertaken in the manner "set forth in the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation,"' 0 7 which had called for "[inviting] States to ratify or accede to
and-implement the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 [and
for] [p]romot[ing] the implementation of chapter 17 of Agenda 21 ... [within
States'] coastal areas and exclusive economic zones."' 1 8 The Johannesburg plan
also called for "[improving] policy and decision-making at all levels through ..
.[p]romot[ing] and improv[ing] science-based decision-making and reaffirm[ing]
the precautionary approach as set out in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration." 109
Not surprisingly, the U.S. had previously assumed a leadership role in each of
these initiatives during the two Clinton Administrations, which had accepted the
UNCLOS framework as the definitive instrument that should inform U.S. oceans
and environmental policy." 0
The close relationship between the UNCLOS and UNEP's Agenda 21 was once
again declared in an even more recent March 2008 United Nations General
Assembly resolution. Resolution 62/215 reaffirmed "the universal and unified
character" of the UNCLOS, as well as its "strategic importance as the legal
framework within which all oceans and seas activities must be carried out" and as
"the basis for national regional and global action and cooperation in the marine
106. See Beijing Declaration on furthering the implementation of the Global Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities, United
Nations Environment Program (2006) at pars. 2, 7,
http://www.mep.gov.cn/ztbd/hyhj/sch/200702/P020070212302633511528.pdf.
107. Id at para. 8-9.
108. Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(Sept. 4, 2002), at para. 30(a)-(b),
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POPD/English/WSSDPlanlmpl.pdf.
109. Id at para. 109(f) (emphasis added).
110. See United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Implementation of Agenda
21: Review of Progress Made Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 1992: United States of America - AGENDA 21 CHAPTER 17:
PROTECTION OF THE OCEANS, ALL KINDS OF SEAS, INCLUDING ENCLOSED
AND SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS, AND COASTAL AREAS AND THE PROTECTION,
RATIONAL USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR LIVING RESOURCES (Apr. 7-25,
1997), http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/usa-cp.htm (emphasis added); See also Fact
Sheet. US. Oceans Policy and the Law of the Sea Convention, Released by the Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (May 28, 1998),
http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oecans/fs-oceanslos.html .
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sector"' ' ' It also reemphasized the need for all nations "to harmonize . . . their
national legislation with the provisions of the Convention... and to ensure... that
any declarations or statements.., made.., when signing, ratifying or acceding to
the Convention do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of its
provisions ... in their application to the State concerned .... ,,12 Is it possible
that the General Assembly might have been referring to the United States?
Beyond its close relationship with UNEP's Agenda 21, which emerged during
the 1992 Earth Summit, the provisions of UNCLOS Part XII also arguably reflect
environmental policy objectives that were in common with numerous other
regional and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) developed during an
earlier era. From 1972''"- 1992,'14 the world had witnessed the negotiation of
many multilateral treaties calling for the increased regulation of the environment.
In fact, as many as 302 separate but overlapping MEAs were drawn up during this
era, many of which ("197, or nearly 70%") are regional rather than global in
scope. 1 15
I1l. See U.N. General Assembly Res. A/RES/62/215, Oceans and the Law of the Sea (March
14, 2008), Preamble, para. 5,
http://www.ioc-
unesco.org/hab/components/comoe/oe.php?task=download&id=4023&version= 1.0&lang=
l&format= ; Id., at par. 95, (calling also for "States to implement the Global Programme of
Action ... and to take all appropriate measures to fulfill the commitments ... embodied in
the Beijing Declaration").
111. See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, United
Nations Environment Program website
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticlelD= 15
03 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
II 3. See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, United
Nations Environment Program website
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticlelD= 15
03.
114. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (1992),
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html; Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, United Nations Environment Program website,
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD= 11
63.
115. See International Environmental Governance: Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs) - Status of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, UNEP/IGM/I/INF/3 (April 6,
2001), presented at the Meeting of Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers or
their Representatives on Int'l Envir. Governance. (April 18, 2001) apars. 9-11,
http://www.ramsar.org/keyunepgovernancel.htm; See also Linda Nowlan and Chris
Rolfe, Kyoto, POPS and Straddling Stocks: Understanding Environmental Treaties, WEST
COAST ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jan. 2003) at 16
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These MEAs are viewed as falling within two general categories. The first
category consists of core environmental conventions and related international
agreements. They are themselves divided into five clusters: (1) the biodiversity-
related conventions," 6  (2) the atmosphere conventions, 17  (3) the land
conventions,' 18 (4) the chemicals and hazardous wastes conventions,'' 9 and (5) the
regional seas conventions and related agreements."' 20  According to UN
authorities, the second category of MEAs consists of "[o]ther Global Conventions
Relevant to the Environment, including Regional Conventions of Global
Significance,"' 2' to which the 1982 UNCLOS belongs.' 22  Both UN and
http://www.wcel.org/wcelpub/2003/13929.pdf.
116. Id. para. 18, ("The scope of the biodiversity-related conventions ranges from the
conservation of individual species (CITES and the Lusaka Agreement) via conservation of
species, their migration routes and their habitats (CMS, AEWA, EUROBATS,
ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS and various MOUs) to the protection of ecosystems (CBD, the
Ramsar Convention, the World Heritage Convention and the International Coral Reef
Initiative-- ICRI)").
117. Id. para. 19 ("The Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol are closely associated in
protecting the environment by eliminating or stabilizing anthropogenic emissions that
threaten to interfere with the atmosphere"); Craig, supra note 63 at 10192 ("[Agenda 21,]
Chapter 17's fifth program addresses climate change. It is worth emphasizing, however,
that oceans are particularly vulnerable to two types of climate change: global wanning and
ozone depletion.").
118. Id. para. 20.
119. Id. para. 21.
120. Id. para. 22-23 (Showing a strong interrelationship between the global mosaic of regional
seas conventions and actions plans, the chemicals-related conventions, and the biodiversity-
related conventions in particular "Table I - Core Environmental Conventions and Related
Agreements of Global Significance").
121. Id. para. 14.
122. Mark Drumbl, Actors and Law-Making in International Environmental Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at 18 (Ong & Fitzmaurice,
eds.)(2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022363. ("Major MEAs can be divided
into two groups: first generation and second generation. First generation MEAs focus on
issues such as air and water pollution, wildlife conservation, and protection of vulnerable
habitat. Pivotal first generation treaties include MARPOL 73/78; the London Convention
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972); the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) (1973); and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971). Second generation
MEAs involve even more complex issues that implicate economic behavior and lifestyles at
a multiplicity of levels. Pivotal second generation treaties include the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985), and subsequent Protocols (in particular the
Montreal Protocol (1987) and London Amendment thereto (1990)); the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) (1992) and Kyoto Protocol (1997); the
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environmental commentators believe that "40% [or more] of [all of] these treaties
are related to the protection of the marine environment, with the comprehensive
UNCLOS as [their] centerpiece. 13
Besides the UNCLOS, which operates "under the U.N. General Secretariat," '12
4
and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL), 1 5 there are several MEAs administered by the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), namely those concerning biodiversity, atmosphere
and land126 that fall within this core grouping. These include the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its accompanying Kyoto Protocol
and the UN Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone (Montreal
Protocol) (atmosphere); the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
(land); the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the non-binding
UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) (biodiversity).'27 But, "by far, the largest cluster of
MEAs is related to the marine environment . . . and is distinguished by the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1992); the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989); and the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) (1994). Another major MEA is the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) which, although not
primarily concerned with environmental issues, addresses pollution and protection of the
marine environment.").
123. See Nowlan & Rolfe, supra note 115 at 16, citing Mostafa Tolba and Iwona Rummel-
Bulska, Negotiating the Environment, (Boston: MIT Press) (1999) ("the memoirs of the
longest serving Executive Secretary of UNEP, documenting this period of MEA
development") (emphasis added).
124. See "International Environmental Governance: Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs) - Status of Multilateral Environmental Agreements," UNEP/IGM/I/INF/3 supra
note 115 at para. 90; See also LAWRENCE ZIRING, ROBERT E. RIGGS & JACK C. PLANO,
THE UNITED NATIONS - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (2000) at
57.
125. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, modified by
the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78),
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=255.
126. See WORLD IN TRANSITION: VOLUME 2 - NEW STRUCTURES FOR GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE (Earthscan
Publications Ltd.) (2000) Figure B 3.2-1 at 55,
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgujg2000engl.pdf,
http://www.wbgu.de/Images/jg2OO0_en/figB3-2-1 .pdf.
127. See UNFF Fact Sheet, United Nations Forum on Forests website
http://www.un.org/esa/forests/about.html; United Nations Forum on Forests Report of the
Seventh Session (Feb. 24, 2006 - April 27, 2007); Economic and Social Council Official
Records, 2007, Supplement No. 22, E/CN. 18/2007/8 at 4,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/349/3I/PDF/N073493 I.pdf?OpenElement
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(UNCLOS)."' 28
The cluster of marine environment-related agreements referred to above also
consists of 11 legally binding regional seas conventions operating under the joint
auspices of the U.N. General Secretariat and the UNEP.12 9 Included among these
is the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment
of the Wider Caribbean Region and its accompanying Protocol Concerning
Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities. 30  According to the United
Nations, these "regional seas conventions and action plans, are a global mosaic of
agreements with one over-arching objective: the protection and sustainable use of
marine and coastal resources."1 31 And, "because of their multisectoral nature" they
are deemed "the most comprehensive of the framework conventions"'' 32 and to be
"closely, and in some cases, systematically linked to global conventions and
agreements" such as UNCLOS, whose implementation they tend to support.133 "In
fact, the regional seas programmes were developed as complimentary instruments
to UNCLOS,"' 134 to address primarily "the deteriorating conditions in the
marine/coastal environment through the control of their land-based causes."'
135
128. See International Environmental Governance: Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs), Status of Multilateral Environmental UNEP/IGM/l/INF/3 (April 6, 2001), supra
note 115 at para. 11.
129. See United Nations Environment Programme Regional Seas Programme website
http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/legal/conlist.htm.
130. See Protocol Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities to the
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region (Treaty Doc. 110-1) (Annexes done at Oranjestad, Aruba, on October 6,
1999, and signed by the U.S. on that same date ),
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/lbsmp/final %20protocol/lbsmp-protocol-eng.htm
I; see also Article 7, Pollution from Land-Based Sources - Convention for the Protection
and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/cartxt.html; see also Protocol Concerning
Pollution from Land-based Sources and Activities - Overview of the LBS Protocol
http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/plonearticlemultipage.2005-12-
01.7401488329/plonearticle.2005-12-
0 1. 11 15293440/view?portal_statusmessage=Your%20changes%20have%20been%20save
d.
131. See "International Environmental Governance: Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs), - Status of Multilateral Environmental Agreements," supra note 115 at para. 22.
132. Id. at para. 26.
133. Id. at para. 25, 27 (emphasis added).
134. Id at para. 92; See also Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programme - UNEP
Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 26 at 3, http:/lmarine-
litter.gpa.unep.org/framework/region-8-next.htm#actionplan.
135. See OECD Development Assistance Committee (1996) Guidelines for Aid Agencies on
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C. Relevant UNCLOS Environmental Provisions and Regulations May be Used
to Facilitate Adoption of the Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law
Several key provisions within UNCLOS Part XII provide UNCLOS parties with
the ammunition to legally challenge the perceived failure of U.S. environmental
law to implement the hazard-based Precautionary Principle within the ocean zones
over which the U.S. government exercises jurisdiction and control. These
prescriptive provisions obligate all UNCLOS parties to prevent marine "pollution"
generated by land-based, water-based and atmosphere-based sources. There are
also other important provisions with UNCLOS Part V (Articles 61-67) and Part
VII (Articles 117-120) which would empower foreign nations to challenge U.S.
failure to fully implement the Precautionary Principle for purposes of adequately
protecting migrating fish stocks and other living resources found within the U.S.
EEZ and on the high seas.
Article 192 is the primary UNCLOS provision that sets forth the broad
obligation and legal duty of care "to protect and preserve the marine environment"
that is assumed by all national government UNCLOS parties.'36 Upon ratifying the
UNCLOS, Article 194 would require the U.S. to take all measures necessary and
within its means to prevent, reduce and control pollution and ensure against
damage to the marine environment from any source or activity under its
jurisdiction or control. 37 That duty and obligation is owed, as well, to other States
and their environments and to the global public commons at large - i.e., the
"Area.' ' 3 8 In particular, Article 194(3) mandates that such measures "shall deal
with all sources of pollution of the marine environment. These measures shall
include, inter alia, those designed to minimize to the fullest possible extent: (a) the
release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are
persistent, from land-based sources, from or through the atmosphere or by
Global and Regional Aspects of the Development and Protection of the Marine and Coastal
Environment, Guidelines on Environment and Aid, No. 8, OECD, Paris at 3, 22,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/9/1887756.pdf; See generally, DAC Guidelines on Aid
and Environment, Development Cooperation Directorate, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
http://www.oecd.org/document/26/0,3343,en_2649_33721_1887578_ 1 1_ 1,00.html
(emphasis added).
136. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 192 ("States have the obligation to protect and preserve
the marine environment").
137. See Id. art. 194(1), (2).
138. Id. art. 194(2).
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dumping." '39  Article 194(3)(b)-(d) obligates national governments to enact
measures that also ensure against pollution from vessels, installations, seabed and
seafloor exploration and exploitation devices, and from "installations and devices
[otherwise] operating in the marine environment." This duty arguably relates to
activities and operations conducted within the U.S. EEZ and the high seas. At
least one commentator has characterized Article 194 as a "no-harm" rule.14
0
Article 207 imposes more specific obligations with respect to land-based
pollution sources than the broader legal obligations contained in Article 194(1)-
(3)(a). Article 207 requires coastal states to "adopt laws and regulations ... and
take other measures as may be necessary .. . to prevent reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from land-based . .. taking into account
internationally agreed upon rules, standards and recommended practices and
procedures."' 4' This means that UNCLOS parties must make an effort "to...
harmonize their policies ... [and to design and] establish global and regional rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures" to prevent land-based
sources of pollution originating in "rivers estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures
from harming the marine environment. 142 To this end, such laws, standards and
practices should, "to the fullest extent possible ...minimize ...the release of
toxic, harmful or noxious substances (chemicals], especially those which are
persistent, into the marine environment."'' 43 In other words, Article 207 mandates
and facilitates regional and international oceans governance.
For purposes of these provisions, the Montreal Guidelines broadly defined the
term 'land-based sources' as,
Municipal, industrial or agricultural sources, both fixed and mobile, on land, discharges
from which reach the marine environment, in particular: a. From the coast, including from
outfalls discharging directly into the marine environment and through run-off; b. Through
139. Id art. 194(3)(a).
140. See RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY, (2005) at 193, available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=iTDfdMjpflJC&pg=PA 193&lpg=PA 193&dq=unclos+
article+235+state+responsibility&source=web&ots=3-
8YAfzQ5h&sig=t2iXVaJwCSVOjoXodhrBfv9eBec.
141. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 207(l)-(2).
142. Id. art. 207(3).
143. Id (referencing impliedly other U.N. environmental treaties that the president has quietly
submitted to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee for ratification, namely, the U.N.
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants - POPS and the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity).
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rivers, canals of other watercourses, including underground watercourses; and c. Via the
atmosphere: (ii) Sources of marine pollution from activities conducted on offshore fixed or
mobile facilities within the limits of national jurisdiction. 144
These guidelines also broadly defined the term "marine environment" as, "the
maritime area extending, in the case of watercourses, up to the freshwater limit and
including inter-tidal zones and salt-water marshes," and the term "freshwater limit"
as, "the place in watercourses where, at low tide and in a period of low freshwater
flow, there is an appreciable increase in salinity due to the presence of sea
water."
45
Areas of concern (what areas are affected or vulnerable): (not listed in order of priority) (i)
Critical habitats, including coral reefs, wetlands, sea grass beds, coastal lagoons and
mangrove forests; (ii) Habitats of endangered species; (iii) Ecosystem components,
including spawning areas, nursery areas, feeding grounds and adult areas; (iv) Shorelines;
(v) Coastal watersheds; (vi) Estuaries and their drainage basins; (vii) Specially protected
marine and coastal areas; and (viii) Small islands. 
146
The Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment from
Land-Based Activities and the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of
the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities thereafter identified the types
of substances from land-based sources that have "land-based impacts upon the
marine pollution." They include "specifically [impacts] resulting from sewage,
persistent organic pollutants, radioactive substances, heavy metals, oils
(hydrocarbons), nutrients, sediment mobilization, litter, and physical alteration and
destruction of habitat"1 4 7 Both the Montreal Guidelines and the Global Programme
of Action effectively demonstrate that the UNCLOS potentially reaches deeply
into U.S. domestic watershed areas.
Article 212, likewise, imposes more specific obligations with respect to
atmosphere-based sources of pollution than the broader legal duty of Article
194(l)-(3)(a). "States shall adopt laws and regulations ... [and take whatever]...
other measures [are] necessary to prevent, reduce and control . . .pollution of the
144. See Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment Against Pollution
from Land-Based Sources, supra note 96, at "Definitions - l(c)," at 3 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at I(d).
146. See The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Land-Based Activities, supra note 65 at 14.
147. See Washington Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities, supra note 102 at p. I; The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, United Nations Environment Program,
supra note 65 at I1, 14.
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marine environment from or through the atmosphere."' 148 And, as in Article 207,
states must, "in fulfilling these obligations ... tak[e] into account internationally
agreed rules, standards ... practices ... and the safety of air navigation"' 49 while
endeavoring to "establish global and regional rules and recommended practices to
prevent, reduce and control such pollution."' 50 The "atmosphere" in question is
that "applicable to the air space under [a state's] sovereignty and to vessels flying
[the state] flag or vessels or aircraft of the state registry."' 5'1 Given Article l(4)'s
definition of "marine pollution" as consisting of "the introduction by man of
'energy' into the marine environment," one may reasonably conclude that Article
212 mandates national government regulation of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gas emissions from land-based 52 as well as sea-based sources within
U.S. sovereign territory or control. This appears, at the very least, to offer
European nations and American Europhiles a viable back-door channel to secure
UNCLOS party compliance with the U.N. Kyoto Protocol.153 It also confirms how
Article 212 mandates and facilitates regional and international atmosphere and
oceans governance.
In addition, there are the mandatory enforcement provisions of UNCLOS
Articles 213 and 222.154  UNCLOS parties may reference them in a dispute
settlement action brought against another UNCLOS party that has failed to ensure
that its citizens have complied with national pollution laws designed to protect the
marine environment, consistent with Articles 207 and 212. Such actions are likely
to proceed where such failure has already caused or is likely to cause harm to the
148. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 212(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
149. Id. art. 212(1).
150. ld. art. 212(3).
151. Id. art. 212(l).
152. Larry Parker & John Blodgett, Air Quality: Multi-Pollutant Legislation in the I 10th
Congress, CRS Report for Congress (May 25, 2007) at 2,
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Jun/RL34018.pdf ("In the I I0th Congress,
three bills have been introduced that would impose multi-pollutant controls on utilities.
They are all four-pollutant proposals that include carbon dioxide.").
153. See Bums, supra note 48; see also "IMO Policies and Practices Related to the Reduction of
Greenhouse Gas Emission From Ships," Resolution A.963(23) (Dec. 5, 2003) at Preamble,
1-3 para. 2-3, http://www.sof.or.jp/proj/pdf/Res963.pdf; Air Pollution Rules to Enter into
Force in 2005, International Maritime Organization Press Release (May 2005)
http://www.imo.org/Newsroon/mainframe.asp?topicid=848&docid=3620.
154. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. Article 213 (Enforcement with respect to pollution from
land-based sources); Id. art. 222 (Enforcement with respect to pollution from or through the
atmosphere).
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marine environment. Article 213 provides that, "States shall enforce their laws
and regulations adopted in accordance with article 207, dealing with prevention,
reduction and control of land-based sources of marine pollution" (emphasis
added). It requires States to "adopt laws and regulations and take other measures
necessary to implement applicable international rules and standards" that ensure
such compliance.' 55 Article 222 is the corresponding enforcement provision
relating to atmosphere-based sources of marine pollution, including carbon
dioxide, within a nation's sovereign jurisdiction and control. According to its
mandatory provisions, "States shall enforce, within the air space under their
sovereignty or with regard to vessels flying their flag or vessels or aircraft of their
registry, their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with Article 212(1) and
with other provisions of this Convention."' 56 States "shall [also promulgate such]
laws and regulations and take [whatever measures are otherwise] necessary to
implement applicable international rules and standards . . . to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the maritime environment from or through the atmosphere,
consistent with . . . all relevant international rules and standards concerning the
safety of air navigation."' 
57
Last, but not least, there is Article 235, which can be utilized by an UNCLOS
party to impose international legal liability against another UNCLOS party
pursuant to the international law doctrine of State Responsibility.' 58 This provision
thus effectively catapults evidence of alleged violations of Articles 192, 194, 207,
212, 213 159 and 222 to a 'higher level' if land or atmosphere-based sources of
pollution result or are likely to result or have resulted in damage to the marine
environment. "Article 235 UNCLOS stresses that State Responsibility is triggered
if States do not fulfill their environmental duties under UNCLOS. This is mirrored
by [A]rticle 35 of the Straddling Stocks Agreement."' 60  Article 235 also calls
155. See Id. art. 213.
156. See Id. art. 222 (emphasis added).
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 798 (2002) 798-799,
http://www.asil.org/ajil/ilcsymp3.pdf.
159. The Mox Plant Case discussed, infra, Part II.E. (Ireland relied on these same articles in
support of its argument that the United Kingdom had violated its obligations to protect the
marine environment of the Irish Sea).
160. See Verheyen, supra note 140 at 194 ("The Straddling Stocks Agreement could provide
additional primary rules obliging States to prevent or minimize climate change damage").
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upon UNCLOS parties to work cooperatively to expand and enforce the law of
state responsibility for marine pollution within the UNCLOS regime. 161
Another prime source of UNCLOS environmental law derives from the growing
number of International Seabed Authority (ISBA) environmental regulations that
implement UNCLOS Articles 136-139, 145 and 147. UNCLOS Part XI, which
was allegedly amended by the 1994 Agreement, establishes the guidelines for the
ISBA's structure and operations.) 62 UNCLOS Article 136 sets forth the central
principle establishing the ISBA's jurisdiction over 'the Area' and its living and
nonliving resources. It provides that, "[t]he Area and its resources are the common
heritage of mankind." 163 Article 137 describes the 'legal status' of "the 'Area' or
its resources" (the global commons) - as not being susceptible to "claim or exercise
of sovereignty or sovereign rights... or appropriation" [by] any State or natural or
juridical person."' 64 Rather, "[alil rights in the resources of the Area are vested in
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are
not subject to alienation" (emphasis added), 165 (i.e., they are not reducible to
private property). Article 140 reinforces this notion: "Activities in the Area shall,
as specifically provided for in this Part, be carried out for the benefit of mankind as
a whole."' 166 "The Authority shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial
and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through any
appropriate mechanism, on a non-discriminatory basis."' 67 Were the analysis to
end here it would likely indicate that CHM doctrine is concerned solely with the
exploitation, extraction and use of minerals and other natural resources gathered
from the Area. Indeed, the congressional testimonies of one government official 
68
161. UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 235(2)-(3).
162. See Senate Executive Report 110-9, CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Report
Together With Minority Views of Committee on Foreign Relations [To accompany Treaty
Doc. 103-39] (Dec. 19, 2007), at 24-25 http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_rpt/Iots.pdf;
See 1994 Implementing Agreement website
http://www.un.org/Depts/Ios/conventionagreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
163. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 136 (emphasis added).
164. See Id. art. 137(1).
165. Id. art. 137(2).
166. Id. art. 140(1).
167. Id. art. 140(2).
168. See JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DEPUTY SECRETARY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the Ratification of the 1994
Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention, Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Sept. 27, 2007, [Senate Treaty Document 103-39] at 15,
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2007/NegroponteTestimony070927.pdf.
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and one legal scholar 69 both indicate that the regulatory functions of the Seabed
Authority are limited to mining activities. However, the law and the facts say
otherwise.
Article 145 imposes upon UNCLOS parties the obligation to take all "necessary
measures to ensure effective protection for the marine environment from harmful
effects which may arise from . . . activities [undertaken] in the Area."' 170 It then
mandates the International Seabed Authority to "adopt appropriate rules,
regulations and procedures for inter alia: (a) the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, including [from] the
coastline, and of interference with the ecological balance of the marine
environment."' 17 1  Article 145 also specifies that such rules, regulations and
procedures must ensure "the protection and conservation of the natural resources
of the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine
environment."'172 These provisions more than suggest that the potential reach of
the ISBA extends beyond the management of deep seabed mining activities, to
encompass also the environmental stewardship of all activities conducted by U.S.
nationals, both within the Area, U.S. EEZs, and sovereign U.S. territory, that could
potentially affect the Area's marine environment and living and nonliving
resources. 173  And, the ISBA is empowered to achieve this by means of both
regulation and fee assessments. 174
The environmental community well recognizes the expansive scope of the
ISBA's organizational mandate. The World Conservation Union, for example, has
declared that, "the ISA's mandate regarding the resources of the deep seabed
extends well beyond mineral exploitation, and the Authority is being encouraged to
more fully exercise its powers and responsibilities with regard to living resources
169. See BERNARD OXMAN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW,
Testimony at the Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works,
108th Congress, 2nd Sess., S.Hrg. 108-498 (March 23, 2004) at 164-165.
170. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 145, Preamble.
171. Id. art. 145(a).
172. ld. art. 145(b).
173. See Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166,
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/7/A/2 (May
18, 2001) at 3, http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/7Sess/Ass/lSBA_7A_2.pdf.
174. See ISA Council Begins Substantive Work on Draft Regulations On Sulphides, International
Seabed Authority Press Release SB/13/5 (July 10, 2007) at:
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Press/Press2007/SB- 13-5.pdf.
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of the seabed and to ensure that marine ecosystems are properly protected." 75
The ISBA's role as regulatory steward of the marine environment in and around
the 'Area' has also been confirmed by the Authority's Secretary-General and the
U.N. General Assembly. According to the former, "[w]hilst the Authority's role is
primarily concerned with prospecting, exploration and exploitation of mineral
resources, it also has a broader role concerning the protection and preservation of
the marine environment (including its biodiversity)" against contractor activities. 116
And, the latter, in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 58/240,' noted "the
importance of the ongoing elaboration by... ('the Authority'), pursuant to article
145 of the Convention, of rules, regulations and procedures to ensure the effective
protection of the marine environment, the protection and conservation of the
natural resources of the Area and the prevention of damage to its flora and fauna
from harmful effects that may arise from activities in the Area."',
78
The ISBA Secretary-General has also clearly linked this stewardship function
with the Authority's need to employ the Precautionary Principle, as noted by one
of the members of the ISBA Legal and Technical Commission:
Since its establishment in 1994, the Authority has kept environmental protection as one of
it highest priorities, as evidenced by the comprehensive regime for monitoring and
protecting the marine environment in the Area ... by the adoption of the environmental
guidelines by the Legal and Technical Commission of the Authority. We must remember
that nowadays, more than in 1982, the development of the international environmental law
leads to the application of a precautionary approach to ocean management. 179
175. See IUCN (2004) TEN-YEAR HIGH SEAS MARINE PROTECTED AREA STRATEGY:
A Ten-year Strategy to Promote the Development of a Global Representative System of
High Seas Marine Protected Area Networks, Executive Summary (Sept. 2003) at 13,
Toolbox 1, http://www.iucn.org/THEMES/MARINE/pdf/10-
YearHSMPA Strategy SummaryVersion.pdf.
176. See Nandan, supra note 93, (citing Regulation 31(3): Benthic refers to the bottom of an
ocean, estuary or lake); See Benthic Flux, Toxic Substances Hydrology Program U.S.
Geological Survey http://toxics.U.S.gs.gov/definitions/benthicflux.htm; See Answer.corn
http://www.answers.comltopic/benthos, (Defining Benthos as "The Collection of organisms
on or in sea or lake bottoms" and as "The bottom of a sea or lake").
177. See G. A. Res. 58/240 Oceans and the law of the sea, A/RES/58/240 (March 5, 2004),
http://www.intfish.net/docs/2004/un/res58-240.pdf.
178. Id. at Preamble para. 1-3; Id. at Part IV, para. 14.
179. See Frida M. Armas Pfirter, The Management of Seabed Living Resources in the "the Area"
under UNCLOS, I I REVISTA ELECTRONICA DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (2006) 25
and accompanying fns 105-106, available at
http://www.reei.org/reei%2011/F.Armas(reeill).pdf (emphasis added) (Frida M. Armas
Pfirter is a Member of the Legal and Technical Commission of the International Seabed
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The U.N. General Assembly apparently agreed. In paragraph 52 of Resolution
58/240, the General Assembly appealed to
the relevant global and regional bodies, in accordance with their mandates, to investigate
urgently how to better address, on a scientific basis, including the application of
precaution, the threats and risks to vulnerable and threatened marine ecosystems and
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction [and] how existing treaties and other
relevant instruments [e.g., Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 ]... can be used in this process
consistent with international law, in particular with [UNCLOS]and with the principles of
an integrated ecosystem-based approach.' 
80
The ISBA, supported by its Legal and Technical Commission,18' has been
rather active since 1997.182 They have already completed final environmental
regulations and guidelines governing the activities relating to polymetallic
nodules' 83 and only recently submitted to the ISBA Assembly for consideration
draft regulations and guidelines they have worked on to encompass polymetallic
ferromanganese sulfides 184 and cobalt-rich crusts. 1
85
At least one specialist from the ISBA's Office of Legal Affairs, in addition to
the ISBA Secretary-General himself, has detailed how the obligation of the ISBA
Authority).
180. See G. A. Res. A/RES/58/240, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, at Preamble, par. 3, Part X,
par. 52 (emphasis added).
181. See International Seabed Authority, Legal Technical Commission, at 2 par. 2,
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/about/members/legal ("Recommendations from the Workshop to
Develop Guidelines for the Assessment of the Possible Environmental Impacts Arising
from Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area).
182. See Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166,
par. 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", at p. 4, citing
ISBA/4/C/4/Rev. I; see also Michael W. Lodge, The International Seabed Authority's
Regulations in Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, THE
JOURNAL, VOL. 10, ABSTRACT 2 (Dec. 18, 2001) at 12,
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/j ournal/html/voI 10/article IO-2.pdf.
183. See Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area,
International Seabed Authority Assembly ISBA/6/A/I 8 (July 20, 2000),
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/6Sess/Ass/ISBA-6A- I8.pdf.
184. See Draft Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the
Area, International Seabed Council ISBA/13/C/WP. I (March 29, 2007),
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/l 3 Sess/CncUIISBA- 13C-WP I .pdf.
185. See Draft Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese
Crusts in the Area, International Seabed Authority Legal and Technical Commission
ISBA/13/LTC/WP.l (May 9, 2007),
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/13Sess/LTC/ISBA- 13 LTC-WP I .pdf; see
Informal Note on Matters before the 14h Session of the Int'l Seabed Authority (May 26 -
June 6, 2008), http://www.isa.org.jm/en/sessions/2008.
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to protect the marine environment goes beyond mere prevention. According to this
specialist, UNCLOS imposes a two-part duty of care upon the ISBA, any
contractors operating in the "Area," and even coastal state governments. Not only
must these actors take preventive steps against known or knowable harms to the
marine environment, but they must also exercise precaution in advance to ensure
that activities in or around the "Area" or otherwise directly or indirectly affecting
the "Area" do not pose any unknown or uncertain potential future hazards to the
marine environment. In other words, the ISBA is obliged, as a matter of
international environmental law, to employ precaution. 86
Given this mandate, it is therefore not surprising, as the ISBA Secretary-
General notes, that the recently crafted final environmental regulations and both
sets of draft environmental regulations "are [also] based on a precautionary
approach as contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration."' 87 This presumably
means that it contains an economic cost-benefit analysis (balancing) requirement
within it - i.e., whatever measures are finally settled upon to prevent the harm
from occurring in the first place must be "cost-effective" and proportionate to the
potential harm being prevented.
The facts reveal, however, that although each of these sets of regulations
currently contain Precautionary Approach language, 88 within a section of Part V
entitled, 'Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment,' there had
previously been marked differences of opinion (amounting to a dispute) between
the European and American delegations over its actual legal meaning.' 89 These
delegations did manage to agree that this section of the regulations generally
should parallel the requirements of UNCLOS Article 145.190
186. See Lodge, supra note 182, at 21, citing UNCLOS Article 165(2)(e),(f), (h); Annex 11I,
Article 17(I)(b)(vii), Article 17(2)(f).
187. See Nandan, supra note 93 at I; See also Report of the U.N. Conference on Environmental
and Development, A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. 1) (June 3-14, 1992)
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51/aconfl 5126- Iannex L .htm (emphasis added).
188. Regulation 31 of ISBA/6/A/18, Regulation 33 of ISBA/I3/C/WP.l, ISBA/13/LTC/WP.l
(containing this language).
189. See discussion infra.
190. See Outstanding Issues With Respect to the Draft Regulations on Prospecting and
Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules In the Area (ISBA/5/C/4/REV.l) - Note by the
Secretariat, Doc. No. ISBA/6/C/INF. I (Dec. 30, 1999), in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA - DOCUMENTARY YEARBOOK 2000, (Barbara
Kwiatkowska & The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea Eds.) Vol. 16 (2000) at
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The cause of that dispute can be traced to an August 1999 Netherlands proposal
to add a formal definition of the Precautionary Principle anchored in Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration to the then current draft's Regulation I "Definitions"
section. The Netherlands proposal also sought to add Precaution language to the
Regulation section covering the Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment, for the purpose of amending it "to provide for the application of the
precautionary principle in the conduct of activities in the Area."' 19'
According to the minutes from the Seabed Council's fifth session meeting,
which the Seabed Authority subsequently publicized in a March 2000 press
release 92 despite the reference to "cost-effective" preventive measures, some
members of the American delegation were uncomfortable with introducing the
Precautionary Principle into the ISBA's regulations at all, where it had not been
explicitly incorporated within the UNCLOS and "could be interpreted in many
ways." 93 Similarly, they were concerned that the phrase "reasonable grounds for
concern" also "could be very broadly interpreted and could place stumbling blocks
in the way of investors."' 194  Nevertheless, the press release noted how "most
speakers supported the Netherlands proposal," and how some had recognized that
"the [P]recautionary [P]rinciple . . . had become a full-fledged principle of
international law... that knowledge about the environment and how to protect it
had advanced significantly since the signing of the Convention nearly two decades
401,403,
http://books.google.com/books?id=lzBlfgyCmxEC&pg=PA404&lpg=PA404&dq=%22isba
+5+c+I+8%22+netherlands&source=web&ots=Q_PVOQMeWa&sig=vbVFOrvAo_5fjVuQ
OAz-wlhpHUA.
191. Id. at 404, para. 15.
192. Press Release, "Seabed Council Takes Up Environmental Part of Mining Code," ISBA
SEA/1660 (March 22, 2000),
http:/www.un.org/newslPress/docs200020000322.seal 660.doc.html ("The main clause of
the proposal read as follows: "In the conduct of activities in the Area, the precautionary
principle shall be applied to protect and preserve the marine environment, by virtue of
which cost-effective preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable
grounds for concern that these activities may cause serious harm to the marine
environment, even where there is lack of full scientific certainty")(emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id. ("Most of today's debate centered on a proposal by the Netherlands concerning
precautionary measures to be taken to prevent environmental degradation. The proposal
(ISBA/5/C/L.8), resulting from informal consultations last August, is based on principle 15
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted in Rio de Janeiro in
1992 by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development ... Divergent
positions were expressed today on whether to incorporate the Netherlands text").
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ago. . . that the Agreement which had come into effect only in 1994 did not reflect
any lessening of concern about protection of the marine environment ... [and] that
while the Convention might not contain the exact words '[P]recautionary
[P]rinciple, ' they were implied in its spirit.'"195
In the end, the Europeans were successful in having secured the Precautionary
Approach language within both the final and draft ISBA regulations. The Council
had apparently reasoned that although the principle was not explicitly contained in
the UNCLOS text "it was implied in its spirit."
'196
At least one legal commentator has argued that, although the language of the
polymetallic nodules regulation, on its face, could not legitimately be read as
incorporating the more stringent hazard-based form of the Precautionary Principle,
the resulting confusion over which meaning was actually intended, as evidenced by
the lack of an explicit standard on the burden of proof, was likely to hamstring the
mining industry in the future. 97  After all, deep sea mining, whether of
polymetallic nodules or of crusts and sulfides, engenders similar "general risks at
the exploitation stage.., to a variety of organisms - including zooplankton, fishes
and deep diving mammals," in addition to, the "inherent risks to the extant
ecosystems at the crust and sulfide mining sites."
' 98
Furthermore, the Europeans had successfully managed to add new language to
the Emergency Orders (Provisional Measures) section within these crust and
sulfides Regulations. The reader should note that the phrase "to prevent, contain
and minimize the threat of serious or irreversible damage to the marine
environment" within Regulation 35 of these draft regulations'99 is different from
the terminology used in Regulation 32(2) of the final regulation covering
polymetallic nodules - "to prevent, contain and minimize serious harm to the
marine environment." It would appear that if such a change becomes permanent,
UNCLOS parties and the ISBA will have succeeded in reducing the legal and
scientific thresholds that must be reached before precautionary action can be taken
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Jason C. Nelson, The Contemporary Seabed Mining Regime: A Critical Analysis of the
Mining Regulations Promulgated by the International Seabed Authority, 16 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 27,45 (2005).
198. Id. at 70.
199. See ISBA Draft Regulation 35 - Draft Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for
Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts in the Area; See also ISBA Draft Article 35 - Draft
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area.
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in and around the Area. In other words, rather than having to show the existence
of actual, probable or likely serious harm, a claimant seeking precautionary action
need only show a threat of serious or irreversible damage to threat of serious or
irreversible damage, to the marine environment. The outcome of this debate is
even less certain now than it was previously, considering the real possibility that a
future U.S. government is more likely to work with rather than against the
Europeans.
According to the Chief of the ISBA's Office of Legal Affairs, the incorporation
of precautionary language into Part V 'Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment' of each such ISBA regulation is significant because it represents the
broadening scope of ISBA regulatory authority:
[a]lthough the Regulations do not go as far as some delegations would have liked, it is
suggested that what is contained in Part V of the Regulations is in fact a very significant
advance upon Article 145 of the Convention and provides afirm basis for the elaboration
of a comprehensive code of environmental regulation.
200
This thinking was again evidenced in a recent May 2007 report prepared by the
ISBA Secretary-General. It expressly referred to the Precautionary Principle in
discussing how the ISBA "should go about managing nodule mining and the
design of 'marine protected areas.' 2 0' It was thereafter reported, during July
2007, that the Australian delegation to the continuing negotiations over ISBA draft
regulations for polymetallic sulfides submitted a proposal to add the Precautionary
Principle to but yet another regulatory provision:
With regard to regulation 2, relating to prospecting, Australia proposed a sentence to be
added to paragraph 2, which would now read: "Prospecting shall not be undertaken if
substantial evidence indicates the risk of serious harm to the marine environment. In any
event, prospectors and the Authority shall apply a precautionary approach, as reflected in
principle 15 of the Rio Declaration." 
20 2
In May 2008, the ISBA's Legal and Technical Commission reexamined the
200. See Lodge, supra note 182 at 22 (emphasis added).
201. Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166,
par. 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/13/A/2 (May 29,
2007) at par. 74 (This report provides an account of the Authority's work "over the past 12
months .. .a review of the 2005-2007 programme of work and a presentation of the
proposed programme of work for 2008-20 10).
202. See Seabed Council Takes Note of Legal and Technical Commission Report; Continues
Discussion on Draft Regulation, International Seabed Authority Press Release SB/13/8 13Ih
Session (July I1, 2007), http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Press/Press2007/SB- 13-
8.pdf (emphasis added).
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scope of the ISBA's mandate and its ability to manage the marine environment in
and around the Area incident to deep sea mining.2 0 3 The Commission concluded
that, while "[t]he threats [to biological resources] are numerous ... as far as the
Authority is concerned ... its mandate is limited to the management of potential
impacts as a result of mining. ' 2°4 Yet, according to the Commission, this self-
imposed limitation on the exercise of the Authority's regulatory powers, at least for
the time being (i.e., until the time the Authority's environmental regulations, as
adopted and enforced, are challenged), would not preclude it from regulating
mining activities in the Area pursuant to the hazard-based Precautionary Principle
and the foundations of ecosystem-based management. 20 5 Nor would this limitation
discourage the ISBA from formally calling upon coastal State governments,
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., UNEP) and multilateral environmental
treaty secretariats, in their respective capacities, to work harder in implementing
the Johannesburg plan for the purpose of protecting the global commons. Thus,
the ISBA can and will continue to encourage coastal States to cooperate in finding
better ways to manage risks to marine biological diversity, namely by employing
203. See Considerations relating to an economic assessment of the marine environment in the
Area and the use of area-based management tools to conserve biodiversity, Note by the
Legal and Technical Commission of the International Seabed Authority Secretariat,
ISBA/14/LTC/5 (May 12, 2008) at pars. 3-4,
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/14Sess/LTC/ISBA-14LTC-5.pdf.
204. Id. para. 4.
205. See Proceedings of Pew Workshop on Design of Marine Protected Areas for Seamounts
and the Abyssal Nodule Province in Pacific High Seas (Oct. 23-26, 2007)
http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/oceanography/faculty/csmith/MPA-webpage/documents/Proc
eedingsPEW_WorkshopMPAs October 2007.pdf; see also Craig R. Smith, Steven
Gaines, Alan Friedlander, Charles Morgan, Andreas Thurnherr, Sarah Mincks, Les Watling,
Alex Rogers, Malcolm Clark, Amy Baco-Taylor, Angelo Bernardino, Fabio De Leo, Pierre
Dutrieux, Alison Rieser, Jack Kittinger, Jacqueline Padilla-Gamino, Rebecca Prescott and
Pavica Srsen, Preservation Reference Areas for Nodule Mining in the Clarion-Clipperton
Zone: Rationale and Recommendations to the International Seabed Authority, expert
participants in the Workshop to Design Marine Protected Areas for Seamounts and the
Abyssal Nodule Province in Pacific High Seas, (Oct 23-26, 2007)
http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/oceanography/faculty/csmith/MPA-webpage/documents/Smit
h%20et%20al.%20-
%20Recommendations%20to%20the%201SA%20for/o20design%20otO/o2OPRAs%20in%2
Othe%20CCZ%20-%202-2008.pdf; see also Rationale and recommendations for the
establishment of preservation reference areas for nodule mining in the Clarion-Clipperton
Zone - Summary outcomes of a workshop to design marine protected areas for seamounts
and the abyssal nodule province in Pacific high seas, International Seabed Authority Legal
and Technical Commission, [SBA/14/LTC/2 (March 28, 2008) at:
http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/ 14Sess/LTC/ISBA- 14LTC-2.pdf.
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the Precautionary Principle both within and beyond areas of national jurisdiction,
consistent with the UNCLOS and general international environmental law.
20 6
In effect, the ISBA has clearly signaled that the UNCLOS framework can be
used by certain coastal states, or even the ISBA itself, to compel the U.S.
government to subject all U.S. economic activities (i.e., including those undertaken
at locations within U.S. jurisdiction and control) that may potentially impact the
marine environment to Precautionary Principle-based environmental regulations.
Judging from the juxtaposition of paragraphs II and 12 contained within this May
2008 ISBA Legal and Technical Commission note, the coastal state governments
most likely to try this are those based in Europe.2 °7
D. Non-UNCLOS Substantive Environmental Law May Be Used to Facilitate
Adoption of Europe's Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law
As a matter of substantive law, UNCLOS Article 293 provides that "a court or
tribunal having jurisdiction" under Part XV, Section 2 (compulsory, binding
decisions) "shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Convention." According to one European legal
commentator, this understanding comports with the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,20 8 and takes into account the potential applicability of other
relevant treaties as well as customary international law in interpreting the
provisions of the UNCLOS and such other treaties. 209 As a second commentator
has pointed out, the UNCLOS articles "addressing the protection and preservation
of the marine environment . . . incorporate by reference 'generally accepted
international rules and standards,' thereby increasing the sources of law that may
be applicable to a dispute." 210
206. See ISBA/14/LTC/5 (May 12, 2008) supra note 224 para. 12.
207. Id. para. 11.
208. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
1155, p. 331, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/englishconventions/ 1 11969.pdf.
209. See ALAN BOYLE, Some Problems of Compulsory Jurisdiction Before Specialized
Tribunals: The Law of the Sea, 242-253, at 252, in ASSERTING JURISDICTION:
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Patrick Capps, Malcolm Evans &
Stratos Konstad Dinidis Eds.)(2003), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=bbOVULJ8g5MC&dq=unclos+tribunals+jurisdiction.
210. See NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA(2005), at 58, available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=jdz6KSyyXJkC&dq=Various+artices+of+UNCLOS,+p
articularly+those+addressing+the+protection+and+preservation+of+the+marine+envirnme
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In other words, since the UNCLOS provisions for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment and its living resources set forth general
rules and obligations that "are best viewed only as sources of guidance and
interpretation rather than as standard-setting principles,' an International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) panel would likely need to reference
more specific and substantive non-UNCLOS sources of law to discern how the
UNCLOS framework and guidance rules apply in a given circumstance.
212
Substantive non-UNCLOS sources of law include, for this purpose, both domestic
laws as well as internationally agreed upon standards, rules and principles either
incorporated within other relevant international treaties or reflected in customary
international law.
2 13
Therefore, "[a]ny dispute based on these substantive provisions of the
Convention would necessarily have to rely on sources extraneous to the
Convention in order to assess whether a treaty violation had occurred. '1 4 As
previously discussed, Europe's Precautionary Principle cloaked in Precautionary
Approach treaty language is incorporated within a number of international
environmental agreements. It arguably constitutes such an extraneous source of
law that an UNCLOS tribunal or arbitral body would need to consider when
interpreting the relevant UNCLOS Part XII or Part VII provisions in the event of a
dispute among treaty parties. But, what if the U.S. is not a party to those other
treaties at the time of a dispute? Would an UNCLOS tribunal or arbitral body, in
that case, need to consider whether the Precautionary Approach is a rule of
customary international law for such purposes?
One European commentator has opined that an ITLOS tribunal and an arbitral
panel possessing subject matter jurisdiction would be empowered to and, in fact,
must take into account the law of the CITES, the CBD and any other relevant
treaties and protocols, as well as any germane customary international law (e.g.,
reflecting the Precautionary Principle) when interpreting the general UNCLOS
nt,+incorporate+by+reference+%E2%80%98generally+accepted+internationa+rues+and+
standards%E2%80%99&source=gbssummarys&cad=O.
211. Id. at 149, citing Moira L. McConnell and Edgar Gold, The Modern Law of the Sea:
Framework for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment? 23 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 88 AND 98 (1991).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id
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land-based and atmosphere-based pollution provisions cited in a dispute.2 5 Such
logic would also require consideration of the provisions of the Migratory Fish
Stocks Agreement Implementing the UNCLOS, including its Article 6 -
"Application of the Precautionary Approach"-when interpreting the general
UNCLOS living resources provisions. 2 16 Indeed, UNCLOS Article 288(2) vests
any tribunal selected in Article 287 with the procedural jurisdiction to interpret and
apply provisions from other treaties "related to the purposes of this Convention. '1 7
The U.S. has long been a party to the CITES, 21 8 but is not a party to its 1983
amendment. 2 19 The U.S. is a signatory to the CBD, but has not yet ratified it.
220
Both the CITES amendment and the CBD, along with other MEAs noted above,
215. See Boyle, supra note 209, at 252-253.
216. See Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention relating to the
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in
Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the
related Agreements as at 26 October 2007,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/conventionoverview fish-stocks.ht
m.
217. See UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 288.
218. See "Member Countries - List of Parties," Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, UNEP website,
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/alphabet.shtml, (Showing The United States
ratification of CITES on January 14, 1974); See Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoPI4) Criteria for
Amendment of Appendices I and 11 http://www.cites.org/eng/res/09/09-24R14.shtml#FNO;
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/09/EO9-24RI4.pdf (CITES regulates the protection of over
30,000 plant and animal species depending on their biological status and the impact that
international trade may have upon them. The EU has argued that the CITES arguably
incorporates a later (nonbinding) resolution requiring application of the Precautionary
Principle); Discussion Document on Precautionary Measures in CITES Resolution Conf.
9.24, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/criteria/lstmeeting/precautionary.shtml, discussed in
Lawrence A. Kogan, The Precautionary Principle and WTO Law: Divergent Views Toward
the Role of Science in Assessing and Managing Risk, supra note 44, at 94-95 and
accompanying endnote 144.
219. See Amendment to the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), done at Gaborone April 30, 1983 (Treaty Doc.: 98-10)
(submitted to Senate October 4, 1983); See also Gaborone Amendment to the Text of the
Convention (permitting accession by regional economic integration organizations such as
the European Communities), http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/gaborone.shtml.
220. See Convention on Biological Diversity, (Treaty Doc.: 103-20) (drafted in Rio de Janeiro
June 5, 1992 and signed by the United States at New York on June 4, 1993, submitted to
Senate November 20, 1993). See also GREEN PAPER: TOWARDS A FUTURE MARITIME
POLICY FOR THE UNION: A EUROPEAN VISION FOR THE OCEANS AND SEAS, COM(2006)
275 final Volume II - ANNEX (6/7/06) 42-43,
http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/com_2006 0275_enpart2.pdf.
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remain in the U.S. Senate pending ratification. 221 Both the CITES and CBD focus
on protecting marine life, including mammals, migratory fish, birds, fauna and
flora, consistent with UNCLOS Part VII, Section 2222 and Part XII.223  Both
instruments have attracted transatlantic debates over the Precautionary Principle.
The U.S., furthermore, is a party to the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement (MFSA),
which had also previously engendered such debates.224 In fact, U.S. ratification of
the MFSA already renders the U.S. subject to ITLOS dispute settlement
jurisdiction and to the relevant substantive provisions of the UNCLOS, any related
international treaties and customary international law, should the U.S. or another
MFSA party decide to initiate proceedings pursuant to MFSA Article 30.225
European Union officials have expressly referred to the UNCLOS and the CBD
as being integral to their efforts to employ the Precautionary Principle globally,
particularly, on the high seas and in the Area. Given that "[p]roper oceans
governance . . . requires action that is forward-looking and is based on the
[P]recautionary [P]rinciple, rather than being merely reactive to the problems of
today ... we should strengthen our resolve to only act with the greatest care in...
coastal state areas and areas beyond national jurisdiction ... by giving full effect to
the provisions of UNCLOS and other international conventions such as the
Convention on Biological Diversity." 226 So it would seem that EU member states
221. See Treaties Pending in the Senate (Updated as of October 1, 2007), U.S. Department of
State, http://www.state.gov/s/I/treaty/pending, http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/treaties.pdf.
222. UNCLOS, supra note 51, Part VII § 2(, Conservation and Management of the Living
Resources of the High Seas).
223. Id. Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment).
224. See Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State, LETTER OF SUBMITTAL,
Accompanying Letter of Submittal, accompanying AGREEMENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF
THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO FISH STOCKS, Treaty Doc. 104-24,
104th Cong. 2nd (Feb. 20, 1996) at p. VI, at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgidbname= 104 congdocuments&docid=f:td024.pdf, ("Although the United
States need not become party to the Convention in order to become party to the Agreement,
we would maximize our benefits from these two treaties if the United States were a party to
both of them ... The linkage between the two treaties is very strong."); see also discussion,
infra at Part IIl(A)(6).
225. See Article 30(l)-(5), Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of Dec. 10 1982, relating to the conservation and
management of Straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, G. A.
A/CONF. 164/37.
226. See Statement on Behalf of the European Union by Mr. Arjan P Hamburger, Deputy
Permanent Representative, Plenary, 59' G. A., EU Presidency Statement: Oceans and the
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are likely to be the first UNCLOS parties to invoke CBD provisions together with
the Precautionary Principle in an UNCLOS Part XII or Part VII Section 2 dispute.
In addition, the U.S. is not yet a party to two chemicals-based UNEP treaties,
namely the Stockholm Convention on POPS 227 and the PIC Rotterdam
228thConvention, that address the listing, use, distribution and transport of toxic
chemicals that may find their way to U.S. territorial seas via agricultural and/or
urban runoff. These agreements remain in the U.S. senate pending ratification and
have engendered contentious domestic and international debate concerning the
application of the Precautionary Principle within their provisions.
229
Furthermore, the U.S. is a party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)2 30 which, as one legal commentator has emphasized, "would
appear to be . . . the most germane international obligation in the context of
potential climate change damages to the oceans,",2 3 1 and thus, a fertile source of
non-UNCLOS substantive treaty law that must be considered and interpreted by
the ITLOS or an arbitral panel in the event of a future UNCLOS dispute. He has
also noted how UNCLOS Articles 197, 212 and 235 could be relied upon to
provide the basis for initiating such a cause of action.
The UNFCCC should clearly be construed as the 'competent organization' to address
climate change under Article 197 of UNCLOS given the fact that it has been ratified by
189 nations .... Moreover, the obligations under UNFCCC should be recognized as
'international mechanisms to control pollution' under Article 212, since its overarching
purpose is to control greenhouse gas emissions so as to 'prevent dangerous anthropogenic
Law of the Sea (Nov. 16, 2004),
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4065_en.htm.
227. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, (Treaty Doc.: 107-5) (done at
Stockholm May 22, 2001 and signed by the United States on May 23, 2001, submitted to
Senate May 7, 2002).
228. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, (Treaty Doc.: 106-21) (done at Rotterdam
September 10, 1998 and signed by the United States on September 11, 1998 submitted to
Senate February 9, 2000).
229. See Lawrence A. Kogan, 'Enlightened' Environmentalism or Disguised Protectionism:
Assessing the Impact of EU Precaution Standards on Developing Countries, National
Foreign Trade Council (April 2004) at 19-28,
http://www.wto.int/english/forumse/ngoe/posp47 nftc enlightenede.pdf. See also
reference and accompanying footnotes, infra Part Ill.
230. See Ratification Status - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
UNFCCC website http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?country=US (The U.S.
ratified the UNFCCC on 15 October 1992).
231. See William C. G. Bums, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in
International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 48 at 46.
What Goes Around Comes Around
interference with the climate system.' Finally, under Article 235, the UNFCCC is clearly
an international obligation that can contribute to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 232
However, it might be quite difficult to prevail in such an action - i.e., to show
that a breach of UNFCCC obligations, and thus, of related UNCLOS provisions
has occurred - in the absence of "causal links between climate change and
alleged damages to marine resources." 233 Given the lack of understanding among
scientists concerning how geologic processes ultimately determine the level of
atmospheric C02, and regarding the capacity of the oceans to absorb it,
establishing such causal links (physical evidence) would be especially challenging,
that is, unless science is suspended in favor of politics and faith.234
Lastly, there is the protocol to the UNEP-managed 235 mini-UNCLOS in the
Caribbean region 236 dealing with land-based 237 sources of marine pollution that
awaits Senate ratification. A close evaluation of this treaty (a.k.a the "Toilet Bowl
Treaty") 238 has already attracted great public interest given its extensive reach into
U.S. sovereign territory encompassing U.S. inland waterways, estuaries,
watersheds and bathroom bowls 23 9 and its close relationship to another U.N.
232. Id. at 46-47.
233. ld. at 49.
234. See e.g., Lawrence Solomon, Models trump measurements, CANADIAN FINANCIAL POST
(July 7, 2007) http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=433b593b-6637-4a42-970b-
bdef8947fa4e (" 'The IPCC postulates an atmospheric doubling of C02, meaning that the
oceans would need to receive 50 times more C02 to obtain chemical equilibrium,' explains
Prof. Segalstad. 'This total of 51 times the present amount of carbon in atmospheric C02
exceeds the known reserves of fossil carbon-- it represents more carbon than exists in all
the coal, gas, and oil that we can exploit anywhere in the world.')(emphasis added); See
also, Tom V. Segalstad, Web-info about C02 and the 'Greenhouse Effect' Doom,
http://www.co2web.info.
235. See Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programme - UNEP Regional Seas Reports
and Studies No. 26 at 3, http://marine-litter.gpa.unep.org/framework/region-8-
next.htm#actionplan.
236. See Land-Based Sources of Marine Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region: A Protocol
for Action," LBS Protocol Fact Sheet, UNEP (June 2005) at 1-2,
http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/plonearticlemultipage.2005-12-
01.7401488329/plonearticle.2005-12-01.8829489599.
237. UNCLOS, supra note 5I, a. Art 1. 1(4), available at
shttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/unclos/unclose.pdf; see Id. art.
194(1), (3)(a).
238. See Cliff Kincaid, "President Bush's Toilet Bowl Treaty," The National Ledger (Oct. 29,
2007), http://www.nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_272616936.shtml.
239. See Annexes I and Ill, Protocol Concerning Pollution from Land-Based Sources and
Activities to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
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Regional Seas Program agreement integral to the operation, implementation and
interpretation of the UNCLOS - the European OSPAR Convention. At least one
legal commentator has emphasized how EU member states have construed the
terms of the OSPAR Convention, the UNEP regional seas agreement for the
northeast Atlantic,240 as not only "following the language of the LOS Convention,"
but also as implicitly and explicitly incorporating the hazard-based formulation of
the Precautionary Principle within its Preamble and its definitional and general
obligation articles.24'
The precautionary principle was first articulated under the [1974] Paris Convention ... for
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources ... in a nonbinding form in
PARCOM Recommendation 89/1 of 22 June 1989 on the Principle of Precautionary
Action and implicitly in the Prior Justification Procedure under the [1972] Oslo
Convention . . for the Prevention of Marine by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft ....
Thereafter, following a German initiative, it was inserted into the [1992] Ospar
Convention.
24 2
The juxtaposition of these multilateral environmental treaties alongside the
UNCLOS within the U.S. Senate is legally significant, given UNCLOS'
acknowledged role as "an 'umbrella convention' most of [the] provisions [of
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, with Annexes, (Treaty Doc. I 10-1)(done at
Oranjestad, Aruba, on October 6, 1999, and signed by the U.S. on that same date; submitted
to Senate February 16, 2007); see e.g., Protocol Concerning Pollution From Land-Based
Sources and Activites to the convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/lbsmp/final %2protocol/bsmp-protocol-eng.htm
I; see also Article 7 Pollution from Land-based Sources - Convention for the Protection and
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/cartxt.html; See also Protocol Concerning
Pollution from Land-based Sources and Activities - Overview of the LBS Protocol,
http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention/plonearticlemultipage.2005-12-
01.7401488329/plonearticle.2005-12-
0 1. 111 5293440/view?portal status message=Your/o20changes%20have%20been%20save
d.
240. See United Nations Environment Program Regional Seas Database Manager - Regions:
Northeast Atlantic (OSPAR) website,
http://www.gpa.unep.org/regsea/regions/view.php?ids=23; See also, 7 th Global Meeting of
the Regional Seas Conventions and Action Plans (Helsinki, Finland Oct. 2005),
UNEP(DEC) /RS.7/ INF.9./IGR,
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/globalmeetings/7/INF.9.IGR PartnershipRoll-up.pdf.
241. See Marr, supra note 36 at 60; See also Preambular par. 13 and Articles l(d) and 2(a), 1992
OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, OSPAR Commission website, http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html.
242. Id.
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which] ...being of a general kind, can be implemented only through specific
operative regulations in other international agreements. " 243  In particular,
UNCLOS Articles 197244 and 207245 collectively require UNCLOS parties to
cooperate in developing competent international organizations through which
appropriate and relevant international rules, standards and practices for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment and its living and nonliving
resources, may be elaborated.24 6
Consequently, were the U.S. to ratify the UNCLOS and any of the other
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that President Bush submitted to
the Senate for consideration during 2007, each of which arguably incorporates the
243. See Implication of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the
International Maritime Organization., International Maritime Organization
LEG/MISC/3/Rev. I (Jan. 6, 2003) at 3, http://www.andreekirchner.de/imel/imo.pdf; see
also Anna Mihneva - Natova, The Relationship Between the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea and the IMO Conventions, United Nations and Nippon Foundations
(June 2005) at 14, 33,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff-programme home/fellows-pages/fellows-papers
/natova 0506 bulgaria.pdf, (These are variously referred to as 'applicable international
rules and standards,' 'internationally agreed rules, standards, and recommended practices
and procedures,' 'generally accepted international rules and standards,' 'generally accepted
international regulations,' 'applicable international instruments' or 'generally accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices'); see also, Agustin Blanco-Bazan, IMO
interface with the Law of the Sea Convention, Paper presented at the Seminar on current
maritime issues and the work of the International Maritime Organization, Twenty-Third
Annual Seminar of the Center for Ocean Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of
Law, IMO, (January 6-9, 2000),
http://www.imo.org/infoResource/mainframe.asp?topicid=406&doc id= 1077.
244. UNCLOS, supra note 51, art. 197 ("States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as
appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations,
in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.") (emphasis
added)
245. Id. art. 207 ("(1) States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries,
pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures; (2) States shall take other measures as may be
necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution; (3) States shall endeavor to
harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level; (4) States,
acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic conference,
shall endeavor to establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
land-based sources.)" (emphasis added).
246. See e.g., Id. a.Art 61, 119, 211,213-214, 216, 218, 222.
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hazard-based Precautionary Principle, the U.S. government could potentially find
itself before the ITLOS or an arbitral panel. It would then need to respond to other
UNCLOS party allegations, that it had failed to strictly regulate emissions of land-
based, water-based or atmosphere-based sources of pollution, consistent with
UNCLOS Part XII and the relevant provisions of such MEAs, where such actions
or inactions have resulted in, or threaten to result in, serious damage to the marine
environment and/or its living resources.
E. UNCLOS Tribunal Provisional Measures May Be Used to Facilitate
Adoption of Europe's Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law
The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) seems the most
likely venue at which the U.S. government's interpretation of international
environmental regulatory law could be successfully challenged by UNCLOS State
parties favoring Europe's Precautionary Principle. At least one commentator has
noted how the jurisdiction exercisable by the ITLOS is particularly well suited to
quickly granting interim measures for the purpose of preempting and ultimately
avoiding possible irreversible environmental harm, especially "where there is as
yet no definite proof of environmental damage."
247
In this commentator's opinion, the legitimacy of such jurisdiction is found in
UNCLOS Part XII, the text of which emphasizes the obligation of state parties to
prevent and protect against serious harm to the marine environment. In addition,
as international environmental law has continued to evolve, there has been a
consequent need to enforce emerging norms as evidenced by the expansion of
international litigation of environmental issues in the International Court of Justice,
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the World Trade Organization and the
ITLOS. 248 In other words, there is a growing acceptance of "soft- law principles of
[once] amorphous content and uncertain normative status," such as the
Precautionary Principle, "which have [over time] been given concrete effect by
international courts." 24 9  This largely motivated the parties in three previous
ITLOS cases to ground their application for a provisional measure on the
Precautionary Principle 250 in order to postpone or otherwise ban a contested
247. Stephens, supra note 49, at 101.
248. Id. at 313-314.
249. Id. at.314-315.
250. Id. at 223 ("ITLOS has issued provisional measures on three occasions [since 1999] to
protect marine environmental interests. And, in all these cases there has been at least
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economic activity, despite the absence of scientific evidence that the activity had
caused, or would cause, environmental harm.
251
Although the ad hoc ITLOS tribunals clearly had determined that the hazard-
based Precautionary Principle was not applicable in those particular cases
25
(perhaps because they had applied the same higher evidentiary threshold required
in Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 253 provisional measure proceedings
commenced pursuant to Article 26 of the Environmental Rules) 254 - i.e., the need
to present evidence of any likelihood of environmental damage, 2 55 this same result
cannot be guaranteed in the future. In light of continually evolving international
environmental law, U.S. law and policymakers, regulators and industry officials
would surely be remiss if, after reviewing these cases, they failed to discern an
emerging global pattern towards greater environmental governance and
awareness.2 5 6 A brief review of these cases follows.
In the SBT Case,2 57 the Governments of Australia and New Zealand had sought
provisional measures to halt the Japanese Government's Experimental Fishing
Program (EFP). These governments alleged that, by continuing its EFP, Japan had
breached its obligations under UNCLOS Article 118 "to cooperate with each other
implicit reliance upon the precautionary principle")(emphasis added).
251. See SBT Order (1999); See also, MOX Plant Case (Ireland vs. United Kingdom
(2002)(Provisional Measures); See Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and
Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures) (2003).
252. Stephens, supra note 49, at 104-105 ("ITLOS has without question contributed significantly
to the evolution of the LOS Convention[.] [H]owever . . . in all three of its provisional
measure orders in environmental cases, ITLOS has been careful to avoid taking a position
in the debate concerning the legal status of the concept of 'precaution.' Rather than
identifying precaution as a customary 'principle' of law, or indeed merely a guiding
'approach', the Tribunal has favored the more neutral notion of 'prudence and caution'.")
(emphasis added).
253. See Ad Hoc Arbitration Under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea Permanent Court of Arbitration, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag id=1288 (The PCA has served as registry in four out of five
cases arbitrated under Annex VII of the UNCLOS).
254. See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes relating to
Natural Resources and/or the Environment, (2002), art. 26, at 198, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/ENVIRONMENTAL( l).pdf.
255. Stephens, supra note 49, at 27-28.
256. Id. at 223 ("The compulsory dispute system of the LOS Convention is arguably the most
important environment-focU.S.ed adjudicative arrangement currently in existence, and it
remains to be seen whether ITLOS judges and ad hoc arbitrators appointed to Annex VII
Arbitral Tribunals will seek to realize its full potential in this respect.").
257. Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Autl. V. Japan, 38 ILM 1624, (Provisional
Measures Order of Aug. 27, 1999).
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in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high
seas" and under UNCLOS Article 117 "to take measures as may be necessary for
the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.' '258 As noted by several
commentators, the Tribunal, in expressly stating that "the conservation of the
living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the
marine environment," implicitly applied the precautionary principle.259
[E]ven though ITLOS did not expressly refer to or endorse the Precautionary 'Principle,'
its decision revealed a classic 'Precautionary 'Approach" ... ITLOS noted that there was
scientific uncertainty regarding the measures necessary to conserve stocks of SBT, but that
the Tribunal was not in a position to assess this evidence conclusively .... [I]n so doing.
. .ITLOS appears to have given effect to the obligation to apply the precautionary
approach to straddling and highly migratory species under Article 6 of the Straddling
Stocks Agreement, notwithstanding that the instrument was not then in force, and despite
the controversy that surrounds it applicability to fisheries management.
260
In the MOX Plant Case,261 the Government of Ireland sought provisional
measures to suspend both the UK Government's authorization of a permit to
operate a nuclear facility located along the Northwest English coastline opposite
the Irish Sea, and any transport of associated radioactive materials through Irish
coastal zones. It alleged that the UK had breached its UNCLOS obligations: "to
take the necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment"; "to cooperate" with Ireland in 'the protection of the marine
environment' of the Irish Sea by "sharing information" about the plant with
Ireland; and "to carry out a proper environmental impact assessment," consistent
with UNCLOS Article 206, concerning the potential marine environmental impacts
of the plant.2 62 Although the ITLOS ultimately avoided discussion of whether to
apply the Precautionary Principle to suspend such activities, legal commentators
roundly criticized the decision as being the textbook case of when to apply
precaution.
258. Stephens, supra note 49, at 204.
259. Id. at 203-204.
260. Id. at 204, 206 and accompanying FN 147 (referencing FN 147, citing Adrianna Fabra, The
LOSC and the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle (1999), 10 Y.B. OF INT'L
ENVTL LAW 15); David Freestone, Caution or Precaution: A Rose by Any Other Name? in
10 Y.B. OF INT'L ENVTL LAW 15 (1999); Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases:
The Precautionary Approach and Conservation and Management ofFish Resources (2000),
I1 EURO. J. OF INT'L LAW 815 (emphasis added).
261. MOX Plant Case (Ireland vs. United Kingdom), 41 ILM 405 (2002) (Provisional Measures).
262. Stephens, supra note 495, at 214-215.
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[Despite] the existence of scientific uncertainty as to the marine environmental impacts of
the MOX plant, together with the highly dangerous nature of the radioactive materials
involved, it is surprising that the Tribunal made no reference to the precautionary approach
or principle. Such characteristics of the dispute suggest that it is a 'textbook example' of a
situation that would ordinarily demand the invocation of the precautionary approach.
263
In the Straits of Johor Case,2 64 the Malaysian Government sought provisional
measures against the Singapore Government to suspend land reclamation work it
had undertaken in and adjacent to a narrow strait separating the island of Singapore
from the Malay Peninsula known as the Straits of Johor. Malaysia alleged that
Singapore has breached its UNCLOS obligations to provide Malaysia with full
information about its current and projected work on the straits and an opportunity
to comment on it, and to protect and preserve the marine environment in the straits.
In particular, the Government of Malaysia "contended that the concept of
precaution must direct the application and implementation of obligations under the
LOS Convention." 2 65 However, the ITLOS declined to grant Malaysia's order and
instead "suggest[ed] that the parties themselves must adhere to the Precautionary
Approach. 2 6 6
Apparently, at least for now, the ITLOS deliberately sidestepped the political
and legal controversy surrounding the status and application of the Precautionary
Principle/Approach.2 6 7 It likely did this for either of two possible reasons. First, as
a matter of law, this last panel seems to have heeded the words of Judge Wolfrum.
In MOX, he focused on the threshold of evidence of harm to the marine
environment that must first be shown before an ITLOS provisional measure will be
invoked, and which Europe's Precautionary Principle and its reversal of the burden
of proof cannot override. 268 Second, as noted by one commentator, these results
263. Id. at 216, FN 214, citing David Vander Zwaag, The Precautionary Principle and Marine
Environmental Protection: Slippery Shores, Rough Seas and Rising Normative Tides, 33
OCEAN DEV.& INT'L LAW 165, 177 - 178 (2002) (emphasis added).
264. Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor
(Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures) (Oct. 8, 2003), http:www.itlos.org.
265. Stephens, supra note 49, at 220-221.
266. Id. at 221.
267. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Kogan, WTO Ruling on Biotech Foods Addresses "Precautionary
Principle," LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 8, 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.wlf org/upload/120806kogan.pdf, Kogan, World Trade Organization Biotech
Decision Clarifies Central Role of Science in Evaluating Health and Environmental Risks
for Regulation Purposes, 2 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 149 (2007).
268. See, MOX Plant Case, at 3-4, (separate opinion of Judge Wolfrum),
http://www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2001/document en 202.pdf.
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may reflect a conscious effort on the part of the ITLOS institution "to facilitate an
amicable settlement rather than to reach definitive conclusions regarding
compliance with environmental obligations."
269
[Arguably,] . . . this is a consequence of the 'proceduralisation' strategy adopted in the
LOS Convention [i.e.,] ... that 'the parties were prepared to sign off the Convention text
without dotting every 'i' and crossing every 't,' because the details in critical areas would
be worked out either by state practice or, if all else failed, by recourse to adjudication. ' 27 0
No doubt, the influence of transatlantic academic and environmental activist
groups in favor of adopting Europe's Precautionary Principle has continued to
grow and trigger louder political calls for paradigmatic change concerning how
possible but not provable international environmental hazards are to be evaluated
and managed where there is scientific uncertainty as to causation, magnitude of
harm or timing. 27' Given international environmental law's evolutionary march in
apparent lock-step with this positivist ethos, however, international adjudication
bodies such as the ITLOS and UNCLOS ad hoc arbitral panels, will eventually
have little choice but to respond in like fashion.
272
For this reason, two UNCLOS commentators believe that the further
development of UNCLOS Part XV, Article 290 provides the key to the
relationship between the hazard-based Precautionary Principle, the respective
rights of UNCLOS parties and the absolute UNCLOS erges omnes obligation to
preserve and protect the marine environment. Article 290(1) vests the ITLOS
Seabed Disputes Chamber with the power to prescribe provisional measures.
The reference in Article 290 of the LOS Convention to the avoidance of 'serious harm to
269. See Stephens, supra note 49, at 104.
270. Id. citing Vaughn Lowe, Advocating Judicial Activism: The ITLOS Opinions of Judge Ivan
Shearer, 24 AUSTL. Y. B. OF INT'L LAW 145, 150 (2005).
271. Peter J. Smith, Former Vice President Al Gore Makes Star Debut in Toronto as Global
Warming Prophet, LIFESITENEWS.COM (Feb. 22, 2007) ("Al Gore's environmental message
is a development of ideas first set forth in his 1992 book: Earth in the Balance: Ecology and
the Human Spirit, where he wrote: 'We must make the rescue of the environment the central
organizing principle for civilization. . . .' Gore calls for a Global Marshall Plan or
Strategic Environmental Initiative, with the first goal as stabilising what he believes is an
overpopulated world, with the end result of massively increasing the powers of government
to engineer a 'wrenching change of society' in order to save the world's ecology"')
(emphasis added), http://www.lifesite.net/Ildn/2007/feb/07022204.html.
272. Stephens, supra note 49, at 200 (According to international law professor Philippe Sands,
"the PCA's [Permanent Court of Arbitration's] 'contextual and 'acontextual' approach'
confirms that environmental considerations have 'not yet fully permeated the reasoning
processes of some classical international lawyers"').
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the marine environment' indicates that this mechanism was designed specifically to allow
ITLOS to deal with potential environmental harm efficiently and effectively. It may also
be noted that since jurisdiction need only be established on a prima facie basis, and the
court at an interlocutory stage must be cautious of definite factual findings that may
prejudice a later determination on the merits, there is an obvious conceptual affinity
between the precautionary principle in international environmental law and this
particularjudicial mechanism for providing interim relief.
2 73
III. INTERNAL PATHWAYS TO U.S. ADOPTION OF
EUROPE'S PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE VIA THE
UNCLOS
Since 2004, the former Bush administration insisted that no federal
environmental implementing legislation would be required incident to UNCLOS
accession.
Except as noted below regarding deep sea-bed mining, the United States does not need to
enact new legislation to supplement or modify existing U.S. law, whether related to
protection of the marine environment, human health, safety, maritime security, the
conservation of natural resources, or other topics within the scope of the Convention. The
United States, as a party, would be able to implement the Convention through existing
laws, regulations, and practices (including enforcement practices), which are consistent
with the Convention and which would not need to change in order for the United States to
meet its Convention obligations .... The one area in which implementing legislation
would be necessary at some point after U.S. accession is legislation to enforce decisions of
the Seabed Disputes Chamber, with respect to which the Administration proposed a
declaration for inclusions in the Senate's resolution.
2 74
Yet, simultaneously, legal scholars and environmentalists who have advocated
in favor of both UNCLOS accession and adoption of the Precautionary Principle
have called for the updating of U.S. federal environmental laws and regulations
incidental to UNCLOS accession. Indeed, at least one such commentator has long
argued that U.S. accession to the UNCLOS would benefit the U.S. because it
would encourage greater U.S. domestic implementation of the UN Agenda 21
sustainable development-based oceans directives. At least one such commentator
believes that since "The United States has yet to fully meet Chapter 17's primary
273. Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added); see Marr, supra note 36, at 67-69.
274. See Annex I-Letter from State Department Legal Adviser William H. Taft, IV to Chairman
Lugar, dated March 1, 2004, accompanying Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 108th Congress, Senate Executive Report
108-10 (March 11, 2004), at Annex I, p. 23, at: pp. 166-168, available at
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/UNCLOS-Sen-Exec-Rpt- 108-10.pdf (emphasis added).
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emphasis. . . land-based nonpoint source pollution continues to degrade ocean
water quality in unsustainable ways., 275  Consequently, in this commentator's
view, the U.S. approach to oceans management must be changed to a new
paradigm of precautionary thinking that is likely to entail modifications to current
legislation and the manner in which such legislation is implemented via
regulation. 76
In the decade since the 1992 Rio Conference, the United States has only begun to shift
away from the paradigm of inexhaustibility to a new paradigm of sustainable use and
precautionary thinking... [It] generally has done a good job of regulating and preventing
marine pollution. However, [these]... efforts have focused on readily identifiable and
controllable point sources of pollution, such as ships and factories. To make further
progress in this aspect of sustainable development, the United States must address the
remaining issues in sewage treatment and the problem of land-based nonpoint source
pollution."
'277
Regarding marine pollution, the United States has been slow to address the multiplicity of
sources of land-based runoff and even slower to impose substantive goals for reducing
such pollution of the marine environment. These distinctions in regulatory focus and
effect indicate that U.S. ocean policy has yet to fully embrace the precautionary approach
and the necessary long-term thinking that sustainable use requires.
27 8
These seemingly contradictory positions raise several interesting questions.
Would or would not the U.S. federal environmental law changes recommended by
these experts entail incorporation of Europe's Precautionary Principle as U.S. law?
What form would these changes ultimately assume-formal amendments to
existing legislation or reinterpretation of implementing regulations? And, when
would such changes take place - before or after U.S. accession to the UNCLOS?
In lieu of seeking formal legislative amendments to U.S. environmental laws,
275. See Craig, supra note 62, at 10202 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 10191.
277. Id. at 10901,10206 (emphasis added); see Protocol concerning Pollution from Land-based
Sources and Activities to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Annex I (Adopted Oct. 6, 1999) ("'Point
Sources' means sources where the discharges and releases are introduced into the
environment from any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to pipes, channels, ditches, tunnels, conduits or wells from which pollutants are or
may be discharged; and 'Non-Point Sources' means sources, other than point sources, from
which substances enter the environment as a result of land run-off, precipitation,
atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage or by hydrologic modification.")
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/lbsmp/final%20protocoUlbsmp-protocol-eng.htm
I.
278. Craig, supra note 62, at 10192.
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commentators have also discussed how presidents may effectuate a similar change
to agency environmental regulations via the issuance of executive orders and
memoranda. In addition, presidents might use these instruments to ensure that
U.S. federal courts enforce international judgments, especially those handed down
by UNCLOS tribunals.
A. There Have Been Specific Efforts and Recommendations to Amend U.S.
Federal Environmental Legislation to Incorporate Europe's Precautionary
Principle and Comply With the UNCLOS and Related Treaties
Although the U.S. has not acceded to certain MEAs, including the UNCLOS,
the U.S. Congress has introduced bills to amend corresponding U.S. federal
environmental legislation, as if the U.S. had already acceded to or was expecting to
accede to such treaties and was now considering how to implement them. As
noted above, most of these treaties incorporate the Precautionary Principle. What
is not widely known, however, is how essential and integral these statutes are to
U.S. implementation of its UNCLOS obligations following U.S. accession. They
include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act
(CWA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), the Clean Air Act (CAA)
and the Oceans Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21st
Century Act (HR 21).279
Indeed, several independent commissions and nongovernmental organizations
have prepared studies and reports recommending UNCLOS accession, as well as
amendment or reinterpretation of existing U.S. environmental laws and
regulations, in preparation for a new comprehensive U.S. national oceans policy
that could effectively implement the legal obligations the U.S. would assume upon
UNCLOS ratification.
279. See generally, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries (Ocean Dumping) Act, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, The Submerged Lands Act, the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act, a new and revised National Invasive Species Act, the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, the Shore Protection Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 and the Rivers and Harbors Act. (There are other federal
statutes with corresponding regulations through which the U.S. government manages the
marine environment, that are not discussed within this article due to limited space).
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A 2003 Pew Oceans Commission report, 28 0 for example, has highlighted the
need to amend the CWA, the MSFCMA and the National Invasive Species Act.25 '
The Pew Oceans Commission Report is interesting also because of the legislative
amendments it does not recommend. Instead, it suggests that adjustments can be
made to federal administrative regulations to better implement current federal
environmental laws such as the ESA and MMPA.282
In addition, a 2004 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy 28 3 report contains more
comprehensive recommendations, concerning amendment of the NEPA, CAA,
CWA, ESA, MMPA, CZMA and the MSFCMA.25 4 In calling for U.S. accession
to UNCLOS, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy report also implied both that
UNCLOS may be used as political leverage within the U.S. to secure long-desired
amendments to U.S. environmental laws, and that the desired amendments to U.S.
environmental laws could inversely be used for diplomatic purposes abroad to
further shape and amend the UNCLOS in the U.S. image. 28 5  Apparently,
Precautionary Principle proponents have pursued the same double-edged strategy
280. See America's Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change, Pew Oceans
Commission (May 2003)
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting-ocean-life/
POC Summary.pdf.
281. Id. at 23, 25, 27.
282. Id. at 25 (speaking of adjustments to bycatch quotas and regional fisheries allocation plans).
283. An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, Final Report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy (Sept. 2004), at:
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/oceancommission/documents/full -colorrpt/welcome.htmlhtt
p://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color rpt/welcome.html; U.S. Commission
on Ocean Policy, About the Commission, (The Final Report was issued to the President and
the Congress on September 20, 2004, triggering the ninety-day (legislatively mandated)
response window for the White House. On December 17, 2004, two days before the
Commission was scheduled to expire, pursuant to the Oceans Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-256),
the White House issued Presidential Executive Order 133663. The E.O established a
cabinet-level Committee on Ocean Policy (COP), which then released the U.S. Ocean
Action Plan (OAP)). See also "About the Commission," U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy, http://www.oceancommission.gov/commission/welcome.html; Press Release, U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy, Chairman of U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy Commends
President Bush on Initial Step toward a National Ocean Policy (Dec. 17, 2004),
http://www.oceancommission.gov/newsnotices/decl7_04.html; U.S. Ocean Action Plan:
The Bush Administration's Response to the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy,
,http://ocean.ceq.gov/actionplan.pdf.
284. See Transmittal Letter from James D. Watkins to The Honorable William H. Frist, M.D.
Majority Leader, United States Senate dated September 2004, accompanying the
submission of An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century.
285. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, supra note 282, at 444-45.
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in calling for environment-friendly trade policies and proactive environmental
legislation in Europe so that it is eventually incorporated into treaties and then
adopted here in the U.S. However, such a strategy can easily backfire.
286
A 2006 report issued by the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative (JOCI) called
for changes in U.S. legislation and regulation to "[e]nable the transition toward an
ecosystem-based approach. 28 7  It specifically recommended that federal
environmental regulatory agencies develop guidelines to implement proposed
amendments to federal environmental statutes that will come up for reauthorization
in the future, including the MSFCMA, CZMA, CAA, CWA and the National
Marine Sanctuaries Act. 288 The JOCI report also highlighted the interrelationship
between its recommended U.S. statutory and regulatory changes and the need for
the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS.28 9
Apparently, the 1 1 0 1h Congressional majority closely analyzed the
recommendations contained within each of these reports in drafting the Oceans
Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the 21st Century Act (HR 21),
which is discussed later in this article.
290
Beyond these U.S. environmental and wildlife laws, U.S. chemicals laws, as
well, would need to be amended or reinterpreted incident to UNCLOS accession.
They include the Toxic Substances and Control Act (TSCA) 29 1 and the Federal
286. Joel Tickner, Carolyn Raffensperger & Nancy Myers, The Precautionary Principle in
Action -A Handbook, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NETWORK, at 3, ("In some
cases, especially those involving trade and proactive legislation in places like Europe, the
U.S. government is actively lobbying against precautionary actions by other governments..
. This lobbying threatens to undermine use of the precautionary principle in other countries,
which will ultimately affect the pressure that other countries can exert on the U.S. to invoke
the principle") (emphasis added),
http://www.biotech-info.net/handbook.pdf,
http://www.mindfully.org/Precaution/Precaution-In-Action-Handbook.htm.
287. See Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, From Sea to Shining Sea: Priorities for Ocean
Policy Reform, Report to the United States Senate, (June 2006), at 19-20,
http://www.jointoceancommission.org/resource-center/1-Reports/2006-06-
13 Sea to ShiningSeaReport to Senate.pdf.
288. Id. at 19-20.
289. Id. at 30-31.
290. See discussion infra.
291. The Toxic Substance and Control Act (TSCA) 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. (1976) ("was enacted
by Congress to give EPA the ability to track the 75,000 industrial chemicals currently
produced or imported into the United States. EPA repeatedly screens these chemicals and
can require reporting or testing of those that may pose an environmental or human-health
hazard. EPA can ban the manufacture and import of those chemicals that pose an
unreasonable risk . .. TSCA other Federal statutes, including the Clean Air Act and the
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Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 92 which regulate toxic
chemicals alleged to have been found in increasing quantities in U.S. river
effluents and ambient air flowing to U.S. coastal waters and into the oceans. In
fact, the Pew Oceans Commission report specifically stated that, "[t]he U.S. should
ratify the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and
implement federal legislation that allows for additions to the list of the 'dirty
dozen' chemicals." 293  During 2004294 and 2006295 Congress had convened
hearings for precisely this purpose. However, environmentalist calls to incorporate
Toxic Release Inventory under EPCRA") (emphasis added); see Summary of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, Laws, Regulations, Guidance and Dockets, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, ("TSCA Section 2(b), however, only requires action to regulate
chemical substances and mixtures which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
the environment, and to take action with respect to chemical substances and mixtures which
are imminent hazards") (emphasis added), http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/tsca.html.
292. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 135 et seq
(1972) (enacted originally in 1947, amended in 1972 by the Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act and then amended again and renamed in 1998. FIFRA's purpose is to
"protect the public health and environment from the misuse of pesticides by regulating the
labeling and registration of pesticides and by considering the costs and benefits of their
use...The 1988 Amendments strengthen[ed] EPA's authority in several major areas ....
Under FIFRA [as amended], all pesticides must be registered (licensed) by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) before they may be sold or distributed in
commerce. FIFRA sets an overall risk/benefit standard for pesticide registration, requiring
that pesticides perform their intended function, when used according to labeling directions,
without posing unreasonable risks of adverse effects on human health or the environment.
In making pesticide registration decisions, EPA is required by law to take into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of pesticide uses...FIFRA [also]
requires the review and 're-registration' of all existing pesticides ...FIFRA authorizes
EPA to cancel the registration of an existing pesticide if new test data show that it causes
unreasonable adverse effects on human health or the environment")(emphasis added); See
FIFRA Amendments of 1988 - History, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, (FIFRA
was recently amended again during 2008), http://epa.gov/history/topics/fifra/0l.htm.
293. See America's Living Oceans, supra note 279, at 28.
294. See POPS, PIC, AND LRTAP: The Role of the U.S. and Draft Legislation to Implement
These International Conventions, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Environment and
Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, H. Rpt. 108-112, 108th Cong. (July 13, 2004),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 108_househearings&docid=f:95454.pdf.
295. See Legislation to Implement the POPS, PIC and LRTAPs POPS Agreements, Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, H. Rpt. No. 109-63, 109'" Cong. (March
2, 2006),
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/05may2006I230/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/h
ouse/pdf/109hrg/27145.pdf.
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the Precautionary Principle expressly within POPs and PIC federal implementing
legislation designed to amend TSCA and FIFRA (by diminishing the role of
empirical risk assessment and economic cost benefit analysis) became a serious
sticking point and ultimately doomed U.S. ratification efforts.
296 297 298
If one were to agree, based on the findings of Part IL of this article, that the
Precautionary Principle is embedded within the UNCLOS, then one cannot also
agree with the former Bush administration, that no U.S. federal environmental
implementing legislation is required incident to UNCLOS accession. To do so,
would be to acknowledge that the Precautionary Principle is already embedded in
U.S. law, as well.
296. See Comments of Brooks Yeager in Response to Questions Posed by Rep. Tom Allen, H.
Rpt. No.108-112, at 98-99 (Precautionary Principle implementing legislation and treaty
debates during the 2004 hearings); Statement of Susan B. Hazen, Principle Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Id., at 20-22; Prepared Statement of Michael P. Walls,
American Chemistry Council, Id., at 37; Prepared Statement of Glenn M. Wiser, Senior
Attorney, The Center for International Environmental Law on Behalf of National
Environmental Trust, Oceana, Pesticide Action Network North America, Physicians for
Social Responsibility, Sierra Club, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Id., at 78;
Comments of Michael Walls, American Chemistry Council, in Response to Questions
Posed by Honorable Paul E. Gillmor, Id., at 91; Response for the Record by Steven
Goldberg on Behalf of CropLife America, Id., at 125-126; Comments of Michael Walls of
the American Chemistry Council and Steven Goldberg representing CropLife America in
Response to Questions Posed by Rep. Tom Allen, Id., at 97-98; Comments of Michael
Walls of the American Chemistry Council and Brooks Yeager, Visiting Fellow, The H.
John Heinz Ill Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, in Response to
Questions Posed by Rep. Mike Rogers, Id., at 102-103.
297. Prepared Statement of Brooks B. Yeager, Visiting Fellow, The H. John Heinz Ill Center for
Science, Economics, and the Environment, H. Rpt. No. 109-63, 59-61 (Precautionary
Principle implementing legislation and treaty debates during the 2006 hearings); Prepared
Statement of Michael P. Walls, Managing Director, Regulatory and Technical Affairs
Department, American Chemistry Council, 1d, at 64-67; Comments of Michael P. Walls
Before the Honorable Paul Gillmor, Id., at 62-63; Response for the Record by E. Donald
Elliott, Partner, Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to The Honorable John D. Dingell and the
Honorable Hilda L. Solis", Id., at 117-119; Response for the Record By Susan B. Hazen,
Principal Deputy Assistance Administrator, Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic
Substances, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to the Honorable Paul E. Gillmor," ld,
at 162-165.
298. See Generally, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries (Ocean Dumping) Act, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, The Submerged Lands Act, the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act, a new and revised National Invasive Species Act, the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, the Shore Protection Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 and the Rivers and Harbors Act. (There are other federal
statutes with corresponding regulations through which the U.S. government manages the
marine environment, that are not discussed within this article due to limited space).
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There is a difficulty in making this latter assumption, however, if one were to
agree with the findings of the environmentalists and legal commentators in Part III
of this article. They argue that the Precautionary Principle is, at best, incorporated
within specific U.S. environmental laws in spirit and must be expressly adopted as
U.S. law and actually employed in U.S. regulatory practice in order for the U.S. to
fulfill the legal obligations imposed on all nations by the UNCLOS and UN
Agenda 21, Chapter 17. This would seem to indicate rather clearly that
implementing legislation is required incident to U.S. UNCLOS ratification. If so,
Congress should hold open public transparent hearings to look into this question
and provide Americans with some answers.
1. The National Environmental Policy Act
Precautionary Principle proponents have opined that the NEPA statute and
regulations, 299 by virtue of their requirement that federal agencies undertake an
environmental impact study, analysis or assessment that addresses scientific
uncertainty before funding project activities that might potentially affect the
environment, embody the Precautionary Principle in spirit, "even though it is not
expressly mentioned in laws or policies."300 However, "[D]espite U.S. acceptance
of the precautionary principle in international treaties and other statements, little
work has been done to implement the principle" within the United States. 30 ' This
299. See The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (Pub. L. 91-190, 42
U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-
83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982),
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/nepa/nepaeqia.htm; National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, as amended, http://www.nps.gov/history/local-law/FHPLNtlEnvimPolcy.pdf; The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, (signed into law on January I,
1970, establishes national environmental policy and goals for the protection, maintenance,
and enhancement of the environment, and it provides a process for implementing these
goals within the federal agencies. The Act also establishes the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ)); See National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) - Basic Information, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/basics/nepa.html; Jim
Chen, The Jurisdynamics of Environmental Protection (Environmental Law Institute)(2003)
at 117 ("NEPA requires a searching investigation before any federal action that may affect
the environment goes forward. Such an investigation involves forecasting future impacts
and predicting whether an activity will erode the necessary ecosystems that sustain our
healthy human condition).
http://books.google.com/books?id=8vCkSM I auwlC&dq=NEPA+%2B+precautionary+prin
ciple&source=gbssummarys&cad=0.
300. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
301. See Tickner, Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 286 at 3.
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admission is quite significant. It signals to the academic and environmental
faithful that a much greater effort must be waged to amend or create new U.S. laws
and regulations, particularly those covered by the NEPA, that expressly
incorporate the Precautionary Principle and reflect its actual practice.
302
2. The Clean Water Act
"The Clean Water Act [CWA]30 3 prohibits the discharge of pollutants from a
point source into navigable waters without an NPDES [national pollution discharge
elimination system] permit. ' '304 It defines a "discharge of a pollutant" as "any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
30 5
At least one Precautionary Principle proponent has argued that the CWA's
requirement of a "permit to pollute," in the case of identifiable "point sources,"
essentially constitutes a reversal of the burden of proof from government to
industry.30 6 This implies that the CWA embodies the Precautionary Principle.
This proponent cites two cases that support her position. In South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe,30 7 the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether the pumping of canal water from a manmade canal into a water
302. See Amanda Griscom, Polluting the Village to Save It, Grist Environmental News and
Commentary (Aug. 12, 2004), http://www.grist.org/news/muck/2004/08/12/griscom-
defense/index.html.
303. The Federal Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, (As amended, is rooted in
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, October 18, 1972); See
"Clean Water Act - Laws and Regulations," U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("The
Clean Water Act established the basic structure for regulating discharges of pollutants into
the waters of the United States. It gave EPA the authority to implement pollution control
programs such as setting wastewater standards for industry. The Clean Water Act also
continued requirements to set water quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters.
The Act made it unlawful for any person to discharge any pollutant from a point source into
navigable waters, unless a permit was obtained under its provisions .... Revisions in 1981
streamlined the municipal construction grants process, improving the capabilities of
treatment plants built under the program. Changes in 1987 phased out the construction
grants program, replacing it with the State Water Pollution Control Revolving Fund, more
commonly known as the Clean Water State Revolving Fund. This new funding strategy
addressed water quality needs by building on EPA-State partnerships. Over the years,
many other laws have changed parts of the Clean Water Act"),
http://www.epa.gov/r5water/cwa.htm.
304. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342.
305. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
306. See Carolyn Raffensperger, Arguing Pollution is Legal Under the CWA, The Environmental
Forum (March/April 2006) at 16, http://www.sehn.org/pdf/mar apr06.pdf.
307. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), slip. op.,
http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/pdf/O2-626P.ZO.
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conservation area, where the pumping activities served to artificially maintain the
water table in the water conservation area at a level significantly higher than the
water level in the lands drained by the canal (i.e., to prevent backflow of the waters
into the canal and eventual flooding of populated areas) constituted a "pollution
discharge" requiring a CWA permit.308 Apparently, the waters were considered
pollution because they contained contaminated groundwater and agricultural,
urban and residential surface runoff.30 9 Unable to discern from the facts whether a
transfer of pollutant-laden waters from one body of water to another meaningfully
distinct body of water had occurred, the Court vacated the order of the lower
district court and remanded the case back for such a determination.
31 0
In the related case of Friends of the Everglades et al. v. South Florida Water
Management District,3 1 ' environmentalists and sports fisherman filed suit during
2006 against the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) to enjoin it
from pumping ground and rainwater runoff allegedly containing "contaminants,
including phosphorous from fertilizers" discharged by sugar plantations located
along the developed Florida Everglades Agricultural Area into Florida's adjacent
Lake Okeechobee and accompanying wetlands. 31 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the
pumping constituted "the discharge of a pollutant" that required a CWA permit.
31 3
Having followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Miccosukee Tribe, the federal
district court ruled, during December 2006 that, in the absence of a NPDES permit,
SFWMD's operation of pump stations to back pump pollutant-containing waters
from the canals into Lake Okeechobee was in violation of the CWA. 3 14 The court
withheld judgment on plaintiff's request for injunctive relief until June 2007, at
which time it issued a permanent injunction against the SFWMD, thereby freezing
its pumping activities until it obtains a permit.
31 5
308. Order Setting Forth Finding of Fact, Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water
Management District, Case No. 02-80309-Civ-Altonaga (S.D. Fla.).
309. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, supra note 307, Slip op. at 2-4.
310. Id. at 13-14.
311. Order Setting Forth Finding of Fact, supra, note 320.See, et al., Case No. 02-80309-Civ-
Altonaga, Order Setting forth Finding of Fact (SD FL 2006).
312. Id.
313. See Raffensperger, supra note 307.
314. Id. at 106.
315. See Friends of the Everglades, Inc. et. al., v. Henry Dean Case No. 02-803309-Civ-
Altonaga, Final Judgment (SD FL 2006),
http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legaldocs/judge-rules-pumping-polluted-water-into-
lake-okeechobee-illegal.pdf.
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In contrast to these two decisions, National Association of Home Builders v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers31 6 rejected environmentalists' arguments that home
builders and developers needed a CWA permit "to operate construction equipment
in wetlands unless they are actually dredging or filling them in. Simply clearing
brush or extra vegetation - or even turning on the backhoe... the court [reasoned].
. .should not require a permit." 317  The Court saw through environmentalists'
efforts to narrowly interpret a revised CWA regulatory 'incidental fallback'
exception to the general administrative presumption of a 'discharge of dredged
material.' 31 8 It ruled that "a 'discharge' of dirt should be regulated not by the
quantity that is being disturbed, but by where it is put. Regulators can only step in
if the dirt is being moved to another location on the property, which presumably
might affect the function of the wetland and trigger Clean Water Act interest.
Second, the court found the ... [regulatory] rule defective because it improperly
shifted the burden ofprooffrom the agency to the landowner."31
9
Alternatively, in the absence of any clear reference to the Precautionary
Principle within either the CWA's text or legislative history, activists have argued
that the CWA and its accompanying regulations must be amended or supplemented
to expressly reflect it. They reasoned that although we in the U.S. are already
largely practicing precaution by adopting and complying with many environmental
laws and regulations, these laws and regulations still do not cover "each possible
industrial hazard or chemical. 320 In addition, the majority of our environmental
rules, such as those contained in the Clean Water Act and other statutes, are
316. National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (D.DC 2007)
Civil Action No. 01-0274 http://rapanos.typepad.com/tulloch2opinion.pdf;
317. See NAHB applauds 'Tulloch II' Clean Water Act Ruling, Builders News Network (Feb. 2,
2007) at 5, http://www.hbaofsc.com/bnn/2007 02 02.pdf.
318. National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, supra at 2-3
("This suit is the most recent manifestation of a longstanding legal dispute about just what
constitutes the discharge of dredged material. Between 1986 and 1993, the Corps defined
the discharge of dredged material as 'any addition of dredged material into the waters of the
United States' while expressly excluding 'de minimis, incidental soil movement occurring
during normal dredging operations' . . . 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) .. .In 1993, however, the
Corps issued a new rule that eliminated the de minimis exception ...It defined the
discharge of dredged material as 'any addition of dredged material into, including redeposit
of dredged material within, the waters of the United States"').
319. Id (emphasis added).
320. See Tickner, Raffensperger & Myers, supra note 286, at 17; The Precautionary Principle -
A Common Sense Way to Protect Public Health and the Environment, Science and
Environmental Health Network (Jan. 2000)
http://www.mindfully.org/Precaution/Precautionary-Principle-Common-Sense.htm.
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intended to control "the amount of pollution released into the environment and
cleaning up once contamination has occurred . . . . [They] ...are based on the
assumption that humans and ecosystems can absorb a certain amount of
contamination without being harmed."02 ' And, "there are some major loopholes in
the way these rules are being applied.",322 Accordingly, Americans must change
their way of thinking about and approaching environmental issues and expressly
adopt the Precautionary Principle. If the [Precautionary [P]rinciple were
universally applied, many toxic substances, contaminants, and unsafe practices
would not be produced or used in the first place .... The [P]recautionary
[P]rinciple would become the basis for reforming environmental laws and
regulations and for creating new regulations. . . . In coming years precaution
should be exercised, argued and promoted on many levels-in regulations, industrial
practices, science, consumer choices, education, communities, and schools."
323
At least one commentator argues that the CWA's lack of defined water quality
standards, which precludes the EPA from regulating land-based activities that
threaten ocean water quality,324 constitutes one such loophole. In this
commentator's opinion, adoption of the Precautionary Principle within the CWA
would enable the EPA to stop land-based pollution. Although this may not yet be
politically possible, it is worth aiming for in the future.
The United States could make astounding progress toward controlling land-based pollution
of the oceans if every developer, farmer, silvaculturist, forestry operation, sewage
treatment plant, and urban planner had to prove an affirmative answer to one question: Are
you certain that your actions will not harm or impair the ocean, or any of the organisms
that inhabit the ocean, most directly downstream of your watershed? Such a truly
precautionary regulatory regime is unlikely to garner political support in the next 10
years, but it is worth identifying as a potential future goal now.
325
3. The Endangered Species Act (ESA)
The ESA implements obligations the United States assumed upon becoming a
party to two international treaties, each containing important provisions for the
protection of migratory birds. 326 The obligations include CITES (noted above) and
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id(emphasis added).
324. See Craig, supra note 62 at 10206.
325. Id. (emphasis added).
326. The Endangered Species Act (ESA), 7 U.S.C. 136; 16 U.S.C. 460, (1973) ("provides a
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the Pan American Convention (the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere).327
Both a former senior Bush administration official and a legal scholar well
versed in the UNCLOS have testified before the U.S. Senate that it is not necessary
to amend the ESA incident to U.S. UNCLOS accession. Their reasoning:
UNCLOS Article 194 imposes only a minimal general standard - "to take
measures to control pollution of the marine environment" - which the U.S. has
already done. In their estimation, there is nothing more required since "Article 194
does not specify any particular pollution control standards." 328 Their position
likely acknowledges that neither the UNCLOS nor the ESA currently incorporate
the Precautionary Principle expressly. However, does it not overlook the fact that
both might very well incorporate the Precautionary Principle in spirit?
Legal commentators who are skeptical of the Precautionary Principle and its
legal and economic implications are not unaware of such gamesmanship. At least
one has alleged that, "precautionary thinking has affected the implementation of
U.S. environmental laws, including ... the Endangered Species Act.... If a given
action could harm a species that might be endangered, do not allow it." 329
Another commentator's research places the plausibility of such testimony into
serious question. This scholar has asserted that neither the express language nor
the legislative history of the ESA reflects the Precautionary Principle, and that a
program for the conservation of threatened and endangered plants and animals and the
habitats in which they are found. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) of the
Department of the Interior maintains the list of over 1500 endangered species and 300
threatened species. Species include birds, insects, fish, reptiles, mammals, crustaceans,
flowers, grasses, and trees. Anyone can petition FWS to include a species on this list. The
law prohibits any action, administrative or real, that results in a 'taking' of a listed species,
or adversely affects habitat. Likewise, import, export, interstate, and foreign commerce of
listed species are all prohibited. EPA's decision to register a pesticide is based in part on
the risk of adverse effects on endangered species as well as environmental fate (how a
pesticide will affect habitat). Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), EPA can issue emergency suspensions of certain pesticides to cancel or restrict
their use if an endangered species will be adversely affected"). See Summary of the
Endangered Species Act - Laws, Regulations, Guidance & Dockets, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, (The ESA has since been amended many times),
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/esa.html.
327. See A Guide to the Laws and Treaties of the United States for Protecting Migratory Birds,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/intmltr/treatlaw.html.
328. See Statement of Bernard H. Oxman, Professor of Law, University of Miami, supra note
188, at 163.
329. See Jonathan Adler, Dangerous Precaution, National Review Online (Sept. 13, 2002)
http://www.nationalreview.com/adler/ader091302.asp.
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'Professional Judgment Method' of regulation had long prevailed until the mid-
1990s. Pursuant to that method, agencies implemented substantive duties based
largely on the professional judgment of administrators, whose "decisions were
subject to judicial review under the deferential Administrative Procedure Act
standards., 330 Since the mid-1990's however, two competing alternative methods
of regulation have evolved, "each pull[ing] the statute in opposite directions" and
affecting its implementation. 33 1 One method requires that "an agency decision to
extend protection to a species, such as by limiting land development in the species'
habitat ... withstand the rigors of a scientific peer review process assessing each
facet of the agency's work [the Scientific Method] 3 32 The other dispenses with
"peer review and other accoutrements of science, 333 and requires that "all close
calls are resolved in favor of extending protection to a species, even when the
evidence in support of protecting a species is slim, sufficient at most, to support a
fear that failure to protect the species could have adverse consequences." 134 It is
the latter approach of "err[ing] on the side of the species [, which] ... is embodied
in the Precautionary Principle," 335 and that triggered much of the contentious
public debate since then.
Precautionary Principle proponents have openly argued, for example, that the
Congress intended for the ESA to be an "institutionalization of... caution. It is
likely one of the earliest legislative expressions of what is now referred to as the
Precautionary Principle." 336 Consequently, "the rationale and language used to
articulate the need for passage of the ESA 30 years ago is nearly the same as that
330. See JB Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555,
589-90 (2004) at 10-12, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=444280.
331. Id. at 560.
332. Id. at 560-561.
333. Id.; Daniel J. McGarvey, Merging Precaution with Sound Science under the Endangered
Species Act, 57 BIOSCIENCE MAGAZINE 1 (Jan 2007) 65-70 at 69, ("While it is true that the
origins of the precautionary principle are more political than scientific (Foster et at. 2000),
there is no epistemological reason why it cannot be employed as a legitimate standard in
scientific research"), http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1641I/B5701I 0?cookieSet = 1.
334. See JB Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, supra note 330, at 12.
335. Id. at 3.
336. See Jeff Curtis and Bob Davison, The Endangered Species Act: Thirty Years on the Ark,
OPEN SPACES QUARTERLY (2003) http://www.open-spaces.com/article-v5n3-davison.php,
referenced in Remarks of Assistant Secretary Craig Manson Prepared for Delivery at CLE
International's 10th Annual Endangered Species Act and Habitat Conservation Planning
Conference (Dec. 5, 2003)
http://www.fws.gov/news/speeches/remarksofcraigmanson120503.htm.
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used today to argue for its continued strength. 337 Does this mean that the ESA has
always incorporated the Precautionary Principle in spirit?
The Congressional Research Service has also contributed to this confusion. In
2007, it concluded that although the ESA text "does not expressly incorporate the
Precautionary Principle, it is justifiable to interpret the 'best information/data
available' language contained within the ESA ex post facto as if the statute had
always intended to provide declining species with a margin of safety and the
benefit of the doubt, and thus, as incorporating the Precautionary Principle in
spirit.338 It cites as support the National Fish and Wildlife Service's Endangered
Species Consultation Handbook, which states that,
[E]fforts should be made to develop information, but if a biological opinion must be
rendered promptly, it should be based on the available information, 'giving the benefit of
the doubt to the species,' with consultation possibly being reinitiated if additional
information becomes available. This phrase is drawn from the conference report on the
1979 amendments to the ESA, which states that the 'best information available' language
was intended to allow FWS to issue biological opinions even when inadequate information
was available, rather than being forced by that inadequacy to issue negative opinions,
thereby unduly impeding proposed actions.
339
Environmental and animal rights activists have since employed this reasoning to
keep the U.S. Navy on edge. During 2003, for example, they challenged a
legislative exemption from the ESA that had been granted to the Defense
Department on 'military readiness' grounds. 340 Yet this garnered only a fraction of
the publicity that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's proposed (January 2007)14 1
337. Id.
338. See The Endangered Species Act and 'Sound Science,' CRS Report for Congress #
RL32992 (Jan. 8, 2007) at CRS-17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32992.pdf.
339. Id. at CRS-20 (citing Endangered Species Consultation Handbook: Procedures for
Conducting Consultation and Conference Activities under Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act Washington, DC: Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries
Service, March 1998, 1-6) (emphasis added); U.S. House, Committee of Conference,
Endangered Species Act Amendments, H. Rept. 96-697 (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO,
1979), 12.
340. See David M. Bearden, Defense Cleanup and Environmental Programs: Authorization and
Appropriations for FY2004, CRS Report for Congress # RL32183 (Jan. 5, 2004) at CRS-
17, CRS- 18, http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/04Jan/RL32183.pdf.
341. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Petition Finding and
Proposed Rule To List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its
Range, 72 FR 1064, 1089 (Jan. 9, 2007) (The ESA regulates the 'take' of polar bears, while
"[t]he CZMA applies to polar bear habitats of northern and western Alaska. The North
Slope Borough and Alaska Coastal Management Programs assist in protection of polar bear
habitat through the project review process."),
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and final (May 2008)342 ESA listing of the polar bear did, especially considering
environmental activist efforts to have the FWS "institute a [P]recautionary
[A]pproach when setting harvest limits in a warming Arctic environment," which it
ultimately declined to do.
343
4. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
Like the ESA, the MMPA 344 prohibits the 'take' of a marine mammal, which is
defined as "any act of pursuit, torment or annoyance which has the potential to
disturb a marine mammal in the wild by causing disruption of behavioral
patterns." 345 And, like the ESA, the MMPA does not expressly incorporate the
Precautionary Principle within any of its textual provisions to implement this or
any other of its provisions.
Yet, this has not prevented the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
from promulgating final administrative regulations in 2001 that expressly employ
the Precautionary Principle for purposes of implementing the 'take' prohibition in
both statutes. 346 According to the NMFS, the Precautionary Principle was adopted
within its regulations to prevent vessel traffic from creating disturbances that can
http://www.setonresourcecenter.com/register/2007/Jan/09/1064A.pdf.
342. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status
for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 73 FR 28212 (May 15, 2008), 50 CFR Part 17,
http://alaska.fws.gov/fisheries/mmm/polarbear/pdf/PolarBearFinalRule.pdf.
343. Id. at 73 FR 28280; see Letter from Alaskan Governor Sarah Palin to Honorable Dick
Kempthome, Secretary of the Interior (April 7 2007) (expressing formal opposition to
listing the polar bear under the Endangered Species Act as threatened in all or significant
portions of its range and accompanying attachments, 'express[ing] concern to pursue
precautionary management for the conservation of polar bears'),
http://www.adfg.state.ak.us/special/esa/polarbears/statecomments4-9-07.pdf.
344. The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972,16 U.S.C. 1361-1407, P.L. 92-522,
October 21, 1972, 86 Stat. 1027, (enacted on October 21, 1972 and has been amended
numerous times); Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972 - Overview, NOAA
Fisheries - Office of Protected Resources, ("All marine mammals are protected under the
MMPA ... [which] prohibits, with certain exceptions, the 'tak[ing]' of marine mammals in
U.S. waters and by U.S. citizens on the high seas, and the importation of marine mammals
and marine mammal products into the U.S ... The MMPA was amended substantially in
1994" and then again in 2004"), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa.
345. See 16 U.S.C. §1362(13) of the MMPA; 16 U.S.C. 1538 (Section 9) of the ESA.
346. Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531; Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
16 U.S.C. 1361, (Both authorities issue this rule); See Final Regulations Governing the
Approach to Humpback Whales in Alaska, 66 FR 29502, 50 CFR Part 224 (May 31, 2001)
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/frules/humpbackapproachfr.pdf.
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disrupt humpback whale behavior to such an extent as to rise to the level of a
'taking' that could potentially endanger the health and safety of the species.
Consistent with the definition of 'take' and the associated prohibition on 'take,' NMFS is
implementing these regulations to prevent disturbance of humpback whales that may be
caused by disruption of behavioral patterns. In addition, the precautionary principle would
dictate that NMFS take action to protect a species based on the information that we have
that shows that vessel traffic can cause changes in a whale's behavior .... The impact of
the current level of viewing pressure, or an increased viewing pressure, may not be fully
understood for many years. The risk of harm to the species from a possible delay in
detecting a long-term negative response to increased pressure provides impetus to
implement measures on a precautionary basis to manage vessel interaction with humpback
whales in waters off Alaska." 
347
One 2004 Congressional Research Service report identified and discussed the
issues that might be raised during any future discussions concerning the
reauthorization of the MMPA.348 In so doing, it reviewed the debates that had
arisen over prior legislative and regulatory proposals beginning with the mid-
1990's. 349 The report reveals that, on several occasions, environmentalists and
animal rights advocates and their congressional patrons had endeavored to enact
legislative amendments to and secure regulatory reinterpretations of the MMPA
which would have provided for the indirect adoption of Europe's Precautionary
Principle. 350 These initiatives had focused on changing three definitional standards
within the MMPA: "potential biological removals (PBRs)," "deterrents," and
"harassment."
35
'
The CRS report highlighted that PBR amendment efforts encountered resistance
from industry and native communities. In a nutshell, PBRs determine "the
maximum number of animals .. . that may be removed from a marine mammal
stock while allowing that stock to reach or maintain its optimum sustainable
population., 352 Apparently, the fishing industry and Native Alaskan community
347. 66 FR 29506, 29509 (emphasis added).
348. See Eugene H. Buck, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Reauthorization Issues, CRS
Report for Congress #RL 30120, (June 18, 2004),
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/908/RL30120_20040618.pdfseque
nce-2.
349. Id. at CRS-I.
350. Id. at FN 34, CRS-12, CRS-14, CRS-37, CRS-43.
351. Id. at CRS-12, CRS-14, CRS-37.
352. Id. at CRS-11.
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believed that NOAA's restrictiveness in calculating PBRs compromised the
economic viability of certain fisheries (e.g., the New England and mid-Atlantic
gillnet fisheries, Bering Sea Pollock fishery). 353  Certain scientists and animal
protection advocates, on the other hand, were concerned that if PBR limitations
were made less restrictive, they would "not provide adequate incentive for
commercial fisherman to develop better ways of targeting and catching certain
species of fish (e.g., phasing out indiscriminate harvesting methods). 354 They
further worried that a more liberal PBR standard could "retard the process of
approaching the MMPA's zero mortality rate goal (ZMRG) . . . . Scientific,
animal protection and environmental interests... [saw] PBR as a means of invoking
the precautionary principle in marine mammal management - by which the
federal government takes action to avert possible harm to marine mammals, even
when the causal link between human behavior and those damages is not
completely clear."
' 355
With respect to the MMPA's rules concerning deterrents, which are devices that
fishermen may use "to discourage marine mammals from damaging fish catch or
gear,'356 the report reflects that environmental and animal rights advocates had
endeavored to shift the burden of proof via the Precautionary Principle from the
government to show a given deterrent is harmful, to industry to prove that it was
harmless.
Currently, the burden falls on the federal government to prove that a deterrent is harmful
before it can be prohibited .... With huge gaps of knowledge in marine mammal science,
some animal protection advocates argue that it would be prudent to allow only proven
harmless deterrents for use on marine mammals interacting with fishing vessels and/or fish
farms. Some have argued for reliance on the precautionary principle that would require
manufacturers to prove that a deterrent does not cause permanent harm to any age/sex
class of affected marine mammal species before allowing its use .... Others assert that it
is an extreme standard to be required to prove a negative - that an AHD does not cause
harm.
357
In regard to the statutory meaning of the term "harassment," the report
described how the environmental and animal activists had sought to reverse a 2003
353. Id. at CRS-1 I, CRS-12.
354. Id. at CRS-12.
355. Id. at CRS-I 1, CRS-12 (emphasis added).
356. Id. at CRS-14.
357. Id. at CRS-14, CRS-15 (emphasis added).
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legislative amendment to the MMPA 358 that had effectively granted the
Department of Defense an exemption from the statute's general harassment
prohibition, which they consider to be "among the key protections provided in the
statute., 359 The amendment essentially redefined "harassment" from any action
that has the "potential to injure," to any action that has the "significant potential to
injure" marine mammals.3 60 Environmental activists argued that this change raised
the burden of proof necessary to show that a military readiness activity would
affect a marine mammal (i.e., it made it more difficult to protect them). 361 Some
even argued that such change "effectively reverse[d] the precautionary burden of
proof that ha[d] been the hallmark of the MMPA since its inception," in favor of
U.S. military preparedness, and thus, contravened the original intent of
Congress. 362 In the end, these activists pledged to reverse this amendment and to
expressly reinstate the Precautionary Principle within the MMPA when the statute
came up for reauthorization once again in the future.
3 63
No doubt, Precautionary Principle advocates had already been emboldened by
the 2002 litigation they had commenced in a northern California federal district
court against the U.S. Navy, In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Donald Evans,364 various environmental groups alleging violations of the MMPA,
ESA, APA, and NEPA sought to enjoin the Navy from conducting peacetime
military exercises using low frequency sonar in the U.S. coastal, contiguous and
exclusive economic zones.365 As the result of the plaintiffs' success in securing a
358. See Eugene H. Buck and Kori Calvert, Active Military Sonar and Marine Mammals: Events
and References, CRS Report for Congress # RL33133 (Updated Nov. 3, 2005) ("On
November 24, 2003, "President Bush signed P.L. 108-136 [HR 1588], the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2004, wherein §319 amended the MMPA to exempt military
readiness activities from 'specified geographical region' and 'small numbers' requirements,
and to modify the definition of 'harassment' applicable to military readiness activities.").
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstreai/handle/10207/261 0/RL33133_20051103.pdfsequ
ence=l.
359. See Bearden, supra note 3409, at CRS-20.
360. See Eugene H. Buck, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Reauthorization Issues, CRS
Report for Congress #RL 30120, at CRS-43.
361. Id
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Donald Evans, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003
(N.D. Cal. 2002), http://www.animallaw.info/cases/caus232fsupp2dl003.htm.
365. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Donald Evans, No. C-02-3805-EDL,
Opinion and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, at 1-2,
http://fl I .findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nrdc/nrdcevans82503opn.pdf.
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preliminary injunction, the Navy was compelled to settle.366 But this did not end
the Navy's effort to secure legislative or executive 'fixes' to the problem (e.g., the
MMPA amendment noted above and executive orders exempting Navy adherence
367to the ESA and CZMA on national security grounds). Notwithstanding these
efforts, environmentalists have continued to challenge the Navy's use of low and
medium frequency sonar in U.S. waters, as the litigation initiated in response to the
Navy's more recent grant of exemption demonstrates.
368
Apparently, these activists have been inspired by other Precautionary Principle
proponents familiar with EU law, who believe that current risk-based studies are
inadequate to prove marine mammal safety. According to one such commentator,
"although science is central to risk assessment, values and ethics also play
important roles., 36 9 He has thus argued that, since both the UNCLOS and certain
EU directives protective of the marine environment incorporate the Precautionary
Principle, any use by the U.S. military of high-intensity military sonar within EU
member state (EEZ, contiguous and coastal waters) or the high seas would be
inconsistent with the Precautionary Principle and EU laws. 370 Consequently, the
U.S. government could potentially be found liable under UNCLOS (presumably
under the doctrine of State Responsibility) for any damages that U.S. Naval sonar
exercises might inflict on marine mammals, even if the U.S. military itself was
found to be immune from suit pursuant to UNCLOS Article 298(l)(b).37'
In addition, it must not be overlooked how EU politicians have helped to shape
366. Id.; see also Navy Agrees to Limit Global Sonar Deployment, Natural Resources Defense
Council Press Release (Oct. 13, 2003)
http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/03101 3.asp.
367. See Gibel, supra note 74, at 26-27.
368. See New National Defense Exemption to Marine Mammal Protection Act Authorized for
Navy, U.S. Department of Defense News Release No. 072-07 (Jan. 23, 2007)
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10427; Joe Beck, Navy Gets
Reprieve From Mammal Protection Law, NORTH COUNTY TIMES (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/0I/24/news/topstories/O 04 901 23 07.txt.
369. See Statement of Jonathan Van Dyke, in Erin Vos and Randall R. Reeves, Report of an
International Workshop: Policy on Sound and Marine Mammals 28-30 September 2004,
U.S. Marine Mammal Commission - Joint Nature Conservation Committee UK (Dec. 23,
2005) at 22, http://www.mmc.gov/sound/intemationalwrkshp/pdf/finalworkshopreport.pdf.
370. Id.
371. Id.; see Jon M. Van Dyke, Chapter 15 - The Evolution and International Acceptance of the
Precautionary Principle, in David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber, BRINGING NEW LAW
TO OCEAN WATERS (2004) at 357-379, available at
http://www.mmc.gov/sound/internationalwrkshp/pdf/vandyke.pdf;
http://www.brill.nl/print.aspx?partid=2 l0&pid=21272.
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372international and U.S. public opinion against the U.S. Navy's use of sonar, as
they and various transatlantic constituencies have continued to pressure the U.S.
government to ratify the UNCLOS.373 They previously alleged, for example, that
by granting these military exemptions to the ESA and MMPA, the U.S.
government has failed to implement the Precautionary Principle and consequently
has endangered marine wildlife in violation of the UNCLOS and other
international environmental laws. Indeed, the European Federation of Green
Parties of the European Parliament issued a politically antagonistic resolution
during November 2002 for precisely this purpose. The resolution: (1) asserted that
the U.S. government military's continued use of sonar has violated various
provisions of UNCLOS (Articles 194 and 204-206); (2) declared that the
Precautionary Principle, UNCLOS and the U.N. Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) are customary international law that the U.S. must abide, whether
or not it has implemented the principle or ratified both conventions; (3) insisted
that, consistent with UNCLOS, the U.S. must provide the public with an
environmental impact assessment of its use of sonar; (4) demanded that the U.S.
ratify both the UNCLOS and the CBD and "adhere to other instruments of
international law"; and (5) applauded the ruling in the 2002 Natural Resources
Defense Council decision which blocked the U.S. Navy from deploying a new
high-intensity sonar system in U.S. waters.
374
To be sure, the EU continues to move towards greater oceans regulation. This
372. See European Greens on LFAS, Resolution Adopted by the European Federation of Green
Parties (Nov. 16, 2002) at para. (E)(6), http://www.buergerwelle.de/pdf/grn/omega74.htm.
373. Id. at para. 5; see also Draft Recommendation 833 on Europe's Northern Security
Dimension, in, Paul Wille and Odd Einar Dorum, Europe's Northern Security Dimension,
Report of the European Security and Defense Assembly - Assembly of Western European
Union, DOCUMENT A/2016 (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.assembly-
weu.org/enldocuments/sessionsordinaires/rpt/2008/2016.pdf (expressing concern that the
U.S. must ratify UNCLOS to help resolve competing territorial claims to the Arctic - See
especially: Preamble at para. xxvii-xxix; Recommendation para. 6. at 3-4.); see William H.
Taft IV and Frances G. Burwell, Law & the Lone Superpower: Rebuilding a Transatlantic
Consensus on International Law, The Atlantic Council (Apr. 2007),
http://www.acus.org/docs/070417_Law%20 &%20 TheLoneSuperpower.pdf ("The
United States should join at least one multilateral agreement that will enhance its reputation
as a leader in the international legal field while also furthering U.S. interests. In particular,
securing ratification of the UN Convention on- Law of the Sea would reinforce the U.S.
position as a leader not only in legal, but also environmental matters - topics on which the
U.S. reputation has dropped considerably in recent years, especially in Europe.").
374. See European Greens on LFAS, Resolution Adopted by the European Federation of Green
Parties (Nov. 16, 2002), at para. (C-D), (E)(2), (5), (6).
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past June, the EU Parliament and Council were finally able to agree on a member
state directive that establishes a regional framework on marine environmental
policy 375 that expressly references the UNCLOS, ecosystem-based approach,
marine protected areas, and "in particular, the Precautionary Principle."
' 376
5. The Coastal Zone Management Act
International law commentators are often eager to draw the connection between
U.N. Agenda 21 and the CZMA. 377 They have multiple purposes for doing so.
First, they wish to point how Agenda 21 obligates coastal state governments to
adopt coastal zone management procedures that foster the "sustainable
development of coastal areas and the marine environment under their national
jurisdiction., 378  These procedures include "applying 'preventive and
precautionary approaches . . . to protect and preserve sensitive offshore
ecosystems such as coral reefs and to maintain water quality despite land- and sea-
based pollution." 37 9 They also wish to emphasize how Chapter 17 [of Agenda 2 1]
admonishes coastal states to "to maintain the biological diversity of marine species
in the areas under national jurisdiction and to maintain the productivity of marine
ecosystems. 38 0  In the estimation of one commentator, "[T]he [P]recautionary
[P]rinciple might even require a presumption, at least in coastal areas that are
375. See Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, (June 17,
2008)(establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental
policy, Marine Strategy Framework Directive, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ: L:2008:164:0019:0040: EN: PDF.
376. Id. at Preamble, para. (6), (8), (17), (18), (21), (27), (44), art. l(3), 3(l)(a), 13(4), 21.
377. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Public Law 92-583, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1456,
(enacted in 1972, and has been amended numerous times since); About Coastal Zone
Management Act - Congressional Action to Help Manage Our Nation's Coasts, Ocean &
Coastal Resource Management website of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, ("The Act...provides for management of
the nation's coastal resources, including the Great Lakes, and balances economic
development with environmental conservation. The CZMA outlines two national programs,
the National Coastal Zone Management Program and the National Estuarine Research
Reserve System .... The overall program objectives of CZMA remain . . . to 'preserve,
protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance the resources of the nation's
coastal zone."'), http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/czm/czmact.html; see also, Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972, NOAA Ocean and Coastal Resources Management,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/about/czma.html#section304.
378. See Craig, supra note 62, at 10196.
379. Id.
380. Id.
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already densely populated, against further development and sea traffic, especially
if the coastal environment cannot adequately perform its functions of water
filtration, erosion control, and habitat for marine species."
381
Second, they have emphasized how the U.S. government's failure, thus far, to
implement the Precautionary Principle within the CZMA and the Clean Water Act
has rendered the U.S. government unable to satisfy the CZMA's policy goals, and
has also resulted in the further degradation of the nation's coastal wetlands. "The
CZMA and CWA programs have been insufficient to prevent overall degradation
of the nation's coastal zones or to make significant progress in restoring degraded
areas, particularly degraded wetlands. Neither the CZMA nor the CWA explicitly
incorporates a precautionary approach.
382
Third, in order to satisfy the CZMA's underlying policy objectives for the
benefit of the American public, and to fulfill the international mandate of
sustainable development of the coastlines, these commentators have recommended
that the U.S. Congress amend the CZMA in the future so that it expressly
incorporates the Precautionary Principle. "For example... Congress could amend
. . . the Act [to] . . . encourage states to protect sensitive marine species and
ecosystems, preserve coral reefs, discourage near shore coastal development,
address boating and recreational use issues, and to adopt a precautionary
presumption that further development within a certain distance of the mean high
tide line is prohibited.
383
Fourth, they have recommended that U.S. state-level governments employ their
laws more proactively to achieve these objectives. Since the CZMA is, for all
intensive purposes, a national state-centered program, once a state coastal program
has been certified as satisfying the CZMA requirements, Federal actions
undertaken within the state's coastal zone must be conducted in a manner
consistent with the State's CZM plan to the maximum extent practicable.
384
The California Coastal Commission may have actually followed this advice.
On March 7, 2007, California's Attorney General filed suit under the CZMA in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking to enjoin
381. Id
382. Id. at 10198 (emphasis added).
383. Id. at 10 199-10200 (emphasis added).
384. See Carolyn Raffensperger, A State Preempts the U.S. Navy, ENV'T LAW INST. (May/June
2007), http://www.sehn.org/pdf/may-jun2007.pdf.
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the U.S. Navy from conducting planned military training exercises scheduled
between February 2007 and January 2009 off of the Southern California coast.
These exercises involved the deployment of mid-frequency sonar devices alleged
by the State as being dangerous to large marine mammals and sea turtles. 385 The
suit was filed notwithstanding the Navy's preparation during February 2007 of"an
environmental assessment" [EA] .. .[that bore] a finding of no significant impact -
for the training exercises. 386  The Commission alleged that the Navy's sonar
program did not satisfy the conditions it imposed because it failed to "protect
marine mammals and sea turtles from the effects of mid-frequency sonar."
387
These conditions required the Navy to "take precautionary measures," consistent
with California's coastal management program. 388  The Navy challenged the
injunction, claiming that it already "had made an effort to use the precautionary
approach . . . in the absence of scientific information to the contrary, [by]
assess[ing] that the proposed training [was] harmful to the environment" 389 (i.e., by
intentionally overstating its estimate of potential injuries to beaked whales). In
addition, the Commission alleged that the Navy had violated the reporting
requirements of Section 1456 of the CZMA.39°
On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense Council and other
environmental groups joined the litigation, challenging the Navy's EA and impact
findings and its failure to prepare an environmental impact assessment (EIA) as
required by NEPA. 39' The Court agreed with the NRDC, identifying two ways the
Navy violated the CZMA. First, the Court found that the Navy had failed to
mention in its Consistency Determination (CD) that it intended to conduct such
activities and did not adequately show that its sonar operations would not have a
significant impact on the marine environment and/or would not affect the coastal
zone (effectively imposing a reversal of the burden of proof). Second, the Court
385. See California Coastal Commission v. U.S. Department of the Navy, Case No. CV07-01899
(filed March 7, 2008), http://www.coastal.ca.gov/fedcd/sonar/ccc-v-navy-2-22-2007.pdf.
386. Id. at 7.
387. Id. at 2-3.
388. See Raffensperger, A State Preempts the U.S. Navy, supra note 307.
389. Id.
390. See California Coastal Commission v. U.S. Department of the Navy, supra note 404, at 4;
CZMA Sections 1456(c)(1)(A) and (C); see Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as
amended through P.L. 104-150, The Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1996, U.S. Department
of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/about/czma.html#section307.
391. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, No. 8:07-cv-00335-FMC-FMOx, slip op.
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found that the Navy's CD had failed to incorporate mitigation measures required
by the California Coastal Commission program (effectively amounting to more
than a precautionary approach). 392 Having identified the possibility of irreparable
harm, on August 7, 2007, the Court issued a preliminary injunction against the
Navy of potentially infinite duration - "until the Navy adopt[ed] mitigation
measures that would substantially lessen the likelihood of serious injury and death
to marine life.
393
The Navy subsequently appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
which, on August 31, 2007, stayed the District Court's broad injunction, pending
the Navy's appeal.394 In an order dated November 13, 2007, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the District Court's findings and vacated the stay.395 It also remanded the
case back to the district court instructing it to "narrow the scope of the injunction
by using its findings to craft mitigation measures uniquely tailored to fit the
Navy's ... sonar operations."
396
On January 3, 2008, the District Court issued a narrower preliminary injunction
ruling that the Navy must "maintain a 12 nautical mile exclusion zone from the
California coastline at all times [a zone that corresponds to the U.S. territorial sea
under the UNCLOS] . . . [and that] a twenty-five mile exclusion zone
[corresponding to the contiguous zone under the UNCLOS] would [have been]
unduly burdensome to the Navy." 397 The Court also ruled that the Navy had to
cease operation of sonar when marine mammals were spotted within 2200 yards,
finding that the maintenance of such a "zone of protection" would impose only a
minimal burden upon the Navy.398 A second order was issued on January 10, 2008
to clarify the January 3, 2008 decision, 399 and it imposed other conditions. 400 "The
392. See NRDC v. Winter -- Green Trumps the Blue and Gold -- National Security Takes a Back
Seat to Natural Resources, American College of Environmental Lawyers (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.acoel.org/2008/0 l/articles/nepa/nrdc-v-winter-green-trumps-the-blue-and-gold-
national-security-takes-a-back-seat-to-natural-resources.
393. Id.
394. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2007).
395. NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d. 885 (9th Cir. 2007).
396. Id.
397. NRDC v. Winter, supra note 395.
398. Id
399. NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008), available at
http://docs.nrdc.org/water/wat 08011601A.pdf.
400. See Kristina Alexander, Environmental Exemptions for the Navy's Mid-Frequency Active
Sonar Training Program, CRS Report for Congress # RL34403 (updated Apr. 15, 2008) at
CRS-7, http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34403.pdf.
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Navy filed a notice of appeal the following day. On January 14, 2008, the District
Court denied the Navy's stay application. ' 40
On January 15, 2008, President Bush issued a memorandum exempting the
Navy from compliance with the CZMA, declaring that the Navy's use of mid-
frequency active sonar, in conjunction with its planned military exercises in
Southern California coastal waters, was in the paramount interest of the United
States and that the Navy's forced compliance with the CZMA would undermine its
combat readiness.40 2 On the same day, the Navy filed an ex parte emergency
motion to vacate the injunction with both the District Court40 3 and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 4°' The Ninth Circuit remanded the action to the District
Court on January 16, 2008 to consider the impact of both the military exemption
and the Council on Environmental Quality's grant to the Navy of a waiver from
NEPA's EIA requirement (i.e., "a finding [of] 'emergency circumstances' [that]
provided for 'alternative arrangements' to accommodate those emergency
circumstances").4 5  Although the Court of Appeals subsequently modified the
conditions of the District Court's injunction so that they were somewhat more
flexible for the Navy, the Navy, which contested only two of the District Court's
six conditions, nevertheless petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review that
decision.40 6
On November 12, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the District Court
had abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200-yard shutdown zone and by
requiring the Navy to power down its MFA sonar during significant surface
401. NRDC v. Winter, 513 F. 3d 920 (9th Cir. 2008), 4, available at
http://docs.nrdc.org/water/wat_08011601 A.pdf.
402. Presidential Exemption from the Coastal Zone Management Act - Memorandum .or the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce, White House Press Release (Jan. 16,
2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080116.html.
403. NRDC v. Winter, EX PARTE APPLICATION to Stay Pending Consideration of Ex Parte
Application to Vacate Preliminary Injunction, http://www.scribd.com/doc/2052829/EX-
PARTE-APPLICATION-to-Stay- Pending-Consideration-o f-Ex-Parte-Application-to-
Vacate-Preliminary-Injunction.
404. NRDC v. Winter, 513 F. 3d 920, supra note 395.
405. Id. at 4-5. A consortia of environmental groups later held a press conference at which they
alleged that the President's exemption "flout[ed] the will of Congress, the decision of the
California Coastal Commission and a ruling by the federal court." See Activists Vow to
Push Fight Against Navy Sonar, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 17, 2008);
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22683062; Navy Exempted from Sonar Curbs, REUTERS
(Jan. 16, 2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSN 1610615020080117.
406. See NRDC v. Winter, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4458, *4 (9th Cir. February 29, 2008).
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ducting conditions. It reversed the Ninth Circuit Court's judgment and vacated the
preliminary injunction. 40 7 The U.S. Supreme Court's Majority Opinion delivered
by Justice Roberts held that the Appellate Court's reliance upon the ninth circuit
precedent of "Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of
irreparable harm[,] is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as
an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief., 40 8 The Court's Concurring Opinion authored by
Justice Breyer found that "the evidence of need for the two special conditions
[ordered by the District was] weak or uncertain." 409 In his view, respondents had
failed to show that "the Navy's exercises with the four uncontested mitigation
measures (but without the two contested mitigation measures) in place" would
likely cause the prospective significant "environmental harm" alleged. 411 It is
evident that the Court recognized how these environmentalist groups had
persuaded the California lower courts to read Europe's Precautionary Principle into
the CZMA and NEPA even though these statutes do not expressly provide for it.
4 1
6. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Since April 1976, the MSFCMA 4 12 has provided the U.S. with a national
framework for conserving and managing marine fisheries operating within the U.S.
territorial sea and EEZ, consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, Part V. The
407. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U. S. __ (2008), 518 F. 3d 658,
reversed; preliminary injunction vacated in part, at 1, 24,
http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/pdf/07-1239P.ZO.
408. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
409. Winter v. NRDC, Concur. Op. at 3, http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/pdf/07-1239P.ZX.
410. Id.
411. See Lawrence A. Kogan, A Chill Wind for Precaution?: The Broader Ramification of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Winter Ruling, Wash. L. Found. Working Paper (Apr. 2009).
412. The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C.
1801-1882, (formerly known as The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Act) of
1976, April 13, 1976, as amended is the primary law governing marine fisheries
management in United States federal waters. The Act was substantially amended in 1996
('The Sustainable Fisheries Act'- PUBLIC LAW 104-297 - OCT. 1I, 1996) and then
again during 2006, Public Law 109-479, 109th Congress),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/magact/magnuson-stevens2007.htm; Seesee Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Reauthorized, NOAA Fisheries
Feature, ("Most notably, the Magnuson-Stevens Act aided in the development of the
domestic fishing industry by phasing out foreign fishing. To manage the fisheries and
promote conservation, the Act created eight regional fishery management councils."),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/msa2007/index.html.
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MSFCMA contains national standards for establishing fishery conservation and
management with which all fishery management plans, and amendments prepared
by the Councils and the Secretary must comply.413  The first of these national
standards, the Overfishing Standard, is the cornerstone of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act and is essential for responsible fishery management. The national standards,
including Standard 1, are to be implemented by a set of regulatory guidelines
established by the Secretary of Commerce that provide the details necessary to
implement the standards.41 4
During the spring of 1996, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation reviewed the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA) containing a series of
amendments to the MSFCMA which incorporated elements of a corresponding
1995 House bill, HR 39.415 The Senate committee reported their findings to the
full Senate during May 1996.416 The SFA was later amended again, subsequently
enacted into law 417 and then incorporated as an amendment within the
MSFCMA 4 ' during October 1996.
The 1996 MSFCMA amendments added new definitions1 9  such as
"bycatch, 420 which tracked the language of UNCLOS Article 61(4)41 (dealing
with "standing species"), 422 and required the achievement of the 'optimum yield'
of migratory species, consistent with UNCLOS Article 64.423 In addition, the 1996
413. See MSFCMA, Section 301(a).
414. See MSFCMA Section 303(b).
415. See House Report 104-171 (June 30, 1995), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 104 congreports&docid=f:hr 171.1 04.pdf.
416. See Senate Report No. 104-276 (May 23, 1996), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 104 congreports&docid=f:sr276. 104.pdf.
417. See Public Law 104-297 (Oct. 1I, 1996),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/sustainable fishereriesact.pdf.
418. See Public Law 94-265 (Oct. 11, 1996), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/magact;
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/magact/mag3.html#s301.
419. See Senate Report No. 104-276, supra note 438, at 10.
420. Id. at 5.
421. Id. at 11.
422. See Prepared Statement of Mr. David G. Burney, Past President, U.S. Tuna Foundation:
The conservation and Management of Highly Migrating Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Oceans, and Other Int'l Agreement of U.S. Interest in Asia and the Pacific,
110th Cong., H.Rpt. 110-126 (July 17, 2007) at 30,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/I 10/36823.pdf.
423. Id. at 11-12; see Eugene H. Buck, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Living Resources
Provisions, CRS Report for Congress # RS21631 (Sept. 30, 2003) at CRS-2,
http://lugar.senate.gov/services/pdfcrs/UNconvention law of the seas.pdf.
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changes modified national Standard 5 and added new national Standards 8-10.424
None of these changes expressly incorporated the Precautionary Principle into the
MSFCMA text, since the Congress ostensibly ensured, consistent with the text of
UNCLOS Articles 61(2) and 119(1)(a), that 'best available scientific
evidence'would become the express legislative standard/benchmark.426 At least
one commentator noted that, had Congress wanted to expressly incorporate the
Precautionary Approach within the SFA amendments it would have:
reversed [the] burden of proof by having conservative fishing levels be the default and
maintaining these levels until it [was] shown that higher levels [were] justified .... The
1996 amendments to the... MSFCMA shift[ed] the burden to a degree, in the sense that
targets, such as optimum yield, should be set safety below limits, such as maximum
sustainable yield (MSY), even when data [were] lacking .... [Yet,] there [was] a lack of
consensus on what to do when there [was] inadequate information to understand the
tradeoffs between the goals we wish[ed] to achieve and the outcomes we wish[ed] to
avoid.
427
The lack of any express reference to the Precautionary Principle within the SFA
has not, however, prevented legal commentators from claiming that the SFA
"incorporated sustainable thinking and a [P]recautionary [A]pproach into U.S.
domestic fisheries management" in spirit 428 In other words, the fact that
"'maximum sustainable yield became a 'limit' to be avoided rather than a target..
.to be achieved" and that it has since become common to view the overexploitation
of marine resources as no longer acceptable, marks "a fundamental shift, at least
rhetorically," strongly suggesting the incorporation of the Precautionary Approach
into the MSFCMA.429
It is interesting to note at this juncture how, during February 1996, President
Clinton had transmitted the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement (MFSA) (an
UNCLOS protocol based on U.N. Agenda 21) to the Senate Foreign Relations
424. Id. at 13-14.
426. See The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries with Reference to Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, G. A. Explanatory Note, A/CONF.164/INF/8 (Jan. 26,
1994), at para. 5.
427. See Tim Gerrodette, Paul Dayton, Seth Macinko & Michael Fogarty, Precautionary
Management of Marine Fisheries: Moving Beyond Burden of Proof, BULLETIN OF MARINE
SCIENCE, 70(2): 657-668 (2002),
http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/connect/umrsmas/00074977/v70n2/s I 8.pdf?.ex
pires= 1217211343&id=45271008&titleid = I 0983&accname=Guest+User&checksum=BAF
82BA0358C23 E319B71C6B44D2270C.
428. See Craig, supra note 62 at 10212.
429. Id
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Committee for ratification following his signing of it in December 1995. In his
accompanying January 1996 submittal letter to the President, former Secretary of
State Warren Christopher, however, declared that no federal implementing
legislation was required to ratify the MFSA. 430  As a result, these MSFCMA
amendments were referenced only in the Senate's SFA report. Did the Senate or
the Clinton Administration believe that these MSFCMA amendments should be
treated independently and separate from the MFSA ratification? If so why? Did
not the MSFCMA amendments implement U.S. obligations owed under the
MFSA? Was there an underlying political reason why two parallel unconnected
tracts were pursued? Was the MSFCMA deemed more closely related to the
UNCLOS than to the MSFA that implements its provisions? Has the Bush
Administration, by also claiming that no federal environmental implementing
legislation is required incident to UNCLOS ratification followed this same
strategy?
Unlike the MSFCMA amendments referred to above, the MFSA does expressly
incorporate the Precautionary Principle 431 within its Article 6 and Annex II, a fact
not lost upon Precautionary Principle proponents. 3  In light of the prior
international confusion and debates that arose during the 1994-1995
intergovernmental meetings convened by the U.N. Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) over the different meanings ascribed by the EU and U.S. to
the term Precautionary Approach 4 33 one must appreciate how the true meaning of
that term within the text of the MFSA and the manner in which it is to be
applied/implemented by MFSA parties remains unclear to this day. Therefore,
how different nations endeavor to employ it, citing the treaty text as a foundation,
430. See Warren Christopher, supra note 224, at XV.
431. See Norwegian plenary statement of 28 November 2005 on oceans and the law of the sea,
delivered by Ambassador Mona Juul, Deputy Permanent Representative, Norway Mission
to the UN (Nov. 28, 2005) ("The 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement . . . sets out the
precautionary principle and establishes the institutional framework for cooperation on the
sustainable management of the fish stocks")(emphasis added), http://www.norway-
un.org/NorwegianStatements/PlenaryMeetings/20051201 _lawofsea.htm.
432. See U.N. Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, art. 6, Application of the Precautionary
Approach, ("(a) States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation,
management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in
order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine environment").
433. See Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN
VOLUME 7, ENB: 07:30, http://www.iisd.ca/vo107/0730024e.html; The Precautionary
Approach to Fisheries with Reference to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, G. A. A/CONF.164/INF/8 (Jan. 26, 1994).
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must be carefully scrutinized and closely monitored.
Furthermore, during May 1998, 434 the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) promulgated final regulatory guidelines which enhanced National
Standard I ('optimal yield') (Sections 600.310; 600.310(f)(5)(i)-(iii)) 435 and new
National Standard 9 ('bycatch') (Sections 600.350; 600.350(d)(3)(ii))4 36 in
implementation of Section 301 of the 1996 MSFCMA. As a result, the regulatory
guidelines have since expressly incorporated the Precautionary Principle, despite
the fact that the underlying statutory text still does not. No doubt, this subsequently
encouraged some commentators to claim that the MSFCMA now incorporates the
Precautionary Principle in spirit.
437
Environmentalist efforts apparently persuaded two congressmen during the
10 6th Congress to expressly incorporate the Precautionary Principle within the text
of an MSFCMA reauthorization bill known as the Gilchrest-Farr Fisheries
Recovery Act of 2000 (HR 4046)438 that was introduced during March 2000, 439 but
subsequently languished. According to the bill's proponents,
(HR 4046) [would have] reauthorize[d] and strengthen[ed] the Act by clarifying and
strengthening the conservation provisions added by the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1996.
It addresse[d] the need to avoid bycatch, eliminate over-harvesting, and protect essential
fish habitat, such as coral reefs, from damaging fishing practices. It encourage[d]
management precaution when scientific information is lacking or incomplete, and moves
fisheries management toward ecosystem analysis and planning.
440
434. See Final Rule Amending National Guidelines for National Standards to MSFCMA, 63 FR
24211, 50 CFR 600 (May 1, 1998), http://www.epa.gov/EPA-GENERAL/1998/May/Day-
01/g 11471.htm.
435. See 63 FR 24225-24227, Comments 23, 25-26, 35 and accompanying Responses; see also,
Technical Guidance On the Use of Precautionary Approaches to Implementing National
Standard I of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, NOAA
Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO # (July 17, 1998),
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/NSGtkgd.pdf.
436. See 63 FR 24213, 24236.
437. Justin LeBlanc, The Global Fish Market and the Need for Multilateral Fishing Disciplines,
8 ECON. PERSPECTIVES I (Jan. 2003)("In addition, NMFS requires application of the
precautionary principle -- simply put, the less certain you are the more cautious you should
be -- to fishery management decisions.") (emphasis added),
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/O 03/ijee/toc.htm;
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0l03/ijee/leblanc.htm.
438. See Gilchrest Introduces Fisheries Recovery Legislation, SEA TECHNOLOGY (June 2000),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa5367/is_200006ai n21457320.
439. See Legislative Action Alert - HR 4046 - Fisheries Recovery Act, CaliforniaFish.org,
http://www.califomiafish.org/hr4046.html.
440. See Reef Relief Goes Fishing in Washington, REEFLINE NEWSLETTER, VOL. 12, No. 2
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Indeed, at least one proponent had written that HR 4046 made use of the
Precautionary Approach "as one of its centerpieces." 441 This was echoed by a
legal commentator who later wrote that, "the U.S. Fisheries Recovery Act
explicitly provides that the precautionary approach applies to 'any existing or
proposed action' affecting marine life."" 2
One 2001 Congressional Research Service report clearly documented the extent
of debate over the Precautionary Approach during this period. It discussed how
scientists and environmentalists had proposed that Congress redefine the term
'essential fish habitat' within the MSFCMA so as to reflect the Precautionary
Approach. This would have permitted regional fisheries councils to incorporate
the Precautionary Approach within their fisheries management plans and to then
actually use it in identifying EFH for conservation purposes.443 In addition, both
fishing industry representatives (resource -users) and environmentalists suggested
that Congress modify the MSFCMA to focus more on tangible data gathering to
improve regulatory decision-making i.e., to provide clearer rules. However,
environmentalists wanted to use this opportunity to also call for a "shift [in] the
burden of proof to the resources users ...and away from fishery managers and
scientists" (e.g., government) given their belief that the excuse of "imprecise data"
was being used "to delay conservation measures. 444 It is also clear that although
environmentalists had recognized the NMFS' use of the best available scientific
information and its advocacy of risk-averse decision-making, they believed it was
necessary for "Congress [to] specifically endorse risk-averse decision-making,
especially where limited data and information [were] available., 445 Lastly, many
had sought more information concerning the relationship between the MSFCMA,
existing international fishing treaties, including the UNCLOS, and the
(SUMMER 2000), http://www.reefrelie f.org/ReefLine/Newsletter/vol 12no2/RL3.html
(emphasis added); see also Comments of Veteran Fisherman and Conservationist Phil Kline
on 'The Perfect Storm', American Oceans Campaign Press Release (June 30, 2000),
http://www.commondreams.org/news2000/0630-07.htm.
441. See Molly Thomas and Zeke Grader, The Precautionary Principle - Making it Work for
Fish and Fisherman, FISHERMEN'S NEWS (June 2000), http://www.pcffa.org/fn-jun0O.htm.
442. See Arie Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, at 131 (2006 dissertation),
http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/dissertations/2006-0629-20402 I (emphasis added).
443. See The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Reauthorization
Issues for the 107th Congress, CRS Report #RL30215 (Jan. 10, 2001) at CRS-14,
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs- 1863:1.
444. Id.
445. id., at CRS-42.
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Precautionary Approach.446
These recommendations inspired another wave of amendments to the
MSFCMA during 10 7th Congress, which resulted in a series of hearings and some
significant debates.447 Subsequently, on May 2, 2002, Congressman Gilchrest, the
same sponsor of the unsuccessful HR 4046, convened subcommittee hearings on
the discussion draft of a new bill - H.R. 4749, the 'Magnuson-Stevens Act
Amendments of 2002.'A49 The House Committee on Resources later reported this
bill to the full House along with dissenting views on October 11, 2002.450
However, floor action was not scheduled during the remainder of that Congress.
Not surprisingly, the congressman expressly stated that he wished to find a way to
apply the Precautionary Approach to determine "maximum sustainable yield" in an
effort to improve fishery practices.45'
At least three of the witnesses who had testified that day agreed with
Congressman Gilchrest that it was imperative for the MSFCMA to expressly
incorporate the Precautionary Principle. One, an environmental scientist and
professor at the University of Maryland, emphasized the complexity and
unpredictability of ecosystems, and the "need for more dedicated language on
precautionary approaches in the reauthorized Act .... Firm language in the Act to
recognize and acknowledge the need of precautionary approaches would be
welcome. 452
A second witness, supporting a related bill to amend the MSFCMA, HR 2570 -
The Fisheries Act of 2001, was concerned about the relationship between
446. Id, at CRS-44.
447. See Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act-10 1, House Committee
on Resources,
http://republicans.resourcescommittee.house.gov/archives/ii0/issues/fcwo/magnstev 101 .ht
in.
449. See Legislative Hearing before the Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and
Oceans of the Committee on Resources U.S. House of Representatives, 107th Congress,
2nd Session (May 2, 2002) on H.R. 4749, The Magnuson-Stevens Act Amendments of
2002, http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107h/79374.txt.
450. See House Rpt. 107-746 (Oct. 11, 2002), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 107 congreports&docid=f:hr746.107.pdf.
451. See Statement of Congressman Wayne Gilchrest, Legislative Hearing on H.R. 4749, The
Magnuson-Stevens Act Amendments of 2002 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries
Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans of the Committee on Resources U.S. House of
Representatives.
452. See Statement of Edward D. Houde, Professor, University of Maryland Ctr. for Ent'l.
Science; Statement of Congressman Wayne Gilchrest, supra note 451.
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ecosystem functions and habitat needs.453 In his estimation, there has long been a
"need to expand fishery management beyond traditional single-species planning to
include ecosystem considerations . . . . Such an approach includes, but is not
limited to, interactions between predator and prey species within an ecosystem and
the habitat needs of living marine resources and other limiting factors in the
environment. This concept of ecosystem management supports the Precautionary
Approach to fishery management."
454
This witness was also very concerned about the bill's bycatch and essential fish
habitat provisions, which he believed would curtail the ability of the National
Marine Fisheries Service to do its job - i.e., to fulfill its regulatory mission. He
recommended that explicit Precautionary Approach language be added to HR
4749, consistent with the text of HR 2570, Section I l(a)-(c) to prevent the
introduction of fishing gear that could potentially increase bycatch and damage
essential fish habitats.4 55  HR 2570 would have amended the policy of the
MSFCMA "to assure that the national fishery conservation and management
program . . . 'utilizes and is based upon . . . the precautionary approach.
'
-
45 6 It
would have accomplished by adding a new definitional section (46) defining the
Precautionary Approach 457 and then establishing the Precautionary Approach as a
453. See Fisheries Recovery Act of 2001, H.R. 2570 (amending 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:hr2570:@@@L&summ2=m&; Eugene H.
Buck, Fishery, Aquaculture, and Marine Mammal Legislation in the 107th Congress, CRS
Report for Congress (Jan. 6, 2003) at CRS-3, ("H.R. 2570 and H.R. 4749 were the only
bills introduced in the 107th Congress proposing reauthorization and extensive amendment
of the MSFCMA."),
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/763/lB 10074_20030106.pdf'?sequen
ce=9.
454.See Testimony of Gerald Leape, Marine Conservation Program Director, National
Environmental TrustOn Behalf of the Marine Fish Conservation Network, Before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans On the Subcommittee Discussion
Draft Reauthorization Of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(May 2, 2002) at 3-4, http://www.fairifqs.org/media/gerryleapenettestimony_5-0 2 .pdf.
455. Id. at 7-8.
456. See H.R. 2570, Sec. 11. Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Mgmt. (a)(2), amending Sec.
2, 16 U.S.C. 1801.
457. Id. ("The precautionary approach means (A) exercising additional caution in favor of
conservation in any case in which information is absent, uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate
as to the effects of any existing or proposed action on fish, essential fish habitat, other
marine species, and the marine ecosystem in which a fishery occurs; (B) selecting and
implementing any action that will be significantly more likely than not to satisfy the
conservation objectives of this Act; and (C) taking into account past sustainable fishing
levels.").
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new national standard for fishery conservation and management.458
Lastly, the executive director of a master trade association representing a
number of west coast fisheries argued in favor of expressly adding Precautionary
Principle language contained within Section 11 of HR 2570 to the text of the
MSFCMA. 459 However, judging from his testimony, it appears that his group's
true concern was not about protecting the environment and its living resources, but
rather about maintaining its competitiveness in the face of increased competition
from the aquaculture and biotech industries. In other words, this witness'
constituency embraced the Precautionary Principle as a disguised protectionist
device to level the playing field for its industry.46 °
7. The Clean Air Act
At first glance, it is not obvious how closely the U.S. Clean Air Act 46 I relates to
U.S. oceans policy and to the UNCLOS. However, the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy makes clear that "Managing atmospheric deposition of pollutants to
water bodies is the principal nexus between the CAA and ocean and coastal
management concerns. 462 Indeed, the report reveals an evolved federal strategy to
458. Id. (amending Section 301(a) (16 U.S.C. 1851), "The precautionary approach shall apply to
conservation and management measures, in particular, and without limitation, to the
application of the national standard set forth in paragraph (1)).
459. See Additional Issues, Testimony of W.F. 'Zeke' Grader, Jr., Executive Director, Pacific
coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, Before the House Subcommittee on Fisheries
Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans, Regarding the Reauthorization of the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation & Management Act (May 2, 2002), http://www.pcffa.org/M-
Stestimony2May02.htm.
460. Id
461. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7661; P.L. 95-95, P.L. 88-206, P.L.89-272, P.L. 90-148,
P.L. 95-190, P.L. 97-23, P.L. 91-604, P.L. 89-675, P.L. 95-258, P.L. 87-761, P.L. 86-365,
P.L. 86-493, P.L. 91-137, P.L. 93-15, P.L. 93-3 19, P.L. 91-316, P.L. 92-463, P.L. 92-157,
P.L. 95-623, P.L. 95-426, P.L. 96-88, P.L. 91-605, P.L. 97-375, P.L. 96-300, P.L. 104-59
and P.L. 104-260, (The majority of the amendments to the Clean Air Act were enacted in
1977, P.L. 95-95; 91 Stat. 685, and the primary objective of the Clean Air Act is to establish
Federal standards for various pollutants from both stationary and mobile sources and to
provide for the regulation of polluting emissions via state implementation plans). See also,
Clean Air Act, Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/CLENAIR.HTML; Clean Air Act, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa; see The Plain English
Guide to the Clean Air Act, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/peg.
462. See An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, Final Report of the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy (Sept. 2004) at D8 (emphasis added) (They included: "the maximum
achievable control technology (MACT) standards for emissions of toxic pollutants from
117
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more fully integrate ocean pollution concerns within U.S. air pollution laws and
policies in order to address 'atmospheric deposition of pollutants into water
bodies.' In particular, it referred to the EPA's 2001 'Air-Water Interface Work
Plan, which drew from a number of Clean Air Act regulations that had not been
implemented, and had identified over 20 specific actions that could be taken to
reduce atmospheric deposition of pollutants.
463
A review of the 1970 and 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA), which
set forth two basic strategies to control "air pollutants, 4 4 is helpful in better
understanding this relationship. The first strategy is contained in CAA 1970
Sections 108-1 10. They require the EPA Administrator to publish a list of those
pollutants "which in his[/her] judgment ha[ve] an adverse effect on public health or
welfare," and are "derived from 'numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources. '465 The EPA has designated the six most common pollutants as "criteria"
pollutants. 466 Soon after their listing, the Administrator must issue criteria-based
467
national ambient air (outdoor air)468 quality standards for such pollutants, 469 "the
attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator ...
allow[s] an adequate margin of safety... requisite to protect the public health ' 470
and "to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects
associated with the presences of such air pollutant in the ambient air.,
471
According to one expert, scientific evaluation was long considered embedded
sources, such as industrial facilities and coal-fired power plants; the nitrogen oxides (NOx)
reductions under the Acid Rain program for power plants; a separate program to reduce
NOx emissions to meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards; and controls on
automobiles, trucks, vessels, and other mobile sources that will reduce emissions of both
NOx and toxics.").
463. Id. at 224.
464. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976), (For a
good discussion of the structure of the 1970 Clean Air Act),
http:/Ibulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/545/545.F2d.320.76-6075.146.html.
465. See CAA Section 108(a)(l)(A),(B); see Air Quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/cleanair.html.
466. See What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
(Criteria pollutants include carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates,
ozone and lead), http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair.
467. See CAA Section 109(a).
468. See 40 CFR 50.1(e) (Ambient air is essentially all outdoor air. The regulations define it as,
'that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has
access').
469. See Title I CAA, Section 108(a)(l)(C).
470. See CAA Section 109(b)(l).
471. See CAA Section 109(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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within the requirement of a criteria-based standard. "[W]hen the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 established the federal role in setting NAAQS, the 'criteria
document' became the basic technical underpinning of the standards-setting
process. ,472
At the same time, experts agree that CAA 1970's Section 109(b) focused only
on "protecting the public health and welfare" and was unconcerned about the
economic costs of complying with the standards once adopted.473
Nothing in its language suggests that the Administrator is to consider economic or
technological feasibility in setting ambient air quality standards. The legislative history of
the Act also shows the Administrator may not consider economic and technological
feasibility in setting air quality standards; the absence of any provision requiring
consideration of these factors was no accident; it was the result of a deliberate decision by
Congress to subordinate such concerns to the achievement of health goals.
474
Aside from the costs of complying with the national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS), there was also the issue of timing. CAA Section 108
required the Administrator to immediately develop national ambient air standards.
In addition, CAA Section 110 obligated the Administrator to ensure that such
standards were implemented and that the states could satisfy the standards they set
forth in their own state implementation plans within three years of plan
approval.475 At least two federal courts that have examined the legislative history
of the 1970 CAA have found that the EPA Administrator lacked wide latitude in
delaying the development of standards and in granting extensions to states for
failing to meet the implementation time constraints. In fact, much like today's
Precautionary Principle which requires action in the face of scientific uncertainty,
incomplete scientific knowledge was not then deemed excusable for failing to
establish or implement an ambient quality standard.
For example the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Natural Resources
472. See John E. Blodgett, Larry B. Parker, and James E. McCarthy, Air Quality Standards: The
Decisionmaking Process It - Setting NAAQS, CRS Report for Congress 97-722 ENR (June
24, 1998) http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/air/air-2 I a.cfm#Setting%20NAAQS.
473. See Linda-Jo Schierow, Risk Analysis: Background on Environmental Protection Agency
Mandates, CRS Report for Congress # 98-619 ENR (June 12, 1998),
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk- I 2.cfm#Clean%20Air%20Act.
474. See Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), available at
http://www.altlaw.org/vl/cases/421861; http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-
appeals/F2/647/l 130/237769.
475. See CAA Section 110(a) and (e).
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Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,4 76 ruled that, although "the current state of
scientific knowledge may make it difficult to set an ambient quality standard...
[t]he Administrator must proceed in spite of its difficulties ... on the basis of the
best information available to him., 47 7 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit Court, in Lead
Industries Ass 'n, Inc. v. EPA,478 found that the EPA cannot
wait until it can conclusively demonstrate that a particular effect is adverse to health
before it acts [which] is inconsistent with both the Act's precautionary and preventive
orientation and the nature of the Administrator's statutory responsibilities. Congress
provided that the Administrator is to use his judgment in setting air quality standards
precisely to permit him to act in the face of uncertainty . . . . [A]s ...the legislative
history [shows,] Congress directed the Administrator to err on the side of caution in
making the necessary decisions.
479
Thus, the legislative history of the 1977 CAA Amendments confirms the
precautionary nature or spirit of the statute, notwithstanding the absence of express
precautionary principle language in the statute's text. As noted by the Court in
Lead Industries, "the House Report accompanying the [1977 CAA] Amendments
states that one of its purposes is '[t]o emphasize the preventive or precautionary
nature of the act, i.e., to assure that regulatory action can effectively prevent harm
before it occurs; to emphasize the predominant value of protection of public
health.,
, 480
And, although the 1970 CAA's legislative history did not elaborate much about
the "adequate margin of safety" language contained in Section 109, legal
commentators have argued that the Senate Report accompanying the 1970 CAA,
"clearly indicates that the 'margin of safety' [wa]s designed to protect against the
potential for adverse effects to occur at pollutant concentrations below those
known to cause harm [i.e., to] vulnerable [sensitive] population groups.",
48 1
476. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, supra note 462.
477. See S.Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 416 (1970) discussing S. 4358 - National Air
Quality Standards Act of 1970, "Report of the Committee on Public Works, United States
Senate", 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 1I; A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Vol. 1. at 411 (1974), cited and discussed by the Court in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976), supra note 462.
478. See Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, supra note 472,
http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/421861
479. Id. at para. 64 (emphasis added).
480. Id. at para. 62. To add to the confusion, discerning readers will note that the House Report
interchanges the terms 'preventive' and 'precautionary', while the European Union treats
them as distinct terms.
481. See John E. Blodgett, Larry B. Parker, and James E. McCarthy, Air Quality Standards: The
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Several commentators also noted how the Court in Lead Industries had
interpreted the CAA 109 as reflecting a "specific concern for sensitive
individuals. '48 2 They also pointed out how the Court had interpreted the term
"'welfare' to include 'effects on economic values,' which clearly [did] "not ...
include the cost of compliance with the air quality standards. It only refer[red] to
the economic costs of pollution. 483
In light of the legislative history underlying the 1970 and 1977 CAA
amendments and the accompanying jurisprudence, one expert has concluded that
the 1970 Clean Air Act "effectively operationalized the absolutist version of the
Precautionary Principle., 484 And a second remarked that, "It is hard to imagine a
stronger endorsement of the precautionary principle.,
485
The second strategy of addressing air pollutants is contained within 1970 CAA
Sections 111, 112, 202, 211 and 231. Generally speaking, these provisions
mandate the control of certain specified "hazardous air" pollutants (HAPs)
"at source." Sources include existing and new "stationary sources" (factories,
power plants, refineries) 486 as well as mobile sources (vehicles - automobiles,
buses, trucks, 487 aircraft488). These provisions also focused on regulating the
manufacture and sale of fuels and fuel additives (and thus, fuel content) in order to
reduce air pollutants.489
Furthermore, the second strategy "required EPA to establish a list of hazardous
air pollutants [HAPs] and [to] impose health-based emission standards for each
pollutant., 490 HAPs were those air pollutants listed by the EPA Administrator in
CAA Section 112(b). 491 They were generally categorized as 'air toxics' because
they were believed to have carcinogenic effect 492 _ i.e., to "cause . . .cancer or
Decisionmaking Process [1 - Margin of Safety. CRS Report for Congress 97-722 ENR.
482. Id; see Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, supra note 472 at para. 62, citing S.Rep.No.91-
1196.
483. Id.
484. See INDUR M. GOLANKY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2001).
485. See Ashford, supra note 34, 363-364.
486. See CAA Section 11I.
487. See CAA Section 202.
488. See CAA Title 1I, Section 231.
489. See CAA Section 211.
490. See Background: The Clean Air Act (CAA), As Amended, ChemAlliance.org,
http://www.chemalliance.org/tools/background/back-caa.asp (emphasis added).
491. See CAA Section 1 12(a)(6).
492. See CAA Section II 2(a)(I 1).
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other serious health effects, such as reproductive effects or birth defects, or adverse
environmental and ecological effects.
493
Although the CAA does not, as of yet, impose rules to reduce HAPs emitted by
marine vessels, the I I0th Congress has already begun working on it. On May 24,
2007, California Senators Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein introduced within
the Environment and Public Works Committee 49 4 S. 1499, "The Marine Vessel
Emissions Reduction Act." 495 The Act "is intended to reduce emissions of air
pollutants from marine vessels that contribute to air pollution and failure to meet
air quality standards in certain areas in the United States. 496  The Act would
"amend [Sections 211 and 213 of] the Clean Air Act 497 by adding new
requirements relating to marine vessel fuel sulfur content and advanced marine
vessel emissions controls, ' 4 98 without regard to its likely domestic effects on
commerce and U.S. international economic competitiveness.499 It would also
likely facilitate "desired" environmental amendments to the MARPOL.5 ° °
In developing standards for HAPs, the Administrator is obliged "to provide 'an
ample margin of safety' to protect public health,"' ' which is distinct from the
more permissive 'adequate margin of safety' language of CAA Section 109(b)(l)
covering national ambient air quality standards50 2 which imbues the EPA with
more administrative discretion.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. U.S. Environmental Protection
493. See Pollutants and Sources, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/pollsour.html.
494. Fellow sponsors of the bill included Democratic Senators Cardin, Carper, Clinton and
Whitehouse and Republic Senator Warner.
495. See Open Congress, http://news.opencongress.org/bill/l/ 110-s1499/show.
496. See Marine Vessel Emissions Reduction Act of 2007 - Senate Report 110-413 (July 10,
2008), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= I 10congreports&docid=f:sr413.11 0.pdf.
497. td. at 5-6.
498. td. at 4.
499. Id. at 10-11 (Minority Views of Senators Inhofe, Vitter, and Voinovich); The
Environmental Issues in Relation to the Future EU Policy for Seaports, European Seaports
Organization,
http://www.espo.be/downloads/archive/cOd8bd66-4a08-4343-9405-5e8d I ae I b52b.doc.
500. See Marine Vessel Emissions Reduction Act of 2007 - Senate Report 110-413, supra note
543, at 4-5.
501. See CAA Section 112(f(2).
502. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 804 F.2d 710 (DC Cir.
1986) at para. 50, available at
http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/804/710/435408.
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Agency, 50 3 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals examined the meaning of the phrase
"ample margin of safety" within the context of HAP standards falling under CAA
Section 112. Justice Bork, in writing for the majority, found that costs could not
be considered when initially setting air quality standards, but, that with respect to
implementation of those standards to secure emissions reductions, "safe" does not
necessarily mean risk-free. According to the Court, the "determination of what is
'safe'. . . must be based exclusively upon the Administrator's determination of the
risk to health at a particular emission level .... [T]he Administrator's decision
does not require a finding that 'safe' means 'risk-free' . . . or a finding that the
determination is free from uncertainty ... [C]ost and technological feasibility...
have no relevance to the preliminary determination of what is safe."
504
Similarly, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,50 5 which examined
the meaning of "adequate margin of safety" in the context of national ambient air
standards falling under CAA Section 109(b), Justice Scalia, writing for the U.S.
Supreme Court majority, held that the statutory language "unambiguously bars
cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process. 50 6
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Breyer also distinguished between the
burdens of developing the standard and managing its implementation. He reasoned
that the legislative history underlying CAA Section 109(b)(1) reflects that
Congress did not delegate to the EPA Administrator the discretion to consider
economic costs of compliance when developing air quality standards that protect
public health with an adequate margin of safety. 50 7 Instead, "[t]he Senate directly
focused upon the technical feasibility and cost of implementing the Act's
mandates. And it made it clear that it intended the Administrator to develop air
quality standards set independently of either., 50 8 In addition, he found that this
phrase did "not describe a world that is free from all risk .... [T]he word 'safe'
does not mean 'risk-free.' 50 9 Furthermore, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion
highlighted how the legislative history confirms that the 'technology-forcing' goals
503. Id.
504. Id. at para. 81.
505. 531 U.S. 457 (2001), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/supreme/531/457.pdf.
506. Id. at 471.
507. Id. at 490-491 and 494, citing Cong. Rec. 32901-32902 (1970), 1 Legislative History of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Committee Report compiled for the Senate Committee on
Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-18, p. 227 (1974).
508. Id. at 491-492, citing S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 2-3 (1970), 1 Leg. Hist. 402-403.
509. Id. at. 494-495.
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of the CAA 1970 amendments were retained in the 1977 and 1990 CAA
amendments.51° In the context of the 1990 CAA amendments, this means that
"ambient air quality standards [must] be set at the level that 'protects the public
health' with an 'adequate margin of safety,' without regard to the economic or
technical feasibility of attainment. , 511
Indeed, the CAA 1990 Amendments added significant new burdens on
stationary source locations that did not otherwise satisfy ambient air quality
standards, imposed more stringent standards on mobile source emissions,
drastically restricted the release of HAPs, developed a new operating permit and
emission allowance program ('cap and trade') and established new controls on
electric utility sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions and ozone depleting
substances. 51 2 In addition, "the CAAA established stringent emission standards for
drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. Except for the areas
off the coasts of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, all drilling sites
within 25 miles of the coast are required to meet the same clean air requirements as
onshore sites . . . have increased the costs of exploration and production in OCS
areas other than the Western Gulf."
5 1 3
In particular, according to one science and health expert who had testified
during 2002 hearings convened by the House Subcommittee on Energy and Air
Quality, the CAA 1990 amendments revised the Section 112 HAP rules by
effectively replacing the prior practice of performing a science-based risk
assessment on each suspect substance with an across-the-board hazard-based
assessment framework. This occurred by virtue of the Section 112(b)(l) perpetual
HAP listing requirement (beginning with EPA's original list of 189 substances) in
which there is embedded an administrative presumption of harm for each such
substance added.51 4 It also occurred via the statute's limitation of the EPA's role to
510. Id. at 492.
511. Id. citing S. Rep. No. 101-228, 5 (1989) (emphasis in original).
512. See Background: The Clean Air Act (CAA), as amended, ChemAlliance.org, supra note
488.
513. See The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Energy Information Administration,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oi_gas/natural-gas/analysis--publications/ngmajorleg/clnairact.htm
1.
514. CAA Section 112(b)(3)(B)(providing that the addition of a substance to the list requires a
showing that "the substance is an air pollutant and that emissions, ambient concentrations,
bioaccumulation or deposition of the substance are known to cause or may reasonably be
anticipated to cause adverse effects to human health or adverse environmental
effects")(emphasis added).
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merely removing pollutants from the list upon a finding of no proof of harm, which
essentially reverses the burden of proof from government to industry and imposes
a zero risk threshold.51 5
In addition, this fundamental reform was facilitated via CAA Section
1 12(d)(2)'s requirement that HAP emissions standards result in the "the maximum
degree of reduction in emissions ...including a prohibition on such emissions,
where achievable." Such standards were to take into account the environmental
cost of non-regulation, without reference to the societal and economic benefits
such substances would bring. 5 16 Furthermore, this drastic change in regulatory
perspective was accomplished via CAA Section 1 12(g)(2) which required that the
"maximum achievable control technology" be utilized in order to modify a major
HAP source point.517 Consequently, according to this expert's testimony, the
Precautionary Principle has long been alive and well in spirit and operation within
the U.S. Clean Air Act. "Although not discussed as such at the time, the 1990
amendments to Section 112 of the Clean Air Act governing the control of
hazardous air pollutants contain a classic use of the precautionary principle. ,518
This witness further elaborated upon this point in a subsequently published
article. It highlighted how, although the Precautionary Principle is nowhere to be
found expressly, either in the statutory text or the published legislative history, it
is, nevertheless, embodied implicitly within the CAA.
[T]he regulation of hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs") in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments ('CAAA') embodies pre-emptive precautionary actions that supercede risk
assessment and establish a new principle for regulatory intervention. We have evaluated
the 1990 CAAA concerning HAPs as it is our belief that in such legislation Congress
radically altered the United States' approach to regulating HAPs by a classic imposition
of the Precautionary Principle .... We have found no indication that HAPs were
discussed by Congress explicitly in terms of the Precautionary Principle. Nor did we find
the term "Precautionary Principle" in the published legislative history. Nonetheless, we
believe, as discussed . . . that the amended HAPs Program clearly embodies the
Precautionary Principle . . . . The central elements of the amended HAPs program
515. See CAA Section II 2(b)(3)(B).
516. See Ashford, supra note 34, at 364.
517. Id. at 364-365.
518. See Prepared Witness Testimony of Dr. Bernard Goldstein, Dean, School of Public Health
University of Pittsburgh on the Accomplishments of the Clean Air Act, as amended by the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality,
House Committee on Energy and Commerce (May 1, 2002),
hnp://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/hearings/05012002Hearing548/Goldstei
n939.htm (emphasis added).
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mandate precautionary action that is not based on, and in fact supplants, risk analysis and
thus constitutes what we have called pre-emptive precautionary action. The amendments
were a radical departure from the original. 519
More recently, the Precautionary Principle was indirectly invoked in the high
profile case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et. al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency,520 under the auspices of CAA Sections 202(a)(1) and 302(g).
The case was initiated by State Attorneys General and environmental groups to
compel the U.S. EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles-
mobile sources-as an 'air pollutant.'5 2 ' The DC Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the EPA, finding that its decision not to regulate automobile carbon
dioxide emissions, assuming that it had the authority to regulate it in the first place,
fell properly within its administrative discretion. Yet, the Court's dissenting
opinion authored by Judge Tatel reemphasized the precautionary nature of the
Clean Air Act by reading into it an effort to demonstrate first, that the EPA had the
authority to regulate carbon dioxide, and then, based on the legislative history, that
the EPA had abused its discretion.
The statutory standard, moreover, is precautionary. At the time we decided Ethyl [Corp.
v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976)] section 202(a)(1) and similar CAA provisions either
authorized or required the Administrator to act on finding that emissions led to "air
pollution which endangers the public health or welfare." See 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(a)(l)
(1976). After Ethyl found that "the statutes and common sense demand regulatory action
to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise
inevitable," Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 25, the 1977 Congress not only approved of this conclusion,
see H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 49, but also wrote it into the CAA. Section 202(a)(1) (along
with other provisions, see H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 50) now requires regulation to precede
certainty. It requires regulation where, in the Administrator's judgment, emissions
"contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). As the House Report explained: 'In order to
emphasize the precautionary or preventative purpose of the act (and, therefore, the
519. See Bernard D. Goldstein and Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the Precautionary
Principle for Environmental Regulation in the United States: Examples From the Control of
Hazardous Air Pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 247, 250, 253 (2003) at 250,
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?66+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+247+(Autumn+2003)
+pdf (emphasis added).
520. Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F. 3d 50 (D. D. C. 2005), available at
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/dc/031361a.pdf.
521. See CAA Section 302(g) ("The term 'air pollutant' means any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents ... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise
enters the ambient air").
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Administrator's duty to assess risks rather than wait for proof of actual harm), the
committee not only retained the concept of endangerment to health; the committee also
added the words 'may reasonably be anticipated to.
522
Arguably, Justice Tatel's dissenting opinion influenced the outcome of the U.S.
Supreme Court's subsequent 2007 split decision, delivered by Justice Stevens, in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. 523 According to the Court,
"[b]ecause greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act's capacious
definition of 'air pollutant' we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate
the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles. 5 2 4 The Court, however, did
not require the EPA to make this determination, and focused instead on EPA's
failure to provide a reasoned explanation for deciding not to regulate carbon
dioxide which, it concluded, constituted an abuse of administrative discretion.
5 25
The Court noted only that the EPA was obligated to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions under the CAA only if it found that C02 either independently, or in
combination with other pollutants, endangers public health.52 6  Under extreme
domestic and international political pressure, and despite the scientific
uncertainties surrounding the relationship between anthropogenic sources of
carbon dioxide and global warming, the EPA eventually made such a finding-it
issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to this effect on July 11, 2008.527
The White House issued a press release confirming the report's findings a week
later, on July 18, 2008.528
It is not difficult to imagine how the Supreme Court ruling and the EPA
522. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
523. Mass. v. Envt. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007); 415 F. 3d, at 67, 82,lip Op at
12. ("On the merits, Judge Tatel explained at length why he believed the text of the statute
provided EPA with authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and why its policy
concerns did not justify its refusal to exercise that authority").
524. Mass. v. Envtl. Prot. Agencey, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
525. Mass. v. Envt. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007); slip op at 32. ("In short, EPA
has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases
cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore 'arbitrary, capricious... or
otherwise not in accordance with law."').
526. Id. at 30, 32.
527. See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under
the Clean Air Act, EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0318 (July 11, 2008)
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/anpr.html
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/pdf/anpr200807ll .pdf.
528. See David A. Fahrenthold and Juliet Eilperin, Warming Is Major Threat To Humans. EPA
Warns, WASHINGTON POST (July 18, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/07/l 7/AR2008071701557_pf.html.
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determination that it spawned will be used by UNCLOS proponents and
environmental activists. It is likely they will be employed to promote not only
UNCLOS ratification, but also U.S. regulation of land-based sources of carbon
dioxide emissions, including both mobile and stationary sources, in order to
prevent pollution of the marine environment. As one legal commentator has
argued, they are also likely to result in domestic, and perhaps, even international
climate change and other environmental litigation.
529
Now that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, regulatory controls on motor
vehicles (as well as on other sources of greenhouse gases, including utilities and
industrial facilities) are sure to follow. In time, however, Mass. v. EPA may come to stand
for more than the simple proposition that Congress delegated authority to regulate
greenhouse gases under the CAA. It may herald in a new era of state-sponsored litigation,
environmental standing, and statutory interpretation-and yet still do little to cool down a
warming planet.
530
8. The Oceans Conservation, Education, and National Strategy for the
21st Century Act (HR 21)
As discussed previously, the reports issued by the Pew Oceans Commission, the
U.S. Commission on Oceans Policy and the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative
were seriously considered by the majority within the new I I0 ,h Congress. In
reliance thereon, legislation was introduced during January 2007 53 that endeavors
to establish "a more comprehensive and integrated national ecosystem-based
529. See discussion, infra, about the potential venue for climate change litigation under the
auspices of the UNCLOS and the UN Kyoto Protocol.
530. See Jonathan Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
61, 64 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf (emphasis
added).
531. See H.R. 21, 11 0th Cong. (introduced Jan. 4, 2007), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = l10 congbills&docid = f:h2lih.txt.pdf; "National Affairs and
Legislation Committee, The Garden Club of America", I I0th Congress, 1st Session (May
8, 2007) at 2 (This comprehensive oceans bill was initially introduced during the 10 8 1h
Congress as the 'OCEANS-21' bill, and was later reintroduced during the 109' Congress
where it also languished. During January 2007, it was reintroduced by Congressman Sam
Farr (D, CA). This version of the bill, which was cosponsored by 70 representatives, 64 of
whom are Democrats, "draws heavily from reports issued by the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy, the Pew Oceans Commission and the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative."
The bill was subsequently marked up during April 2008 in the Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife, and Oceans, which then forwarded it to the House Natural Resources for
consideration.), http://www.pgcinc.org/LegisUpdate-5.pdf.
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management approach,532 to ocean stewardship. The express national policy of
HR 21533 is to "protect, maintain, and restore the health of marine ecosystems in
order to fulfill the ecological, economic, educational, social, cultural, nutritional,
recreational and other requirements of current and future generations of
Americans. 534
Coincidentally, HR 21's mention of the need to maintain "'healthy marine
ecosystems' 535 to provide more goods and services, such as seafood and tourism
opportunities' 536 531 closely parallels the European Union's Green Paper on
Maritime Policy. 538 It, too, emphasizes the importance of the seafood and tourism
industries to the EU national and regional economies. The Green Paper also
ironically speaks of how a growth in tourism would help spur the construction of
cruise ships and the development of coastal areas and islands that would likely fall
subject to costly and restrictive Precautionary Principle-based environmental
regulations that ultimately impede such development, tourism and shipbuilding, as
newly created marine protected areas proceed to block access to the islands and
coastal waters surrounding them.
Interestingly, during House subcommittee hearings held on April 26, 2007,
"NOAA Assistant Administrator John Dunnigan told members of the House
Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans Subcommittee that the Bush administration opposes
HR 21 [because] '[m]any of the provisions in this bill are inconsistent with the
president's "Ocean Action Plan," are impractical or are inconsistent with existing
laws."' 539 His last point would seem to highlight the main theme of this article,
namely, that if HR 21 and many of the proposed changes to other federal
532. Id. at § 2(3).
533. Id, Title I, § 101(a).
534. ld
535. Id., § 2(3)(A).
536. Id, § 2(12), 2(14).
537. See Robin Kundis Craig, Still Stumbling Toward Ocean Sustainability: The Ocean
Commissions' Unfulfilled Vision, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. __ at 11-12,15,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=983549.
538. See GREEN PAPER, Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European vision for
the oceans and seas, Commission of the European Communities (June 7, 2006),
COM(2006) 275 final, Volume II - ANNEX, at 3-7, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006 0275Ben0l .pdf.
539. See Lauren Morello, White House Has 'Serious Concerns' With Reform Bill, Joint Ocean
Commission Initiative (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.jointoceancommission.org/news-
room/in-the-news/2007-04-
27_WhiteHouse has serious concerns with ReformBill@E&EDaily.pdf.
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environmental laws are adopted to achieve the objectives of a new comprehensive
U.S. oceans policy which is consistent with UNCLOS environmental provisions,
then U.S. federal implementing legislation will undoubtedly be required.
UNCLOS and Precautionary Principle proponents, by contrast, have applauded
this bill especially in light of the perceived existential threat 540 that emissions of
land, air, internal waterway and sea-based pollutants, including carbon dioxide,
directly and indirectly pose to the planet's oceans and their living resources. 541 In
fact, HR 21's findings cite all of the potential threats to the marine environment
already identified by both commissions and assorted legal commentators and
environmentalists, but which current U.S. laws and regulations have allegedly been
unable to adequately address. They include global climate change, chemical,
nutrient, and biological pollution, unwise land use and coastal development,
habitat damage, overfishing, bycatch and invasive species.
542
However, what stands out most in the January 2007 version of HR 21 is its
express incorporation of the Precautionary Approach/Precautionary Principle
within the bill's definitional provisions.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS. In this Act: ... (23) PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH- The
term 'precautionary approach' means the approach used to ensure the health and
sustainability of marine ecosystems for the benefit of current and future generations, in
which lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a justification for postponing
action to prevent environmental degradation.
543
The Precautionary Approach/Precautionary Principle appears once again in the
bill's provisions dealing with 'national standards.' "In the case of incomplete or
inconclusive information as to the effects of a covered action on United States
ocean waters or ocean resources, decisions shall be made using the precautionary
approach to ensure protection, maintenance, and restoration of healthy marine
ecosystems., 544  It is identified as a basis for restricting or preventing any
otherwise authorized public or private activity ('covered actions,' including those
540. See Marine Degradation From Land-Based Activities: A Global Concern, Remarks by Vice
President Gore at the Ministerial Level Plenary Session of the UN Environmental Program
Inter-governmental Conference on the Protection of the Marine Environment From Land-
Based Activities, Washington, DC, (Nov. 1, 1995),
http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/951101 .html.
541. Id. at 13-14.
542. HR 21, 110th Cong., supra note 529, § 2(9).
543. Id. § 4(23).
544. Id. at Title 1, § 101(b)(2)(C).
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permitted and licensed by the federal government)545 that significantly affects
United States ocean or coastal waters or resources, such that it is "likely to
significantly harm the health of any marine ecosystem" or "to impede the
restoration of the health of any marine ecosystem."
546
During March and April 2007, the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and
Oceans of the Natural Resources Committee convened oversight hearings on HR
21 "to focus on priorities for ocean policy reform in the United States and the
recommendations of the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative." 547  The
subcommittee subsequently held an HR 21 mark-up session during April 2008 that
resulted in several amendments, including one offered by Chairwoman Madeleine
Bordallo. This amendment "would change a requirement that agencies review
each project for its potential effects on ocean health. Instead, federal agencies
would be required to revise existing regulations as needed to ensure that they are
carried out consistently with oceans conservation policy."548 It would appear that
federal agencies and executive offices operating under the auspices of the white
house would now be provided with considerable opportunity for mischief,
particularly, the Committee on Ocean Policy that President Bush established via
Executive Order 13366 as part of the White House Council on Environmental
Quality. 549  Most of the amendments that were filed for consideration by the
committee's ranking members, however, ultimately failed.550
Among the most noticeable changes in the final marked-up bill 551 is the express
545. Id. § 4(4).
546. Id. §101(b)(2)(B).
547. See Ocean Policy Priorities in the U.S. and H.R. 21 Oceans Conservation, Education and
Nat'l Strategy for the 21"' Century Act, Oversight and Legislative hearings, before the
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the Committee on Natural Resources,
U.S. House of Representatives 110 'b Cong. I" Sess, (Mar. 29, 2007, and Apr. 26, 2007),
House Report No. 110-10, http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/I10h/34377.pdf.
548. See Sheril Kirshenbaum, Ocean 21 One Step Closer, Nicholas Inst. for Envt. Pol'y
Solutions (Jun. 24, 2008), http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/nioceans/dispatches/oceans-2 I -
one-step-closer (emphasis added).
549. See Executive Order 13366 (Dec. 17, 2004), 69 FR 76591,
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/06j un2004 I 800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2004/pdf/
04-28079.pdf.
550. See Oceans-21 Bill Clears Major Legislative Hurdle, Legislative Update, VOL. 4, ISSUE 3
RAE NEWSLETTER (May/June 2008),
http://www.estuaries.org/assets/documents/LegUpdate7MayJune208Volume4lssue3part2.
pdf.
551. See Committee Print, 1 1h Cong. 2nd Sess. H. R. 21 (Apr. 28, 2008)(Showing the
Amendment Adopted by the Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries,
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omission of the Precautionary Approach/Precautionary Principle language and the
related term "covered actions" within definitional Section 4. Another conspicuous
change involves the substitution of the word "Principles" for "Standards" within
Section 21, which sounds eerily European. And, among the list of 'Principles' is
an indirect recitation of the broad Wingspread version of Europe's Precautionary
Principle, which authorizes, in the face of scientific uncertainty, governmental
resort to strict proscriptive regulatory measures to reduce or eliminate significant
threats of harm (as opposed to actual harm) posed by human activities to "marine
ecosystem health," notwithstanding the economic costs associated with
undertaking such action(s).
(2) PRINCIPLES.-The National Ocean Policy shall be implemented in accordance with
the following principles: . . . (D) The lack of scientific certainty should not be used as
justification for postponing action to prevent negative environmental impacts. In cases in
which significant threats to marine ecosystem health exist, the best of the available science
should be used to manage ocean waters, coastal waters, and ocean resources in a manner
that gives the greatest weight to the protection, maintenance, and restoration of marine
ecosystem health.
5 52
The most efficient way to evaluate this iteration of the Precautionary Principle
is to compare it to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (Rio Declaration), arguably
the most frequently cited statement of the Precautionary Principle:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely used by
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
55 3
Once compared, HR 21's modified version of the Precautionary Principle raises
several issues.
First, there is no reference at all to the economic costs or cost-effectiveness of
undertaking preferred mitigation or restorative actions or employing measures, or
to the need to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the effects of action versus
inaction or between possible alternative actions, unlike in the case of the Rio
Declaration. Second, while it is expressly stated that "the best available science"
(which, as noted elsewhere in the marked-up bill, is also to be used as the basis for
Wildlife and Oceans), http://resources.ca.gov/copc/7-24-08_meeting/HR%2021.pdf.
552. Id. at Title 1, Section 101(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
553. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development - Annex 1, Report of the U.N.
Conference on Env't. And Dev. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51/aconfl 5126- I annex I .htm.
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ocean and regional assessments 554) should be used to "manage" ocean and coastal
waters and ocean resources, there is no mention of any other factors that might be
considered in arriving at a marine ecosystem management option. In other words,
it would seem that the National Ocean Advisor or agency heads would have only
limited discretion in considering factors other than environmental ones - "the
greatest weight should be given to environmental considerations"-which shall
not, in any event, include costs.
Third, both the initial and marked-up bills employ the phrase "should not be
used as justification for postponing action," whereas the Rio Declaration uses the
phrase "shall not be used as a reason for postponing . . . measures." There is a
definitional distinction between justification and reason that must be emphasized.
A "reason" is defined as
"a statement offered in explanation. . . a rational ground or motive; a sufficient
ground of explanation or of logical defense; something that supports a conclusion
or explains a fact." 555 A "justification" is defined as something that "prove[s] or
show[s] to be just, right or reasonable"; that "shows . . . a sufficient legal . . .
lawful... reason for an act done." '556 Justification has elsewhere been defined as a
"[j]ust, lawful excuse or reason for act or failing to act. A maintaining or showing
of sufficient reason in court why the defendant did what his called upon to answer.
• . See also Legal Excuse." 557 A "legal excuse" is defined as a doctrine by which
one seeks to avoid the consequences of [one's] own conduct by showing
justification for acts which would otherwise be considered negligent or
criminal. 558 It would appear, therefore, pursuant to the language of the original
and marked-up bills, that a lack of scientific certainty could not be used as a legal
defense or excuse in law by a government agency that fails to act to reduce or
eliminate significant threats to marine ecosystem health. Pursuant to the Rio
Declaration language, however, a lack of scientific certainty may qualify as a legal
defense or excuse for such a failure to act, for purposes of avoiding suit (litigation),
but may not suffice as an ethical, moral or political defense or excuse.
554. See Committee Print, Title I1, Section 302(b)(3)(APRIL 28, 2008)(Showing the
Amendment Adopted by the Committee on Natural Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries,
Wildlife and Oceans).
555. See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition (2000) at 971.
556. Id. at 635.
557. See Black's Law Dictionary Special Deluxe Fifth Edition (1979) at 778.
558. Id. at 804.
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Fourth, neither of the terms "marine ecosystem health" nor "healthy marine
ecosystem," are anywhere to be found in the Rio Declaration. Both the original
and marked-up oceans bills define "marine ecosystem health, 559 and the
corresponding legal duty to protect and maintain a "healthy marine ecosystem"
rather broadly.
Each of the terms 'marine ecosystem health' and 'health of marine ecosystems' means the
ability of a marine ecosystem to support and maintain a productive and resilient
community of organisms . . .such that it provides . . .a complete range of ecological
benefits, including (A) a complete diversity of native species and habitats wherein each
native species is able to maintain an abundance, population structure, and distribution
supporting its ecological and evolutionary functions, patterns, and processes and (B) a
560physical, chemical, geological, and microbial environment that is supportive of
patterns, important processes, and productive, sustainable, and resilient communities of
organisms having a species composition, diversity, and functional organization resulting
from the natural habitat of the region.
56 1
Consequently, any activity that disturbs a marine ecosystem's capability of
providing a complete range of ecological benefits to a variety of native organisms
(i.e., activities that render it 'unhealthy') would likely trigger the application of the
Precautionary Principle, and thus, be precluded or severely restricted. 562 Based on
the language used, the risk threshold here would seem to be nearly zero, such that
the burden of proof is effectively reversed and placed upon economic actors to
demonstrate that their suspect activities would not render the marine ecosystem
incapable of providing the environmental services so described.
According to one scientific commentator, progressive concepts of ecosystem-
based management emphasize four common principles. 563  They "must: (1) be
integrated among components of the ecosystem and resource uses and users; (2)
lead to sustainable outcomes; (3) take precaution in avoiding deleterious actions;
and (4) be adaptive in seeking more effective approaches based on experience." 5 64
559. See H.R. 21, 110th Cong., supra note 529 at Short Title, § 4(13), Healthy Marine
Ecosystem; Committee Print supra note 549, at Title 1, § 4(11) 'Marine Ecosystem Health.'
(April 28, 2008)(Showing the Amendment Adopted by the Committee on Natural
Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans).
560. H.R. 21, 110th Cong., supra note 52982 at Section 4(12)(A) and (B).
561. Id. § 4(13)(A), (B); Title 1, § 4(1 1)(A) and (B).
562. Id.
563. See Donald F. Boesch, Scientific Requirements for Ecosystem-based Management in the
Restoration of Chesapeake Bay and Coastal Louisiana, ECOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 26
(2006) 6-26, at 7, 10-1 I, http://www.umces.edu/president/EBM%20CB-LA.pdf.
564. Id. (emphasis added).
What Goes Around Comes Around
In other words, the Precautionary Principle has now been subsumed under the
broader framework of ecosystem-based management (EBM) as one of "four key
management principles," 565 hence the removal of the term Precautionary Approach
from both the "definitions" and "standards" sections of the marked-up bill, which
now refers to "principles."
Perhaps this reconsideration of HR 21 text was precipitated by the testimonies
proffered by some of the witnesses who participated at the March and April 2007
HR 21 hearings. 566 It may have even triggered two industry coalition letters of
concern more recently sent to both the Chairman and the Ranking minority
member of the House Natural Resources Committee. They highlighted industries'
serious reservations about HR 21, including its direct or indirect codification of the
Precautionary Principle.
H.R. 21 will most certainly provide a new basis for contesting development or other
activity necessary to sustain a growing economy and the nation's defense .... For
example, a cumulative impacts analysis required for regulating a facility within a
geographically defined region or on a specific water body becomes exponentially more
difficult to do if the individual and cumulative impacts must be assessed on a regional or
national basis to satisfy the integrated approach contemplated under H.R. 21. Also, we are
concerned that H.R. 21 would codify a version of the highly controversial precautionary
principle. Under that principle as enunciated in the specific language of H.R. 21, federal
agencies would be required to take action even if the science is insufficient to make
informed judgments about a perceived problem and appropriate solutions. Furthermore,
for addressing significant threats to marine ecosystem health, H.R. 21 establishes a new
basis for selecting the scientific analyses to be used, jettisoning the implied consensus
inherent in the requirement of current law to 'use best available science.'
5 6
565. Id. at 7.
566. See Statement of Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and The Honorable Leon E.
Panetta, Co-Chairmen, Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, at Ocean Pol'y Priorities in the
U.S.; H.R. 21, Oceans Conservation and Nat'l Strategy for the 21s" Century Act, Oversight
and Legislative Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the
Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. H.R. I 10th Cong. I" Sess. (March 29, 2007, and
April 26, 2007), at 18; id. at 109-110, Statement of W.F. "Zeke" Grader, Jr., Executive
Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations; id. at 112-113, Response to
questions submitted for the record by Zeke Grader; Id., at 112, Questions From the Hon.
Henry Brown, Minority Ranking Member; id at 117 Statement of Sarah Chasis, Senior
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council; id., at 132, Response to questions submitted
for the record by Dr. Andy Rosenberg; id., at 137, Prepared Statement of David Benton,
Executive Director, Marine Conservation Alliance; id., at 151, 153, Statement of Charles
C. Vinick, President and CEO, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound.
567. Industry Coalition Letter to The Honorable Don Young Ranking Member Committee on
Natural Resources, U.S. House of Representatives (May 30, 2008),
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Beyond these sources, the spirit of the Precautionary Principle embedded within
the marked-up HR 21 can be traced back to Chapter 17 of UN Agenda 21, as
discussed in Part I of this article (readers should note the common use of the
number '21'). In particular, Chapter 17's second program, Marine Environmental
Protection, focuses on the four primary land-based sources of marine pollution,
including urban runoff, agricultural runoff, nonpoint sources of pollution from
diffuse, hard-to-regulate sources and atmospheric deposition of pollutants, all of
which are cited in Article 2(9) of the prior version of HR 2 1.568
Furthermore, the true intent behind marked-up HR 21 with respect to its
incorporation of Europe's Precautionary Principle can be discerned from a key
1998 NOAA 'Year of the Oceans' strategy document 569 which arguably employs
'Precautionary Approach' language to confuse people. In no uncertain terms, this
document emphasized the growing worldwide acceptance of, and called for the
U.S. government's expanded application of, "the Precautionary Approach to
marine resource management."
A concept unheard of a decade ago, the precautionary approach states that in the face of
uncertainty, managers and decision makers must err on the side of conservation of living
marine resources and protection of the environment. This is the opposite of earlier
resource management approaches, where the proponent of resource use prevailed until
something went wrong. Representing a radical shift of the burden of proof from those who
would conserve resources to those who would use them, the precautionary approach is
now being integrated into U.S. policy and practice, as well as into many international
agreements.570
Moreover, the more recent effort to embed Europe's Precautionary Principle
within U.S. environmental laws, including the marked-up HR 21, can be discerned
from the prior congressional testimony presented before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations by Roger T. Rufe, Jr., a retired U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral
http://www.nma.org/pdf/misc/060208joint letter.pdf.; Industry Coalition Letter to The
Honorable Nick J. Rahall, I1, Chairman Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. House of
Representatives (May 30, 2008),
http://www2.eei.org/about-EElladvocacyactivities/Congress/08053OHuntHouse0ceans.pd
f.
568. See Craig, supra note 62 at 10200-10201; See also H.R. 21, 110th Cong. (introduced Jan. 4,
2007), snote 529.
569. See 1998 Year of the Ocean - Ensuring the Sustainability of Ocean Living Resources, The
Ocean Principals Group, C-7, C-23 - C-24,
http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/yoto/meeting/doc/liv-res316.doc.
570. Id. (emphasis added).
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and former CEO of The Ocean Conservancy (OTC). During the March 2004
UNCLOS ratification hearings, Mr. Rufe recommended that the U.S. should and
could adopt the Precautionary Principle as a central tenet of domestic
environmental law, consistent with the spirit of the UNCLOS, "even though the
concept '[P]recautionary [P]rinciple' did not exist at the time UNCLOS was
negotiated and ...did not appear in the Convention." 571 In addition, Mr. Rufe
"urge[d] the United States to ensure the appropriate application of this principle to
guide decision-making ... in future Convention amendments [given that ...]
subsequent multilateral agreements related to UNCLOS include the use of the
[P]recautionary [P]rinciple, including the Straddling Stocks Agreement.
' 572
Lastly, the spirit of the Precautionary Principle embedded within the marked-up
HR 21 may be discerned from the reports of both the Joint Ocean Commission
Initiative 573 and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, which recommended its
adoption as U.S. law. Significantly, the report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy endeavored to distinguish between the Precautionary Approach and the
Precautionary Principle, and recommended that the President's "National Ocean
Council (NOC) ... adopt the principle of ecosystem-based management ... and as
part of this effort ... coordinate the development of procedures for the practical
application of the precautionary approach and adaptive management."
574
However, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy failed to mention anything about
using 'cost-efficient' measures or subjecting precautionary approach-based
management decisions to economic cost-benefit analysis. Nor did it mention
571. See PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL ROGER T. RUFE, JR., U.S.CG
(RET.), PRESIDENT, THE OCEAN CONSERVANCY, WASHINGTON, DC, before The
Committee on Foreign Relations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Senate
Executive Report 108-110 (March I1, 2004) at 130-131,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?lPaddress= 162.140.64.181 &filename=er010.pdf&directory=/diska/wais/data
/108_cong_reports : see also Response of Vice Admiral Rufe to Chairman Lugar; Id. at p.
144.
572. Id.
573. See From Sea to Shining Sea: Priorities for Ocean Policy Reform, Report to the United
States Senate, Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, supra note 286, at 17 ("A new
declaration of national ocean policy should incorporate provisions relating, but not limited
to, the following concepts ...ensure responsible management and sustainable use of
fishery resources and other ocean and coastal resources held in the public trust, using
ecosystem-based management and a balanced precautionary and adaptive approach
(emphasis added).
574. See Recommendation 4-3, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, supra note 283, at 80.
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anything about the burden of proof. Therefore, the distinction they set forth
between these two concepts is arguably nothing more than semantics.
The precautionary principle has been proposed by some parties as a touchstone for
managers faced with uncertain scientific information. In its strictest formulation, the
precautionary principle states that when the potentially adverse effects of a proposed
activity are not fully understood, the activity should not be allowed to proceed. While this
may appear sensible at first glance, its application could lead to extreme and often
undesirable results. Because scientific information can never fully explain and predict all
impacts, strict adoption of the precautionary principle would prevent most, if not all,
activities from proceeding.
In contrast to the precautionary principle, the Commission recommends adoption of a
more balanced precautionary approach that weighs the level of scientific uncertainty and
the potential risk of damage as part of every management decision .... To ensure the
sustainability of ecosystems ... decision makers should follow a balanced precautionary
approach, applying judicious and responsible management practices based on the best
available science and on proactive, rather than reactive, policies. Where threats of serious
or irreversible damage exist, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
justification for postponing action to prevent environmental degradation.5 75
That the Commission went through the trouble to try and emphasize a
distinction and to recommend a "more balanced Precautionary Approach" likely
reflects the prior and current political reality in Washington. The Commission
served at the pleasure of, and was survived by, a Republican administration,
576
even though the Ocean Act of 2000 that directed former President Bush to create
the Commission in the first place was passed by Congress and signed into law
during a Democratic Clinton administration.
57 7
Many will find interesting the fact that, under the auspices of the Bush '41 and
'43 administrations and both Reagan administrations, federal agencies and
575. Id. at 65.
576. See U.S. Commission On Ocean Policy, U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy: Archive of
Commission Documents, (The U.S. Oceans Commission, which was established to
undertake an 18 month study (a final report being due by June 20, 2003) and submit
recommendations to the President and the Congress for a national oceans policy, held its
first business meeting during November 2001),
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/doc_archive.html; U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy, Commission Meetings,
http://www.oceancommission.gov/meetings/welcome.html; see United States Commission
on Ocean Policy, (The Commission subsequently expired on December 19, 2004),
http://www.oceancommission.gov/welcome.html.
577. See S.2327, Oceans Act of 2000, (signed into law on August 7, 2000 as Public Law 106-
256; effective on January 20, 2001),
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/oceanact.pdf.
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executive offices employing scientific risk assessment and economic cost-benefit
analysis focused on the 'cost' side of the ledger to limit the promulgation of
unnecessarily burdensome and costly environmental and health regulations that
impair the exercise of private property rights. This may be contrasted with the
practices of the federal agencies and executive offices operating under the auspices
of the two Clinton administrations. Instead, when applying scientific risk
assessment protocols and economic cost-benefit analysis, the agencies and offices
focused on the identification of environmental and health hazards (rather than
risks) and the anticipated environmental and social public benefits associated with
the enactment of more stringent environmental and health regulations to reduce or
eliminate those hazards. In other words, during the Clinton administration, a
greater emphasis was placed on the benefit side of the ledger and the amelioration
of costs to the environment (i.e., environmental externalities as opposed to
economic costs), which inevitably had negative consequences for private property
rights.5
7 8
It may be argued that these two different conceptions of the role served by risk
versus hazard assessment and costs versus benefits roughly corresponds to the
distinction between the WTO-sanctioned Precautionary Approach and the extra-
WTO European Precautionary Principle,579 which members of the 11 1h Congress
now wish to incorporate within HR 21. It is rather clear that the new Obama
administration intends to reverse the environmental legacy of the Bush years580 and
to enhance that of the Clinton era. 58 As a result, it is almost certain that the cost-
benefit calculus used to determine the stringency and extent of U.S. environmental
legislative and/or regulatory changes deemed necessary to implement the
578. See discussion, infra.
579. Kogan, World Trade Organization Biotech Decision Clarifies Central Role of Science in
Evaluating Health and Environmental Risks for Regulation Purposes, supra note 38.
580. See Can Obama Undo Bush's Anti-Environment Legacy? The President-Elect Has His
Work Cut Out for Him, The Daily Green, Nov. 23, 2008
http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-news/latest/obama-bush-environment-
461108; Barack Obama and Joe Biden: Promoting a Healthy Environment, Barack Obama
website, http://www.barackobama.com/pdfissues/EnvironmentFactSheet.pdf.
581. See, e.g., Jeff Smith, Obama Picks Browner to be 'Energy Czar', Media Mouse blog (Dec.
12, 2008available), http://www.mediamouse.org/news/2008/12/obama-picks-bro.php; Ed
Cutlip, Clinton's Environmental Policy, Media Mouse blog (June 16, 2007),
http://www.mediamouse.org/news/2007/06/clintons-enviro.php; James Carney and John F.
Dickerson, Rolling Back Clinton, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan. 21, 2001) available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,96178,00.html.
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recommendations contained in the final report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy will be reconstituted and modernized to more heavily focus on
environmental hazards and net benefits.,
B. Presidential Executive Orders and Memoranda May Be Used to Ensure U.S.
Compliance With UNCLOS & MEA Provisions Incorporating Europe's
Precautionary Principle
It is quite clear that Congress can play an important role in enacting, pre- or
post- UNCLOS ratification, implementing legislation to ensure that U.S. federal
environmental laws remain explicitly or implicitly in compliance with
Precautionary Principle-based multilateral environmental treaty obligations.
However, it is less than clear how the President may, via the issuance of executive
orders and memoranda, and perhaps even proclamations, 582 instruct federal
agencies to more subtly implement federal environmental regulatory and policy
changes that bypass Congress, for the purpose of incorporating Europe's
Precautionary Principle into U.S. law following UNCLOS ratification.
583
1. Presidential Executive Orders
Executive orders are said to constitute only one form of 'presidential direct
action,' or "situations in which the president simply issues statements, many
having the force of law, with no requirement for any particular processes such as
those required to enact legislation or even to adopt administrative rules."
' 584
582. See discussion in Conclusion, infra.
583. Responses of Hon. William H. Taft, IV, the Legal Advisor, Dept. of State to Additional
Questions for the Record submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, JR, Responses to
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record, accompanying Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 108th Congress,
Senate Executive Report 108-10 (March II, 2004), supra note 273, at 177. ("Question 5.
Does the Executive Branch expect to issue any Executive Orders following U.S. accession
to the Convention in order to implement U.S. obligations under the Convention? If so,
please elaborate on the subjects that would be addressed in such Executive Orders and the
relevant obligations of the Convention that would be covered by such Orders. Answer. The
Administration does not have current plans to issue any particular Executive Orders
following U.S. accession. The Executive Branch may decide over time to make more
formal various mechanisms for ensuring that U.S. Executive Branch actions are consistent
with the provisions of the Convention; however, if so, there are a variety of mechanisms
from which to choose, ranging from informal guidance documents to more formal
Executive Orders.").
584. See David Dehnel, Book Review of PHILLIP COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE
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Scholars have found that presidents have issued executive orders for several
reasons - when they lack the political power to persuade the public, when they are
faced with an uncooperative Congress and when they wish to enhance their good
relationship with Congress, with executive orders being issued more often during a
president's lame duck year.
58 5
Presidents have long issued executive orders to promote environmental
stewardship. For example, President Nixon issued E.O. 11514-Protection and
Enhancement of Environmental Quality,586 while President Bush ('41') issued E.O.
13274 - Environmental Stewardship and Transportation Infrastructure Project
Reviews,18 7 E.O. 13423-Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and
Transportation Management, 588 and E.O. 13352-Facilitation of Cooperative
Conservation.
589
Yet, it is probably the Clinton administration that is best known for its issuance
of executive orders to effectuate comprehensive environmental policy. Prior to
November 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12852, which
established the President's Council on Sustainable Development, the objective of
which was to "advise the President on matters involving sustainable
development," 590 and Executive Order 12856 - Federal Compliance With Right-
To-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements.59' President Clinton also
issued Executive Order 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (Feb. 1994) the policy
objective of which was to ensure that each federal agency makes achieving
USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION (2002) ("Common forms of presidential
direct action include executive orders and proclamations, presidential memoranda, national
security directives, and signing statements. Cooper finds the rising use of these instruments
understandable, but problematic."),
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/cooper-phillip.htm.
585. See Margaret Tseng: Presidential Unilateral Powers: The use of Executive Orders vs.
Executive Memorandum, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton,
Washington, DC, Sep. 01, 2005, at 1-3, 17-19,
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p-mla-apa research-citation/0/4/2/0/0/pages42000/p42
000-I .php.
586. See Exec. Order No. 11514 (Mar. 5, 1970) 35 FR 4247, 3 C.F.R., 1966-1970.
587. See Exec. Order No. 13274 (Sept. 23, 2002) 67 FR 59449.
588. See Exec. Order No. 13423 (Jan. 26, 2007) 72 FR 3919; see also Vision Statement, About
OFEE, Office of the Federal Environmental Executive, http://ofee.gov/about/modified.asp.
589. See Exec. Order No.13352 (Aug. 30, 2004) 69 FR 52989.
590. See Exec. Order No. 12852 (June 29, 1993) 58 FR 35841.
591. See Exec. Order No. 12856 (Aug. 3. 1993) 58 FR 41981.
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"environmental justice" part of its mission.59 2
It is quite clear that these executive orders expanded the scope of federal
agencies' authority to regulate environmental matters coming within their
jurisdictional purview. Indeed, legal commentators and presidential advisers are
well aware of the influence wielded by the executive branch to expand/contract the
size of favored/disfavored regulatory programs. In fact, one commentator has
emphasized:
[e]ven more directly than Congress.. the executive branch can use its grip on the national
purse strings to expand the size of those regulatory program[s] that it favors[] and to
contract the size of those it does not. Furthermore, since 1980, the president has used the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to oversee an economic analysis of all
proposed major regulations. This has had a significant effect on the regulatory initiatives
proposed by the EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
593
The Clinton administration's freedom to increase the level and stringency of
environmental regulation, however, was reined in following the 1994 (midterm)
congressional election. Legal commentators agree 594 that it was largely compelled
to respond to the 'regulatory reform' plank of the new Republican congressional
majority's Contract with America, which had resulted in the adoption of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (1995),595 the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (1996)596 and the Information (Data) Quality Act
(2000)."' "A key goal of this reform movement was that all, or virtually all,
federal regulation should be required to meet a cost-benefit criterion, which would
have required a reduction in the stringency of those regulations whose costs were
deemed not to be justified by the associated benefits." 598
Yet, even despite this apparent constriction, the president continued to wield
592. Exec. Order No. 12898 (Feb. 16, 1994) 59 FR 7629; see Presidential Executive Order
12898 - Environmental Justice, Noise Pollution Clearinghouse,
http://www.nonoise.org/library/execords/eo- I 2898.htm.
593. See Ashford, supra note 40, at 359-359.
594. Id. at 356-357.
595. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Public Law 104-4 (Mar. 22, 1995),
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/unfund.pdf; see Ashford, supra note 21, at 357.
596. See The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (1996), Public Law 104-121
(Mar. 29, 1996) (This act was later amended by P.L. 110-28 (May 25, 2007),
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba-homepage/toolslawsregu-regfair.pd
0; see also Ashford, supra note 40.
597. Id. at 358.
598. Id. at 357.
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considerable regulatory influence through the OMB. Several presidential
executive orders were drafted to satisfy the recommendations contained in the
Clinton administration's ambitious new 'reinventing government' initiative - i.e.,
the National Performance Review (NPR) report overseen by former Vice President
Al Gore.599 Included in NPR's initiative was the Reinventing Environmental
Management (REM) report. That report called for the creation of an interagency
group to undertake "improved federal decision-making through environmental cost
accounting and for the issuance of a presidential directive on environmental cost
accounting."60 1 Several years later, E. 0. 13148 - Greening the Government
602Through Leadership in Environmental Management was issued. Among other
things, E.O. 13148 obliged federal agencies to establish and implement
"environmental compliance audit programs and policies that emphasize[d]
pollution prevention as a means to both achieve and maintain environmental
compliance" (emphasis added).60 3 And, it also encouraged federal agencies,
"whenever feasible and cost-effective. . . to reduce or eliminate harm to human
health and the environment from releases of pollutants to the environment."
6 °4
Although E.O. 13148 was subsequently revoked by Bush E.O. 13423,605 it
remains instructive for purposes of the following analysis. It would seem that the
NPA and REM reports had a measurable impact on federal regulatory practice,
which, while subtle in design, marked a substantive departure from the regulatory
practices of previous administrations. In any event, it reflected the increasing use
of presidential directives to circumvent what had become a Congress adverse to
Clinton administration policies.
For example, Executive Order 13112 (Feb. 1999) was issued to establish a
National Invasive Species Council that would organize, strengthen and expand
federal agencies' jurisdiction over federal lands in implementation of the now-
expired National Invasive Species Act.6° 6 This act arguably circumvented the need
599. See George Nesterczuk, Reviewing the National Performance Review, CATO REGULATION
MAGAZINE, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regl9n3b.html.
601. See Chapter 9: Environmental Economics, Annual Report of the Council on Environmental
Quality (1993), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/N EPA/reports/1993/chap9.htm;
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/reports/1993/toc.htm (emphasis added).
602. See Exec. Order No. 13148 (April 21, 2000), 65 FR 81, 24595.
603. Id. Section 202 - Environmental Compliance.
604. Id. Section 203 - Right-to-Know and Pollution Prevention (emphasis added).
605. See Exec, Order No. 13423 (Jan. 26, 2007), supra note 641, Sec. I I(iv).
606. See "Executive Order 13112 - Invasive Species" (Feb 3, 1999), Sections 2-4,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1999-register&docid=99-
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for congressional legislative amendments.
According to one 1994 Congressional Research Service report (CRS 94-961)
prepared out of concern that legislative proposals then simmering in the 10 4 th
Congress would "require EPA analyses of risks, costs, and benefits of proposed
regulations" that could have constrained Clinton administration environmental
policy, 60 7 it is apparent that the Clinton administration had endeavored to
effectuate subtle but much more broadly applicable national regulatory policy
changes through the use of executive orders. In particular, the report compared and
contrasted the Reagan administration's now revoked E.O. 12291 (Feb. 1981)60
8
and E.O. 12498 (Jan. 1985)609 with the Clinton administration's E.O. 12866 (Sept.
1993)610 which superseded it,6 I evaluating, in the process, how each
administration respectively had required federal agency economic cost-benefit
analysis 61 2 that emphasized either 'risk' probability or hypothetical 'hazard'
3184-filed.pdf.
607. See Linda-Jo Schierow, Risk Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Regulations, CRS Report for Congress 94-961 (Dec. 2, 1994),
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-5.cfm; Id at Introduction,
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-5.cfm#INTRODUCTION.
608. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 FR13193 (Feb. 19, 1981); CRS Report for Congress 94-
961, President Reagan's Executive Orders (Now Revoked),("[C]ost-benefit analysis was
required for all proposed and final 'major' rules . . . '[M]ajor rules' . . . were defined ... to
mean any regulation likely to have an effect on the national economy of $100 million or
more. Rules with a smaller economic impact were also 'major' if they were likely to result
in: a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or
local government, or geographic regions; or a significant adverse effect on competition,
employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of U.S.-based enterprises
to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets . . . . A
requirement for risk analysis was not explicit in President Reagan's 1981 order but implied
by the mandate to assess net benefits of environmental and health and safety regulations.
Most benefits of such regulations are the risks avoided due to Federal action")(emphasis
added), http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-
5b.cfm#President%20Reagan's%2OExecutive%200rders%20(Now%20 Revoked.
609. See Exec.Order No. 12498, 60 FR 1036 (Jan. 1985).
610. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
611. See Ashford, supra note 34, at 359; see also. 58 FEDERAL REGISTER 51735 (Sept. 30,
1993), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eol2866.pdf; see also Circular A-4-New
Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis, Office of Management and Budget,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 17, 2003), at 3-4,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf, see also John Graham,
Memorandum for the President's Management Council Regarding OMB's Circular No.A-4,
New Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis (March 2, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/memopmca4.pdf.
612. Ashford, supra note 34, at 359 ("The core substance of ... President Reagan's 1981
Executive Order 12291 ...remains in effect under a 1993 executive order issued by
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analysis. 6 3 The report noted how these subtle differences in policy objectives and
prescriptions could have political significance and could result in different
614
regulatory outcomes.
According to the report, President Clinton's executive order expressly sought
"to improve the process for [promulgating] Federal regulations" and ensuring
public transparency and oversight, while "President Reagan's orders were intended
[not only] to improve the quality but also to reduce the number of regulations
[through more effective] oversight of the regulatory process (emphasis added). 615
In addition, Reagan and Clinton E.O.s directed agencies to employ different
criteria in pursuit of their respective regulatory objectives. Reagan E.O.s focused
on "'maximiz[ing] net benefits' [i.e.] achiev[ing] the greatest possible economic
gain for society to the extent permitted by law", while Clinton E.O.s focused on
"address[ing] significant problems or compelling public need - [e]conomic
impacts [were] not considered in the choice of objectives (although prior to
promulgating a regulation, agencies must determine that benefits justify costs,
unless the regulation is required by law." 616 Furthermore, Reagan E.O.s "directed
agencies to choose the regulatory alternative with the 'least net cost' while
Clinton E.O.s "established three criteria for choosing a regulatory approach:
maximize net benefits, minimize the overall regulatory burden for various
segments of society, and design the most cost-effective regulation or alternative to
achieve the objective. The philosophy of the Clinton order emphasize[d] the
importance of net benefits . . . (including potential economic, environmental,
public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity),
unless a statute requires another regulatory approach .... ,617
CRS 94-961 also discussed how these differing economic philosophies and
President Clinton.").
613. See John L. Moore, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Issues in Its Use in Regulation, CRS Report for
Congress (June 28, 1995), http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-4.cfm; see
also, Summary, http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-4.cfm#SUMMARY.
614. See, e.g., Seth Borenstein, EPA Drops Value of an American Life, Associated Press (July
10, 2008)
http://news.aol.com/story/_a/epa-drops-value-of-an-american-life/2008071020130999000 1.
615. Id. at Regulatory Planning and Review in the Clinton Administration,
http://www.cnie.orglNLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-
5b.cfm#Regulatory/o20Planning%20and%2OReview%20in%20the%20Clinton%20Admini
stration
616. Id. (emphasis added).
617. Id. (emphasis added).
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objectives had manifested themselves in divergent views toward the usefulness of
federal regulatory agency science-risk assessments-in identifying and
quantifying the presence of public environmental and health harms posed to
humans, animals and particular subgroups from exposure to hazardous activities,
chemicals or technologies. '61 8  The report found that "[r]isk and economic
analyses can be qualitative or, if information is sufficient, quantitative, but
economists can only quantify economic benefits of environmental regulations if
scientists can quantitatively estimate risks to health and the environment."' 6 19 It
also noted the significant disagreements that continue to impair the usefulness of
risk analysis, which typically concern the availability, quality and objectiveness of
scientific information that such analyses provide.
620
A subsequently prepared CRS Report (98-738) adopted an entirely different,
and perhaps, 'more evolved' approach to addressing environmental concerns, in
particular, those relating to the hazards attendant to climate change, 62 1 which is
certainly relevant to any consideration of a future U.S. oceans policy. It conceived
of three different policy lenses - technology, 622 economics 623 and ecology624 -
618. id. at Is It a Scientific Basis for Environmental Decisions?
http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-
5c.c fm#ls%201t%20a%20Scientific%20Basis%20for%20Environmental%20Decisions.
619. See CRS Report Congress 94-961, supra note 608 at Executive Summary,
http://www.cnie.orgINLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-5.cfm#SUMMARY.
620. Id.; see Borenstein, supra note 612.
621. See Larry Parker and John Blodgett, Global Climate Change: Three Policy Perspectives,
CRS Report for Congress 98-738 (Aug. 31, 1998) (This divergence also spills over into the
debate about climate change, which, no doubt, influences oceans policy),
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim- l.cfm.
622. Id. at Technological Lens - Background, ("Viewed through the technological lens, an
environmental problem is an 'opportunity' for ingenuity, for a technical 'fix.' This
technologically driven philosophy focuses on research, development, and demonstration of
technologies that ameliorate or eliminate the problem. Many uncertainties can be ignored if
technology is available to render them irrelevant (a presumption underlying the 'pollution
prevention' concept, for example). From this perspective, environmental policy entails the
development and commercialization of new technologies; Government's role can include
basic research, technical support, financial subsidies, economic mechanisms, or the
imposition of requirements or standards that stimulate technological development and that
create markets for such technologies ... The technological lens reflects a traditional
American 'can-do' faith in technology, and in the country's ability to find a 'technology-fix'
to meet the needs of most problems . . . . The technological lens provides a view of the
economy in which technology permits consumers to continue their preferred behaviors
while concomitantly achieving environmental goals. It is not necessary for consumers to
change their behavior to adjust to the "new reality" of an environmental problem") (italics
in original), http://www.ncseonline.orgINLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim-la.cfm#_1_4.
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through which U.S. federal agency regulations could then be tailored to achieve
climate change mitigation as a matter of Presidential policy, and to simultaneously
influence the direction of other related environmental and energy programs.
625
It is significant to the current debate over the availability, applicability and
stringency of UNCLOS environmental provisions to protect the marine
environment from climate change that this report's authors admitted how politics
and fear perceptions, rather than science, had previously guided Clinton
administration climate change policy and regulatory approach.
Because of the enormous uncertainties associated with global climate change-whether
623. Id. at Economic Lense - Background, ("Estimates of the benefits of a specific
environmental action can be uncertain and can vary by an order of magnitude.
Uncertainties about pollution taxes have focused attention on using economic incentives to
increase polluters' flexibility in achieving environmental standards based upon regulation..
. During the 1970s, four economic mechanisms were adopted to increase polluters'
flexibility in meeting the various requirements of the Clean Air Act. These mechanisms
were offsets, bubbling, banking, and netting. . . . Results from these tradeable permit
systems are spotty. . . [w]hile this [economic] lens is sometimes regarded as the private
market's alternative to a regulatory command-and-control program, the interactions are
more complex. The so-called 'market for pollution rights' would not exist if not for a
governmental role in altering what the market would do in lieu of governmental action ...
[t]hose viewing environmental policy through the economic lens generally presume that
governmental interference, whether through subsidies or regulation, should be minimal. In
reality, the distribution of impacts through the market often leads to calls for political
interventions that compromise efficiency and the 'polluter pays' principle ...
Policymakers using the economic lens see consumers and producers adjusting their
behaviors to the 'new reality' of an environmental problem by responding to the price
signals that take into account a particular environmental goal.")(emphasis in original),
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim- I b.cfm#_ 1 8.
624. Id. at Ecological Approach - Background, ("The ecological lens magnifies elements that
are psychological, philosophical, and theological. A policy decision to address a pollution
problem generally involves a sophisticated and sometimes lengthy educational process of
which economics and technological availability are only components. In this view,
environmental education, Smokey the Bear, and environmental interest groups from
Audubon to Greenpeace to Zero Population Growth represent efforts to inculcate the sense
of moral obligation toward the environment -- to acculturate people to the importance of the
environment as essential to long-term human health and welfare. . . . The ecological
approach understands the problem of environmental policy implementation to be the moral
education of individuals and institutions to the dimensions of the ecological crisis, changing
the climate in which decisions are made, and providing opportunities for individuals and
institutions to make decisions based on ecological concerns, rather than having those
choices limited to alternatives dictated solely by economic criteria.") (emphasis in original),
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim-
I c.cfm#Ecological%20Approach.
625. Id. at Introduction,
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Climate/clim- I .cfm#lntroduction.
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global climate change is occurring or will occur, what the effects might be and their
magnitude, the consequences that would follow from actions to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases, the costs of actions or of taking no action, the time frame of impacts,
etc.-each individual's perception of what, if anything, to do is strongly influenced by
personal values, experience, education and training, and outlook in how to cope with
uncertainty. These personal variations affect one's definition of the issue and the weight
one gives possible approaches to it .... In the end, the origin of and support for different
global climate change policy options arise from differing orientations to, or philosophies
for, thinking about uncertainty, taking risks, human progress and adaptability, and personal
and community values.
626
Also important, is CRS 98-738's discussion of the ecologic lens, which may
now be reviewed with 20-20 hindsight. It highlights the continuing trend in
international politics and policymaking, especially within Europe, to emphasize
communitarian, ethical/moral, humanitarian and religion-based environmental
consciousness as a justification for governmental action. It should be noted that
UNCLOS proponents had previously tapped into this trend more than a decade ago
to promote global ratification of the 1982 and 1994 agreements. 6 27 In addition to
former Vice President Gore, the proponents of this legislative and regulatory
approach consist of the 1 10"h Congress's majority leaders, and perhaps, President
Barack Obama as well. They, too, appear to believe that a "wrenching
transformation of society ' 62 8 (a/k/a progressive change) is necessary for the U.S. to
achieve the environment-centric sustainable development long prescribed by the
U.N. Brundtland Report.62 9
626. Id. (emphasis added).
627. See discussion, supra.
628. See Peter J. Smith, Former Vice President Al Gore Makes Star Debut in Toronto as Global
Warming Prophet, LifeSiteNews.com (Feb. 22, 2007) ("Al Gore's environmental message
is a development of ideas first set forth in his 1992 book: Earth in the Balance: Ecology
and the Human Spirit, where he wrote: 'We must make the rescue of the environment the
central organizing principle for civilization' . . . . Gore calls for a Global Marshall Plan
or Strategic Environmental Initiative, with the first goal as stabilising what he believes is
an overpopulated world, with the end result of massively increasing the powers of
government to engineer a 'wrenching change of society' in order to save the world's
ecology") (emphasis added), http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2007/feb/07022204.html.
629. CRS Report for Congress 98-738, supra note 619 at Ecological Lens - Background, ("The
development of environmental protection as a national policy concern reflects three factors:
(I) the development of an environmental consciousness among the electorate, (2) a change
in the climate of decision-making among individuals, businesses, and government at all
levels, (3) the availability of opportunities to make concrete decisions based on
environmental grounds ... The underlying basis of an environmental consciousness is an
understanding of the interconnectedness of the planet's biological processes, and a
recognition that changes caused by humans may have ecological effects beyond those
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The subtle doctrinal (philosophical) differences underlying the divergent
approaches reflected in the Reagan and Clinton executive orders with respect to the
timing and types of economic-cost benefit analyses to be performed as the basis for
public environmental and health regulation were recently highlighted by Susan E.
Dudley, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget. In an October, 2007 speech delivered at Northwestern
University School of Law,630 Ms. Dudley endeavored to explain the rationale
behind the Bush administration's January 2007 issuance of E.O. 13422,631 revising
Section l(b)(l) of Clinton E.O. 12866. The revision generally requires federal
agencies to identify and explain, beforehand, the specific 'market failure' ("such as
externalities, market power, lack of information ... or other specific problem...
including ...failures of public institutions)" necessitating corrective regulatory
action.
63 2
Ms. Dudley particularly noted the modus operandi of Clinton E.O. 12866 as set
intended or foreseen. From this perspective, it is in humanity's self-interest [as well as in the
interests of non-human life] to protect the basic biological processes that are the foundation
of all life; humans can protect those processes by being conscious of humanity's
environmental impact and by avoiding or mitigating that impact to the greatest extent
necessary (accepting that some impact is unavoidable, and that ecological science has a
crucial role in discovering the effects of human activities) . . . . The challenge of the
ecological approach was given global scope by the 'Brundtland Report' of the World
Commission on Environment and Development. Articulating the goal of 'sustainable
development,' its forward describes the challenge this way: If we do not succeed in putting
our message of urgency through to today's parents and decision makers, we risk
undermining our children's fundamental right to a healthy, life-enhancing environment.
Unless we are able to translate our words into a language that can reach the minds and
hearts of people young and old, we shall not be able to undertake the extensive social
changes needed to correct the course of development ... We call for a common endeavor
and for new norms of behavior at all levels and in the interests of all. The changes in
attitudes, in social values, and in aspirations that the report urges will depend on vast
campaigns of education, debate, and public participation" (emphasis added).
630. See Susan E. Dudley, 30 Years of Regulatory Oversight: Lessons Learned, Future
Challenges, Presented at The Searle Center Northwestern University School of Law (Oct.
11, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/oira/dudley_ 101107.html.
631. See Executive Order: Further Amendment to Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory
Planning and Review, Press Release, The White House (Jan. 18, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070118.html; 72 FEDERAL REGISTER
2763 (Jan 23, 2007),
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/0 ljan2007l800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/
07-293.pdf.
632. See Memorandum for Heads of Executive Depts. and Agencies Reg., Executive Office of
the President, Office of Management and Budget (Apr 25, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07- 13.pdf.
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forth in its accompanying Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles: to
promulgate regulations "made necessary by compelling public need, such as
material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of
the public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people." 633 She
then highlighted why it was important for agencies to focus on identifying the
'market failure' prior to regulating. In that regard, she emphasized that the
preferred regulatory philosophy should instead seek to harness the wisdom of
'decentralized crowds' possessing diverse, localized knowledge and a capability of
processing dispersed information that no one individual (even a regulator) can
obtain - a clear reference to decentralized market processes. As she explained, this
approach will always be superior to a regulatory philosophy of "Government
intervention [that] substitutes the judgment of a small group of experts for the
wisdom of the crowds." 634 In her expert opinion, "[G]overnment intervention... is
best used in a limited way, such as in cases of a clear 'market failure' that cannot
be adequately addressed by other means."
635
Ms. Dudley's remarks were especially timely considering Europe's knack of
identifying market failures that impede local, national, regional and global
achievement of environment-centric sustainable development and require adoption
and implementation of Helvetian-style 'legislation/regulation and education'
campaigns6 36 grounded on Europe's Precautionary Principle. It would also appear
that she was cognizant of how such campaigns have interested and influenced the
thinking of the Majority members of during the second session of the 1 1 0 th
Congress. Not surprisingly, E.O. 13422 was roundly criticized as an effort to
broadly circumvent the authority of Congress and to diminish current
633. See Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles: Executive Order 12866, supra note
610 (emphasis added).
634. See Susan E. Dudley, supra note 630.
635. Id. (emphasis added).
636. ERIC SAMUELSON, A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF COLLECTIVISM (1997), citing MORDECAI
GROSSMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HELVETIUS 16 (1926) (The philosophy of eighteenth
century Frenchman, Claude Adrien Helvetius had left an indelible impression on the
European social behaviorists of his time, and apparently, now, the politicians of today.
Helvetian-favored communalism and utilitarian logic are most definitely the driving force
behind the current indoctrination climate under which European cultural preferences are
being converted into an almost universal and unquestioning acceptance of national,
regional, and potentially, supranational governmental mandates to employ the hazard-based
precautionary principle in every day economic life. Helvetius "advocated legislation ... as
the means by which happiness for the greatest number would be achieved."),
http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/samuelson.html#preserve%20the%20rights.
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environmental and health standards (e.g., the Clear Air Act).637
Based on the policy recommendations recently prepared for the Obama
administration by New York University School of Law's Institute for Policy
Integrity, 638 academics arguably hope to reintroduce and further refine the Clinton
era model of economic cost-benefit analysis. If adopted, these recommendations
would not only eliminate Ms. Dudley's 'compelling public need such as material
failures of private markets' trigger for regulatory action that emphasizes net
costs,639 but they would also more broadly redefine net benefits. 4° In addition,
these proposals would require that cost-benefit analysis consider moral and ethical
concerns and sustainable development-type intergenerational equities as noted
below.
V. Net Benefits: Agencies should focus on maximizing net benefits - including quantified
and unquantified benefits - not on minimizing regulatory costs. VI. Ancillary Benefits:
When accounting for the indirect effects of regulation, agencies should pay equal attention
to both the positive and negative indirect effects. VII. Future Generations: The current
practice of discounting benefits for future generations at a constant rate consistent with the
return on traditional financial instruments should be abandoned in favor of a valuation
mechanism that reflects fundamental moral and ethical difficulties that arise with
regulations that have intergenerational effects.
641
Only time will tell whether President Obama's new OIRA administrator will
accept these recommendations. No doubt, if he did, they would broaden the
637. See Curtis W. Copeland, Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive
Order 13422, CRS Report for Congress (Feb. 5, 2007) at CRS-4, CRS-5,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33862.pdf.
638. See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Fixing Regulatory Review:
Recommendations for the Next Administration, Inst. for Pol'y Integrity, Report No. 2 (Dec.
2008), http://www.policyintegrity.org/documents/FixingRegulatoryReview.pdf.
639. Id. at Markup of Executive Order 12866 at 18-19 ("Regulatory Planning and Review
Principles. Poorly-designed regulation, or the failure to regulate significant risks, imposes
unacceptable and unreasonable costs on society .... Section 1. Statement of Regulatory
Philosophy and Principles .... Federal agencies should promulgate regulations that are
required by law, that are necessary to interpret the law, or that advance the public good by:
correcting failures of private markets").
640. Id. at 19 ("Net benefits include both unquantified and quantified economic, employment,
environmental, public health and safety, and overall welfare effects. When choosing
between regulatory alternatives, agencies should take due account of distributive impacts,
including impacts on future generations and equity. The American public should be given
ample opportunity to comment on regulatory alternatives, and the regulatory process should
be conducted expediently, without unnecessary delay, and with sufficient coordination
between federal agencies and with State, local, and tribal governments").
641. Id. at Executive Summary, 1-2 (emphasis added).
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opportunity for federal agencies to promulgate stricter environmental regulations
on net benefit grounds that would appeal to environmental pressure groups because
they are more consistent with Europe's Precautionary Principle.
642
Furthermore, besides the executive orders noted above that focused on the
economic costs of overly strict regulations, surviving Reagan E.O. 12630 643
remains concerned about the implications of regulation for property rights. E.O.
12630 focuses on the degree to which government regulations, including public
environment, health and safety regulations, can interfere with U.S. constitutionally
protected private property rights. 644  Its objective has been "to ensure that
government actions are undertaken on a well-reasoned basis with due regard for
fiscal accountability, for the financial impact of the obligations imposed on the
Federal government by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and for the Constitution."
645
E.O. 12630 recognized, in other words, that "governmental actions that do not
formally invoke the [eminent domain] condemnation power, including regulations
... but which.., substantially affect the value or use of private property, may [in
fact] result in a taking for which just compensation is required, ' ' 64 6 "even though
the action results in less than complete deprivation of all use or value in the same
private property. ' ' 647 To ascertain whether a regulatory taking within the meaning
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Bill of Rights has occurred, the E.O.
emphasized the effect of the regulation on the exercise and use of private property
rather than the intent of the regulator or the policy objective of the regulation. 64'
642. Id. at 5 ("Retaking Rationality argues that cost-benefit analysis is a conceptually neutral
tool to achieve a more rational system of regulation, but that this tool has often been used in
the service of an ideological driven antiregulatory agenda. Due to this imbalance, groups
that favor an active regulatory role for government - such as environmental groups... have
generally not participated in the debate over the methodology and uses of cost-benefit
analysis. As a result, both substantive and institutional biases with antiregulatory effects
have emerged in cost-benefit analysis. Retaking Rationality identifies eight of these biases
and proposes that by embarking on a campaign to improve cost-benefit analysis, rather than
end its use, pro-regulatory groups can have more success in pursuing their agenda and
promoting a more just and rational regulatory system")(emphasis added).
643. See 53 FEDERAL REGISTER 8859 (March 15, 1988),
http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/regulatory/EOs/eo_ 12630.html.
644. E.O. 12630, (was entitled "Governmental Actions and Interference With Civil
Constitutionally Protected Property Rights").
645. Id. at Preamble.
646. Id. § 1(a).
647. Id. § 3(b).
648. Id. §3(e).
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E.O. 12630 also established broad guidelines that require federal regulatory
agency officials to consider whether proposed governmental actions and policies
could have takings implications before rather than after they are pursued, i.e., to
perform a "takings impact (implications) assessment" where there is a high
probability that a government action or policy could affect the use of any real or
personal property.649  The Department of Justice drafted additional general
guidelines during June 1988 which set forth an analysis of when governmental
actions are likely to constitute a taking, 650 and thereafter, more specific
supplemental guidelines for three of the four relevant U.S. federal agencies - the
Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency and Department of
Interior, but not the Department of Agriculture. 65' At least one think tank has
noted how "[federal] agencies [could have] easily circumvent[ed] E.O. 12630
simply by routinely finding no 'takings implications' each time they perform the
Takings Implication Assessment required by the Attorney General's guidelines for
implementing the Order., 652  A 2003 General Accounting Office report
subsequently found that these federal agencies during the Clinton administration
had actually conducted few takings implications assessments as required by the
executive order.653
Interestingly, E.O. 12630 set forth a more specific standard to determine
whether environment, health and safety (EHS) regulations so affect the value or
beneficial use of private property as to be deemed a taking for public use that is
also entitled to just compensation. This E.O. predates the current international
debate about whether costly and property right-impairing Precautionary Principle-
based European environment and health regulations should also be adopted as the
basis for U.S. regulation. Nevertheless, it eerily seems to have anticipated it.
[T]he mere assertion of a public health and safety purpose is insufficient to avoid [having
the regulation deemed] a taking.... Actions... asserted to be for the protection of public
649. Id. §4, 5.
650. See Rulemaking Guide, Guidance on Takings; Centralized Library: U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service - Excerpt from Guidance on 'Takings' from the Department of Justice, 3-4,
http://www.fws.gov/policy/library/rgtakingsguidance.pdf.
651. See Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Executive Order On Government Actions
Affecting Private Property Use, United States General Accounting Office Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives (Sep. 2003), 13, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031015.pdf.
652. See William G. Laffer, Realistic Options for Reducing the Burden of Excessive Regulation
NEED PINCITE (Jan 19, 1993), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Regulation/CM 15.cfm.
653. Id. at 16-18.
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health and safety, therefore, should be undertaken only in response to real and substantial
threats to public health and safety, be designed to advance significantly the health and
safety purpose, and be no greater than is necessary to achieve the health and safety
purpose....
... In instances in which there is an immediate threat to health and safety that constitutes
an emergency requiring immediate response, this analysis may be done upon completion
of the emergency action.
654
Consequently, it was no surprise that the regulatory and property rights
philosophies underlying E.O. 12630 sparked considerable debate among
environmentalists and policymakers who preferred the regulatory benefits
approach taken by E.O. 12866. Apparently, at least one legal commentator, a
supporter of greater environmental protection, believed that E.O. 12630
represented an effort to:
undermine public health and environmental regulations through the back door by
promoting an exaggerated and inaccurate version of regulatory takings doctrine ...
Because the Executive Order so severely misstated the law, it was difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the true purpose of the Executive Order was not to enforce the
Constitution, but rather to attack regulatory protections. On April 2, 1993, a number of
prominent law scholars wrote to President Clinton urging him to rescind executive Order
12630.655
Another legal commentator noted how the Reagan administrations had
essentially approached regulatory takings assessments in much the same 'look
before you leap' manner as the Clinton administration had used environmental
impact assessments. Each type of impact assessment served to "provide publicly
researched data to adversaries [either those opposed to new regulations or to less
regulation] and to cause the public machinery to slow down in its development and
promotion of new rules, regulations and laws [or its elimination or modification of
654. Exec.Order. No. 12630, Section 3(c), 4(d)(4) (emphasis added).
655. See, e.g., Testimony of John D. Echeverria, Executive Director Georgetown Environmental
Law & Policy Institute, Georgetown University Law Center, Oversight Hearing Based on
the Report of the General Accounting Office on the Implementation of Executive Order
12630, before the Subcommittee on the Constitution Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives (10/16/03), at 4-5,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/papers/2003testimony.pdf; see also, Folsom, R.E.,
Executive Order 12630: A President's Manipulation of the Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause to Achieve Control Over Executive Agency Regulatory
Decisionmaking, 20 B. C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV 639, 650 -659 (1993).
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existing rules]. 656 Apparently, in this commentator's opinion, imitation was not
the best form of flattery.
Therefore, a thorough review of E.O.s 12866 and 12630, and accompanying
guidelines and congressional reports, should inform any rational analysis and
discussion of how Senate ratification of the UNCLOS, might lead to federal
implementing legislation or regulatory reinterpretation that results in adoption of
Europe's Precautionary Principle as U.S. law, and consequently engenders U.S.
constitutional violations. Such a version of the Precautionary Principle would
most certainly impose new and more stringent environmental burdens and higher
costs on industry, result in higher consumer prices for both goods and services, and
almost certainly place a drag on the U.S. economy.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, during June 2006, the U.S. State
Department's Office of the Legal Advisor issued a notice of final rulemaking
updating the regulations implementing recent amendments made to 1 U.S.C. 112a
and I12b.657 Those statutes govern publication of U.S. international agreements
and their transmittal to the Congress. According to the rule change, the Executive
Office of Management and Budget must now be consulted whenever "a proposed
international agreement embodies a commitment that could reasonably be expected
to require (for its implementation) the issuance of a 'significant regulatory action'
(as defined in section 3 of Executive Order 12866). "658 Is it not arguable that the
OMB was concerned about the U.S. entering into Precautionary Principle-based
environmental treaties, including the UNCLOS (with Senate advice and consent),
which would likely impose costly legislative and/or regulatory obligations on the
U.S. government that raise the cost of living, 659 impair private property rights
660
656. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Politics of Property Rights at the National Level - Signals and
Trends, 69 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N. 2, 181-182 (2003).
657. See FEDERAL REGISTER: September 8, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 174)], cited as 22 C.F.R.
PART 181, at 53007-009 (Sep. 8, 2006),
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/0 ljan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/E6-
14850.htm.
658. Id. at 53007.
659. See, e.g., Danny Fortson, Power Firms to Pocket £6bn From Carbon 'Handouts' in New
Emissions Regime, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 2, 2008),
http://news.independent.co.uk/business/news/article3301065.ece; Nick Mathiason & Jo
Revill, Every UK Home to Face I5pc Energy Price Rise, OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2008/jan/06/householdbills.utilities.
660. Kogan, Precautionary Preference: How Europe Employs Disguised Regulatory
Protectionism To Weaken American Free Enterprise, supra note 51, at 65-411; The
Invasion of the Property Snatchers, INST. FOR TRADE, STANDARDS & SUST. DEV. (Oct. 3 1,
7 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2009)
and compromise U.S. global competitiveness? 66'
2. Presidential Memoranda
Alternatively, presidents may rely on memoranda, "which fall under the rubric
of presidential directives . . . to address executive branch officials.
662
"Memoranda are similar to orders and often accompany them, but there is no
particular legal structure for creating or publishing them, and they may or may not
,,663be catalogued and compiled. And, like executive orders, they may be used
(some argue interchangeably) 664 to "initiate policy as well as direct agency
actions."
665
At least one study, however, has shown that presidents have increasingly tended
to view memoranda as "different strategic tools. ' 666  It found generally that
presidents relied on executive orders more than memoranda to enhance their
support in Congress, and that lame duck presidents in particular, were more
inclined to use executive orders to compensate for their lower political clout.
However, the study also found that when a president's congressional support is
low, he often chooses to use the lower profile memoranda, which generates less
publicity, to circumvent Congress' will.
667
For example, the same study documented how President Clinton had
"demonstrated a strong inclination to use memoranda [in lieu of executive orders]
2006), http://www.itssd.org/Publications/lnvasion.pdf; Kogan, U.S. Private Property Rights
Under International Assault, supra note 18.
661. Kogan, Exporting Precaution: How Europes Risk-Free Regulatory Agenda Threatens
American Free Enterprise, supra note 45 at 17-42.
662. Margaret Tseng supra note 585, at 5.
663. See David Dehnel, Book Review of PHILLIP COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE
USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION, supra note 637.
664. Margaret Tseng, supra note 585, at 5, 19 (Presidents now use memoranda for all the same
purposes as executive orders); see Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Executive Order -
Memorandum for the Counsel to the President, (Jan. 29, 2000) ("A presidential directive
has the same substantive legal effect as an executive order. It is the substance of the
presidential action that is determinative, not the form of the document conveying that
action. Both an executive order and a presidential directive remain effective upon a change
in administration, unless otherwise specified in the document, and both continue to be
effective until subsequent presidential action is taken"),
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/predirective.html.
665. Margaret Tseng, supra note 585, at 8.
666. Id. at 19.
667. Id. at 20.
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when he faced an uncooperative Congress." In particular, President Clinton was
observed to use memoranda for the purpose of both averting an adverse
Republican Congress and generating favorable publicity 668 :
The decision to use memoranda in the cases of health care [creating a patient's bill of
rights] and gun control [requiring child safety locks on guns issued by federal agencies and
requiring regulation of weapons sold at gun shows] may have been Clinton's attempt to
signal to the public that he was making an impact on these popular and controversial
issues.
669
President Clinton, however, also issued memoranda directing environmental
policy. An example was the Presidential Memorandum on Environmentally and
Economically Beneficial Practices on Federal Landscaped Grounds, which
implemented the NPR discussed above. In particular, it focused on "increas[ing]
environmentally and economically beneficial landscaping practices at Federal
facilities and federally funded projects," which "mean[t] using regionally native
plants and employing landscaping practices and technologies that conserve[d]
water and prevent pollution." 670 It also emphasized that "although sustainable site
design may have a higher initial cost, it may prove economical over the life of the
project. ' 6
1
A year later, this memorandum was elaborated upon by a guidance document
issued by the Federal Environmental Executive. 672 According to the document, it
would seem that the FEE had emphasized the time value of money in assessing the
costs that would likely be incurred to prevent pollution at source in the present
rather than in the future. However, the use of the term "cost" was somewhat
deceiving, in that it effectively referred to the externalized cost to the environment
(and indirectly to society)673 of preventing pollution now versus the externalized
668. Id. at 21 ("Often times a president will focus on a controversial issue like gun control with
multiple memoranda to draw the public's attention to the fact that he is fixing the
problem").
669. Id. at 20-21.
670. See Presidential Memorandum, Envtl. Practices on Fed. Grounds, The White House (April
26, 1994), http://govinfo.libry.unt.edu/npr/library/direct/memos/25f2.html.
671. Id
672. See Office of the Federal Environmental Executive; Guidance for Presidential
Memorandum on Environmentally and Economically Beneficial Landscape Practices on
Federal Landscaped Grounds, (Aug. 10, 1995) 60 FR 154, 40837,
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/1 995/August/Day-I 0/pr-664.html.
673. Environmental Externalities, OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, ("Environmental
externalities refer to the economic concept of uncompensated environmental effects of
production and consumption that affect consumer utility and enterprise cost outside the
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cost to the environment (and indirectly to society) of waiting to prevent pollution
later, without referring to either the current or future economic costs of regulatory
compliance. In other words, it does not seek to limit the amount of dollars society
spends to prevent pollution (for regulatory compliance), but only to maximize the
environmental and social benefits to be obtained from whatever dollars are spent.
This arguably empowers the government while undertaking cost-benefit analysis to
overstate the environmental benefits to be achieved and to understate the economic
costs deemed necessary to achieve them.
Former President Bush, as well, has utilized memoranda on several occasions to
generate positive publicity for the White House. For example, during May 200164
and September 2005 following Hurricane Katrina, 6 75 the President issued
memoranda to promote energy conservation at Federal Facilities "direct[ing] the
heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) to take appropriate actions
to conserve energy use at their facilities to the maximum extent consistent with the
effective discharge of public responsibilities.,
676
C. Congressional Implementing Legislation or Presidential Executive Orders
and Memoranda May Be Used to Ensure and/or Limit U.S. Federal Court
Enforcement of UNCLOS Tribunal Decisions Involving Europe's Precautionary
Principle
Additional research reveals how congressional implementing legislation and/or
presidential executive orders could also be utilized to ensure that U.S. federal
courts enforce international tribunal decisions for the ultimate purpose of
incorporating international legal, political and social norms within U.S. federal
law. This would undoubtedly facilitate greater U.S. submission to international
environmental law and unaccountable international institutions in furtherance of
market mechanism. As a consequence of negative externalities, private costs of production
tend to be lower than its 'social' cost. It is the aim of the 'polluter/user-pays' principle to
prompt households and enterprises to internalize externalities in their plans and budgets"),
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID= 824 .
674. See Presidential Memorandum, Energy Conservation at Federal Facilities (May 3, 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2001/05/20010507-2.html.
675. See Presidential Memorandum, Energy Conservation at Federal Facilities (Sept. 26, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/2 00509 26-4.html.
676. Id.; see also, Agencies Respond to President's Memorandum to Conserve Energy, U.S.
Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP Focus Special Issue
2006) (Feb 26, 2007),
http://wwwl .eere.energy.gov/femp/news/news-detail.html?news-id =9770.
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global governance. 677  Notwithstanding public political declarations to the
contrary, upon U.S. UNCLOS ratification, the U.S. would be subject to future
adverse decisions handed down by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), especially those involving
"provisional measures" premised on Europe's hazard-based Precautionary
Principle.
UNCLOS offers Treaty Parties with a complex menu of international tribunal
choices through which to resolve treaty disputes which may foster some form of
market-based judicial competition. These choices include special arbitral
tribunals, the International Court of Justice and the ITLOS.67 8 UNCLOS Parties,
however, have no choice but to submit to the compulsory and binding jurisdiction
of the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber for any dispute arising between them in
67968the Area, which is unique among international environmental agreements.68 °
UNCLOS Parties are also expressly required by Article 39 of Annex VI of the
UNCLOS to ensure that their domestic courts enforce the decisions of the Seabed
Disputes Chamber "in the same manner as judgments or orders of the highest court
of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought
' 68
'
Since the U.S. is a dualist 682 rather than a monist jurisdiction in which treaties
677. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, supra note 82, at 104, ,
(accompanying footnote #12, "[L]eading scholars have theorized that interaction between
international tribunals and domestic courts form a central component of an international
order characterized by respect for and submission to international law and international
institutions . . . The two leading proponents of this approach are Dean Anne-Marie
Slaughter of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University and Dean Harold Hongju Koh of the Yale Law School),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=879237; see also, Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Why States Create International Tribunals. A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93
Cal. L. Rev. 900, 953-954 (2005), available http://ssrn.com/abstract=67082 1.
678. See Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. OF
INTL. L., 414-416, 441-444, 447-448 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1071184.
679. UNCLOS, supra note 51, art.186-187, Annex VI.
680. See Gregory Rose & Lal Kurukulasuriya, Comparative Analysis of Compliance
Mechanisms Under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, United Nations
Environment Programme (Dec. 2005) at 12, 28, 95,
http://www.unep.org/Law/PDF/companalysiscompliance mechanisms.pdf.
681. UNCLOS, supra note 51, Annex VI, art. 39, (The decisions of the Chamber shall be
enforceable in the territories of the States Parties in the same manner as judgments or orders
of the highest court of the State Party in whose territory the enforcement is sought).
682. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems, 86 AJIL 310, reproduced in
John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan 0. Sykes, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
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are generally not self-executing (part of the domestic law directly), 683 at least one
legal commentator has argued that the self-executing effect of Article 39 of Annex
VI arguably presents a potentially serious constitutional conundrum the resolution
of which may likely require congressional or presidential action:
[T]his provision appears to require U.S. courts to give more than 'full faith and credit' to
judgments of this international chamber. Rather, it requires a U.S. court to treat such
chamber decisions as equivalent to those of the U.S. Supreme Court. As far as I know, no
prior treaty has ever committed the U.S. in quite this emphatic way.684
Since the U.S. federal courts would be bound (i.e., would lack the discretion
not) to enforce the decisions of the Seabed Disputes Chamber pursuant to Article
39 of Annex VI, the U.S. Constitution's Article III allocation of judicial power to
U.S. federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, could conceivably be
threatened (impaired) .685 However, it is also quite possible that Article 39's self-
executing effect (i.e., the UNCLOS' requirement that U.S. federal courts enforce
Seabed Disputes Chamber decisions as a matter of U.S. law) would conceivably
vest such courts with an "excessive delegation of judicial power under Article Ill"
which, in turn, would effectively be handed off to the Seabed Disputes Chamber.
The problem, as this legal commentator explains, is that such excess delegation
could not be readily addressed. One possible solution would be for the Senate to
attach a declaration to its advice and consent papers stating that this provision is
non-self-executing, as the former Bush administration would have liked.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASE MATERIALS AND TEXT 98, 4th Ed. (2002),("In a dualist jurisdiction, international treaties are part of a separate legal system from that
of the domestic law. Therefore, a treaty is not part of the domestic law, at least not directly
... Generally ... for a treaty rule to operate in the domestic legal system there must be an
,act of transformation.' This entails a government action of some kind (e.g., the legislative
enactment of a statute incorporating the treaty language, an administrative body's adoption
of regulations falling within the scope of its authority, or a court or tribunal decision) by the
State that incorporates the treaty norm into its domestic law").
683. Id. ("In a monist jurisdiction, the domestic law is deemed to include international treaties to
which such country is obligated. In other words, the international treaty has 'direct
applicability' or a 'self-executing effect'. This entitles citizens of another treaty party to
sue in the courts of the monist jurisdiction to require that they be treated in accordance with
the treaty standard").
684. Julian Ku, Why the Law of the Sea Treaty (Annex VI, Art. 39) Is Unconstitutional, OPINIO
JURIS (May 16, 2007), http://opiniojuris.org/2007/05/16/why-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty-
annex-vi-art-39-is-unconstitutional.
685. Id. (Other commentators have taken issue with this interpretation of Annex VI, Article 39
exampled in section "Response of Tobias Thienel"); see also Julian Ku, International
Delegations and the New World Court Order, supra note 82 at 154.
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However, the Congress would subsequently need to pass legislation implementing
the declaration, and this is likely to be construed by other treaty parties as an
impermissible 'treaty reservation' that nullifies the very provision in question.
And, Congress would still have to figure out some constitutional way to ensure that
federal courts enforce an adverse ITLOS judgment. 686
Perhaps, the best way to prevent activist U.S. Federal Courts from exercising
excessive Article III authority (i.e., from enforcing, in rubber-stamp fashion,
without sufficient foreign policy knowledge and experience the decisions of the
UNCLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber) would be to subject U.S. Federal Court
authority to the review and approval of the politically accountable branches of the
U.S. government - namely, the U.S. President or the Congress.68 7 U.S. Federal
Courts should recognize this political override authority through resort to the
judicial nondelegation doctrine. In other words, U.S. Federal Courts would
recognize that the President (or Congress) must expressly and clearly authorize a
U.S. Federal Court's delegation of Article III powers to an international tribunal by
means of executive order (or implementing legislation).688
Such a clear statement requiring judicial enforcement can be expressly provided by the
treaty. Alternatively, a clear statement might be found in congressional legislation
implementing the treaty, or in an executive order made by the President. Applying the
nondelegation doctrine [... ] sharply limits, but does not eliminate the independent role of
domestic courts in deciding how and whether to comply with international tribunal
judgments. "
689
This approach appears logical considering that it is the President of the United
686. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, supra note 82, at 165.
687. Id. at 166-169 ("Forcing the political branches to clarify their intentions about judicial
enforcement prevents them from avoiding responsibility for the consequences of an
international tribunal's judgment ... Political legitimacy is another related justification for
the clear statement rule. By taking courts out of the enforcement process absent the clearest
statement by a political branch, the political legitimacy of international tribunal judgments
becomes enhanced. Why? Because rather than relying on domestic courts to enforce their
judgments, international tribunals will have the imprimatur of Congress or the President for
their judgments ... By relying on the political branches to bring the U.S. into compliance
with international obligations, courts ensure that the political branches have made the
determination to comply with the international tribunal judgment ... Finally, a super-strong
clear statement rule shifts the decision on compliance with an international tribunal
judgment to the institutions of the government with the greatest expertise in foreign affairs:
the executive and legislative branches")(emphasis added).
688. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, supra note 82 at 107, 145-
147.
689. Id. at 107-108 (emphasis added).
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States who ultimately possesses the plenary authority, subject to the Treaty Power
of the Congress, to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of the nation pursuant to
690Article II, Section 2, Clauses I and 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Yet, depending
on the political and policy leanings and proclivities of the U.S. President in office
at the time an international tribunal renders an adverse decision against the United
States, it may also effectively subject the U.S. Constitution and U.S. federal law to
override by international law and institutions.
For example, the former Bush administration unexpectedly intervened in the
recent U.S. Supreme Court case Medellin v. Dretke691 for the specific purpose of
ensuring that U.S. state courts enforced an adverse International Court of Justice
(ICJ) decision that effectively overrode Texas criminal law and the U.S.
Constitution's Tenth Amendment. 692 It did so citing the president's inherent and
delegated authority to conduct foreign affairs on behalf of the Nation.693
According to one legal commentator, President Bush's involvement in the
Medellin case demonstrated how "the executive branch can [try and] take
responsibility for compliance with an international tribunal judgment." 694 In his
estimation, the President's power to enforce foreign judgments as U.S. law is
somewhat analogous to the President's power to alter domestic administrative or
regulatory law through use of executive orders. But it may be even more
expansive. For example, through supervision of administrative agencies, the
President may "directly modify U.S. law by altering an administrative
determination or regulation to comply with an international tribunal judgment,"
whether or not expressly authorized by statute. In addition, the President may
initiate suit against a state or local government to compel "its compliance with an
690. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, 10 (Congress that retains the authority to regulate commerce with
foreign nations).
691. Medellin v. Dretke (Medellin 11), 125 S. Ct. 686, 686 (2004), cert. dismissed, 125 S. Ct.
2088 (2005) (per curiam) ("In December 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted a
petition for certiorari to consider whether a judgment of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) is binding on U.S. courts" where a Mexican national facing execution by the State of
Texas sued to enforce the ICJ's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider his claim for relief
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and the Court thus agreed to
consider the important but unsettled question of an international tribunal judgment's status
within U.S. law).
692. See Medellin v. Texas, Brief for the U.S. as Amici, S. Ct. of the U.S. at 8-10,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/MedCertAmicus.pdf.
693. Id. at 9-16.
694. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, supra note 82, at 166.
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international agreement." Furthermore, the President may preempt a state law that
contravenes an international judgment by invoking his plenary authority to conduct
foreign policy.
695
Although it was not unexpected in Medellin that several legal commentators and
amicus parties favoring multilateralism and globally focused courts had argued in
favor of such a result,696 it nevertheless seemed to surprise the majority of the
President's longtime supporters within his own political party.
697
The great political and legal significance of this case evidently weighed on the
minds of the Justices, with the Court ultimately holding that former President Bush
had overreached his constitutional authority. 698 The Court was certainly aware
that, had it ruled the ICJ judgment was to be enforced directly by the Texas Courts,
it would have been viewed by Americans and the world as having effectively
delegated to a foreign tribunal its exclusive Article III powers to interpret the
Constitution's relationship with international law and the U.S. Constitution itself.
The hesitance of Justices Roberts and Scalia to cede such authority to the World
Court was reflected in the comments they each made during the case's October
2007 oral arguments. According to the Washington Post,
Roberts was one of several justices who seemed skeptical of the deference owed to the
International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court. He asked Medillin's
lawyer, Donald F. Donovan: If the Supreme Court thought a World Court ruling
preempted federal law, 'We would have no authority to review the judgment itself?'
Justice Antonin Scalia agreed, saying he has a constitutional problem with giving an
international body such power. 'I am rather jealous of that authority,' Scalia said. 'I don't
695. Id at 145-147.
696. Id. at 105 ("The briefing before the Supreme Court in Medellin reflected arguments
advanced by these scholars. The petitioner and various amici asked the Court to treat IC/
interpretations of U.S. treaty obligations as judgments binding on all domestic U.S. courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court. In this way, the Medellin case represents an important
first step in bringing a 'new world court order' to the U.S.") (emphasis added).
697. Id.; Frank J. Gaffney, LOST Justice, WASHINGTON TIMES COMMENTARY (Oct. 16, 2007),
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2007/oct/16/lost-justice; Frank J. Gaffney, Mugged By
Legality, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MjY3MTk I OGEwYj lwMzBiY2UI NmIwZWI4MmZ
mODE4Yzg.
698. See Jerry Seper Court Says Bush Stretched Powers, WASHINGTON TIMES (March 26, 2008),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/26/court-says-bush-stretched-powers; see
also, Robert Barnes, Justices Rebuff Bush and World Court, WASHINGTON POST (March
26, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2008/03/25/ST2008032502998.html.
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know on what basis we can allow some international court to decide what is the
responsibility of this court, which is the meaning of the United States law.
6 99
With these concerns in mind, the Court proceeded to examine the nature of the
particular treaties involved. In other words, it looked at whether they were self-
executing 70 or required a further affirmative act by either the legislative or
executive branch in order for an international tribunal decision falling within the
scope of those treaties to be enforceable on U.S. domestic courts.
This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have
effect as domestic law, and those that-while they constitute international law
commitments-do not by themselves function as binding federal law. The distinction was
well explained by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neilson,. . which held that
a treaty is 'equivalent to an act of the legislature, ' and hence self-executing, when it
Ioperates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision'. . . . When, in contrast,
'[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to
legislation to carry them into effect' . . . In sum, while treaties 'may comprise
international commitments.. .they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing'
and is ratified on these terms.' 
70 1
In construing the nature of these treaties, the Court sought to discern whether
the Constitution's Framers imposed any limitation on the Court's constitutional
authority to determine on its own, without regard to international law, whether a
given treaty is 'self-executing' or non-self-executing and whether the presumption
of non-self-executing treaties7° 2 applies in a given case. A non-self-executing
treaty is one "that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have
domestic effect of its own force."70 3  It also looked to the Framers' intent
699. Robert Barnes, Chief Justice Prolongs Executive Powers Debate, WASHINGTON POST (Oct.
II, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/I 0/l 0/AR2007101002438.html.
700. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. _ (2008), slip op., FN 2, available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZO.html ("What we mean by 'self-
executing' is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.
Conversely, a "non-self-executing" treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically
enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has domestic effect depends upon
implementing legislation passed by Congress.").
701. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 315, slip op. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
702. Id. slip op. at I (Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, strongly disagreed that such a
presumption existed at all. "There is a great deal of wisdom in JUSTICE BREYER's
dissent. I agree that the text and history of the Supremacy Clause, as well as this Court's
treaty-related cases, do not support a presumption against self-execution")(emphasis
added).
703. Id. slip op. at 3 1.
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concerning the extent of the constitutional limitations placed on the President's and
the Congress' federal treaty making and enforcement powers.
7°4
With regard to its own constitutional powers, the Court's Majority clearly found
that the Framers had vested the Court with sufficient authority to make these
determinations. It held that, "whether the treaties underlying a judgment are self-
executing so that the judgment is directly enforceable as domestic law in our courts
is, of course, a matter for this Court to decide." 705
With regard to the extent of the constitutional powers vested in the political
branches (the President and the Congress) to make and enforce treaties, the Court
found that the Framers had carefully circumscribed them.
Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be followed before federal
law can be created under the Constitution-vesting that decision in the political branches,
subject to checks and balances. U. S. Const., Art. 1, §7. They also recognized that treaties
could create federal law, but again through the political branches, with the President
making the treaty and the Senate approving it. Art. II, §2.706
As the Court's Majority concluded, the Constitution, through separation of
powers, places clear limitations upon the President's power to unilaterally enforce
non-self-executing treaties as if they were self-executing, especially where the
President and the Congress had not addressed the issue at the time the treaty was
signed and ratified - thus, giving deference to the presumption against self-
executing treaties noted above.
The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce
international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self executing treaty into a self-
executing one is not among them. The responsibility for transforming an international
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress ...
. The requirement that Congress, rather than the President, implement a non-self-
executing treaty derives from the text of the Constitution, which divides the treaty-making
power between the President and the Senate. The Constitution vests the President with the
authority to 'make' a treaty. Art. 11, §2. If the Executive determines that a treaty should
have domestic effect of its own force, that determination may be implemented 'in
mak[ing]' the treaty, by ensuring that it contains language plainly providing for domestic
704. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 413
(1998) (According to at least one constitutional scholar, "the records of the Virginia
Ratifying Convention contain specific discussions of the scope of the treaty power. These
discussions confirm that the Framers did in fact envision [constitutional] limitations on the
treaty power.").
705. Foster v. Neilson, supra note 732, slip op. at 23.
706. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
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enforceability. If the treaty is to be self-executing in this respect, the Senate must consent
to the treaty by the requisite two-thirds vote . . . consistent with all other constitutional
restraints. Once a treaty is ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect,
however, whether the treaty will ever have such effect is governed by the fundamental
constitutional principle that "'[tihe power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the
power to execute in the President.'
70 7
The Court ultimately held that, in the absence of implementing congressional
legislation, "the non-self-executing treaties at issue . . . did not 'express[ly] or
implied[ly]' vest the President with the unilateral authority to make them self-
executing. ' 7° 8  Predictably, the multilateralists within the Court, most notably
Justice Stevens, contrasted the non-self-executing nature of the treaties reviewed in
Medellin with the 'self-executing' nature of the UNCLOS - in particular Annex
VI, Article 39, the text of which expressly provides for the incorporation of
International Seabed Disputes Chamber decisions within U.S. federal domestic
law. 
7 9
However, in doing so, Justice Stevens conveniently sidestepped, as one scholar
has noted, the complex issue that a future congress would, no doubt, face -
namely, how to draft UNCLOS implementing legislation that restricts and
conditions the application of UNCLOS Annex VI, Article 39 without also being
construed as a violation of UNCLOS Article 309, which prohibits any reservations
and exceptions that could be read to nullify any non-self execution declaration.7"0
Apparently, the UN General Assembly's recent March 2008 resolution 62/215 had
this issue in mind.7'
Given the many political objectives sought to be achieved via tactical use of
presidential executive orders and memoranda, would it be too much to expect that
President Obama would issue executive orders and memoranda directing federal
agencies to liberally reinterpret current federal environmental laws for the purpose
of establishing a new more stringent regulatory standard based on the application
of Europe's Precautionary Principle? And, wouldn't U.S. accession to the
UNCLOS, the world's most complex and comprehensive environmental regulatory
treaty in existence, which incorporates the spirit of said Precautionary Principle,
707. Id. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
708. Id.
709. Id. at 2.
710. See Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 82 at 165.
711. Oceans and the Law of the Sea G.A. Res. A/RES/62/215, (March 14, 2008), supra note
100, Preamble, para. 5.
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provide him with adequate political 'cover' and ostensible legal justification to do
just that?
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Recap
This article has explained in detail why the U.S. Congress must hold open and
transparent public substantive hearings to discuss, evaluate and explain the
significant environmental regulatory and judicial enforcement aspects of the U.N.
Law of the Sea Convention before this treaty is resubmitted to the full Senate
during 2009 for a vote of accession.
Contrary to the various assertions made by public officials and certain legal
commentators, the evidence clearly reflects that the UNCLOS, both directly
(explicitly) and indirectly (implicitly) harbors Europe's Precautionary Principle
within its complex and expansive framework. The evidence also clearly shows
how international UNCLOS environmental obligations assumed by the U.S.
government upon accession would likely require that Congress and federal
executive agencies enact, reinterpret, re-implement and more vigilantly enforce
new and current federal environmental legislation and regulations. Many believe
that this would better enable U.S. federal and state governments to protect the
marine environment and natural resources from U.S. land, air and sea-based
sources of marine pollution consistent with Europe's Precautionary Principle.
Should the U.S. government not fulfill these UNCLOS environmental obligations,
it would likely face legal challenges from abroad. They would be initiated by
foreign nations within various UNCLOS tribunals and arbitral bodies that would
be inclined to interpret these obligations broadly and consistently with Europe's
Precautionary Principle (which is incorporated also within other relevant
multilateral environmental agreements). The U.S. may even fall subject to binding
and compulsory adverse rulings issued by the ITLOS and arbitral bodies.
In addition, UNCLOS environmental obligations could be thrust upon the U.S.
government and the American public from within the United States via certain
internal pathways. UNCLOS and Precautionary Principle proponents have long
desired to bring U.S. environmental law into line with evolving international
environmental law. Publicly and privately formed commissions, legal experts,
environmentalists and a number of politicians, for example, have called for
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Congress to amend key federal environmental statutes so that they would expressly
or impliedly incorporate the Europe's Precautionary Principle, consistent with the
UNCLOS. In addition, certain key federal environmental regulations have already
been amended directly by U.S. agencies or reinterpreted pursuant to executive
office directives that call for the indirect incorporation of Europe's Precautionary
Principle, consistent with the UNCLOS and other MEAs. And new regulatory
changes have since been proposed for other federal environmental regimes.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the Congress and the President may use their
respective powers to enact legislation or to issue executive orders and memoranda
for the purpose of ensuring that U.S. federal courts enforce UNCLOS tribunal
judgments calling for the application of Europe's Precautionary Principle to
resolve environmental disputes.
B. Open Questions
These conclusions only lead reasonable and inquisitive persons to ask more
probing questions.
Why do U.S. proponents of the UNCLOS and Europe's Precautionary Principle
still call for express language changes within the various federal environmental
statutes and regulations discussed in this article, if Europe's Precautionary
Principle already exists in spirit within them? Are these proponents trying to help
the Europeans establish their version of the Precautionary Principle as both an
express UNCLOS treaty rule and a norm of customary international law that would
bind the U.S. even if it ultimately decides not to ratify the UNCLOS? Is it the
intention of these proponents to facilitate a global paradigmatic change that
formally locks the U.S. and all other nations into Europe's Precautionary Principle,
for better or for worse?
Indeed, given the substantial political and economic influence the U.S. wields
throughout the world, it would appear that these constituencies are actually
endeavoring to facilitate U.S. UNCLOS accession to help Europe establish its
Precautionary Principle as a peremptory norm of customary international law from
which U.S. law could no longer derogate. Their ability to secure express (black
letter law) language changes within a number of U.S. federal environmental
statutes and regulations, and to achieve a more uniform federal implementation
practice within administrative agencies and the judiciary, consistent with Europe's
Precautionary Principle, would also evidence America's universal recognition of
What Goes Around Comes Around
and actual adherence to its evolving international environmental law obligations,
as set forth within the UNCLOS and related MEAs. In other words, UNCLOS
accession would ultimately enable a progressive U.S. government to show the
existence of: (1) opinio juris (i.e., it has become a party to multilateral
environmental agreements incorporating Europe's Precautionary Principle and has
adopted it domestically out of 'a sense of legal obligation' since other countries
have done so); and (2) state practice (i.e., it has actually made and acted on official
statements of federal Precautionary Principle-based policy and undertaken general
and specific uniform Precautionary Principle-based governmental acts
domestically reflecting its legislative, regulatory and judicial adoption,
implementation and enforcement of that sense of legal obligation). 71 2
Why do UNCLOS proponents insist that U.S. functional (legal) sovereignty will
not be challenged or undermined following U.S. accession to the UNCLOS? Is it
not true that the EU and other nations such as Australia and Canada are already
challenging the rights of the U.S. Navy and U.S. commercial shippers to freedom
of navigation on the high seas and innocent passage in international straits and
territorial waters by effectively invoking Europe's Precautionary Principle to
restrict their activities? 71 3 Do UNCLOS proponents actually believe that by once
712. Rest. 3d of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., Comments and Illustrations (b),(c) § 102
Sources of International Law,
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlLawFaII2007/CourseDocs/Restatement
Sources.doc; see Kogan, EU Regulation, Standardization and the Precautionary Principle,
National Foreign Trade Council (Aug. 2003) note 29-30, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/ngo e/posp47 nftc eu reg finale.pdf, citing
Franco Parisi, The Formation of Customary Law, Presented at the 96th Conference of the
American Scientist Association, Geo. Mason University School of Law (Aug. 31 -Sept. 3,
2000), at 4-5, http://www.gmu.edu/departments/law/faculty/papers/docs/OI-06.pdf, and
Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 101
(1987), http://anthonydamato. law.northwestem.edu/Adobefiles/a87a-trashing.pdf.
713. See, e.g., Lawrence Kogan, U.S. Military Review of the Law of the Sea Treaty Lacking:
Planning Outsourcing Risks Triggering Logistics Nightmare, ITSSD Journal on the UN
Law of the Sea Convention, available at http://itssdjoumalunclos-
lost.blogspot.com/2008/01/us-military-review-of-law-of-sea-treaty.html (explaining how,
environmentally orientated foreign nations have employed the soft power strategy of
'lawfare' - which uses or misuses law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve military objectives - to undermine U.S. military objectives, and that, because the
U.S. military's plans call for doubling the outsourcing of its commercial, industrial and
technology products and processes to private contractors within the next decade, the U.S.
military will become more susceptible to the UNCLOS' strict environmental provisions,
consistent with Europe's Precautionary Principle.). See also, "Letter from the Honorable
James M. Inhofe to Lawrence Kogan (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
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again reestablishing its global environmental leadership on sovereignty and
territorial grounds, the U.S. will be able to prevent or repel such legal
challenges?
714
The facts seem to suggest otherwise. First, spurred on by environmental activist
groups, 71 5 the governments of European coastal states have, since 1998, been
steadily extending greater national sovereignty beyond their coastlines via
http://www.itssd.org/Correspondences/SenatorInhofelettersupportinglTSSDresearch.doc
(expressing interest and support for ITSSD research examining how other countries are
reading a broader than agreed upon version of the Precautionary Principle into the UN Law
of the Sea Treaty (LOST) text, and the likely impact that U.S. LOST ratification, under
such circumstances, would have on U.S. national security and economic and technological
competitiveness).
714. See, e.g., Lawrence Kogan, Myth & Realities # 2 Concerning UN Law of the Sea Treaty -
U.S. Naval Freedom of Navigation and Avoidance of LOST Tribunal Jurisdiction, Despite
Europe's Aggressive Use of the Precautionary Principle?, ITSSD Journal on the UN Law
of the Sea Convention, http://itssdjoumalunclos-lost.blogspot.com/2008/0I/myth-realities-
2-concerning-un-law-of.html (arguing that: I) the U.S. Navy will be unable to shape the
interpretation, application and development of UNCLOS environmental and freedom of
navigation rules in the secretariat bodies without also submitting itself and other U.S.
executive agencies to the UNCLOS' dispute settlement procedures; 2) while the U.S.
government's ability to restrict UNCLOS environmental jurisdiction only to UNCLOS
Annex VIII Special Arbitration proceedings may provide it with a greater opportunity to
select arbitral/tribunal panelists who are not necessarily hostile to U.S. interests, this does
not guarantee a positive arbitral outcome; and 3) it is highly doubtful the U.S. military will
be successful in unilaterally defining what are and are not 'military' activities for purposes
of qualifying for the UNCLOS military exemption from jurisdiction, even from Special
Arbitration proceedings.); cf Roderick Kefferpiitz & Danila Bochkarev, Expanding the
EU's Institutional Capacities in the Arctic Region, Policy Briefing and Key
Recommendations (2008), http://www.boell.de/downloads/KefferpuetzBochkarev-
Expanding theEUs InstitutionalCapacities inthe Arctic_Region.pdf (lamenting the
UNCLOS' weak dispute settlement mechanism - "The fundamental drawback of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, however, is its particularly weak dispute settlement
regime. Article 298 allows each nation to decline to accept any method of resolution for
disputes, such as those surrounding territorial claims. States can therefore avoid an
effective dispute settlement mechanism with a binding character that could solve territorial
and resource disputes between the Arctic states.").
715. "Spurred by WWF's [World Wildlife Federation's] calls for action, Environment Ministers
of 15 NE Atlantic States and [a] Member of the European Commission committed
themselves in Sintra, Portugal in July 1998, to 'promote the establishment of a network of
marine protected areas to ensure the sustainable use and protection and conservation of
marine biological diversity and its ecosystems.' They signed Annex V to the OSPAR
Convention and adopted the Strategy on the Protection and Conservation of Ecosystems and
Biological Diversity of the Maritime Area." See Promoting a Network of Marine Protected
Areas (MPAs) in the North-East Atlantic, WWF's Northeast Atlantic Programme,
http://www.ngo.grida.no/wwfneap/Projects/MPA.htm. See also Legal Status of Marine
Genetic Resources in Question, supra note 87.
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establishment of 'marine protected areas' that effectively territorialize their
716EEZs. This has come at the expense of the once sacrosanct UNCLOS 'freedom
of navigation on the high seas' principle, 71 7 and is likely to spill over into the Artic
region.71 8 It is arguable, that if the U.S. government had not previously asserted
that the Endangered Species Act extends through the U.S. EEZ and the high seas to
the exclusive economic zones of foreign countries, 71 9 these governments would not
now be acting in this manner.
Second, Australia and Canada have imposed their own environmental
restrictions on vessel traffic moving along their coastlines through what the
UNCLOS technically defines as 'international straits.' 720  During 2006, for
example, Australia introduced compulsory pilotage requirements for all vessels
traveling through the Torres Strait and the Great North East Channel, which it
considers to be 'territorial waters,' 7 2' despite protests filed by both the United
States and Singapore at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These
restrictions were imposed ostensibly to protect 'sensitive marine habitats' from
possible future environmental harm. 722  Canada, meanwhile, has asserted sole
716. According to one international law scholar, "[t]he European Community and its member
states seem on the verge of leading a new wave of territorialization against navigation itself
in the name of environmental protection." Oxman, supra note 49 at 850.
717. See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 87.
718. "[Tjhe EU's leadership on climate change and environmental protection are needed in this
fragile area. member-states have reiterated their concerns about the impact of climate
change in the Arctic at a special session of the UNEP Governing Council in February 2008.
The European Union must ensure that any activity in this region is carried out according to
the basic precautionary principle that such a fragile ecosystem will not be put at risk and
that when in doubt we will choose to forgo those interferences that might endanger the
Arctic." (emphasis added) Roderick Kefferputz & Danila Bochkarev, Expanding the EU's
Institutional Capacities in the Arctic Region, supra note 684, at 1I.
719. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Department of the Navy, supra note 87.
720. See UNCLOS, supra note 41, Part III, Sections I and 2.
721. See UNCLOS, supra note 41, Part I1, Section 2 "Limits of the Territorial Sea", all but
Article 8; Similarly, prior to 1982, Malaysia and Indonesia had asserted sovereign
jurisdiction over the Strait of Malacca, claiming it as 'territorial waters', though this claim
was ultimately resolved with regional states assuming shared responsibility over
maintaining the waterway as an international strait, within the meaning of UNCLOS Article
34; see James C. Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, Chap.
3, in DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CANADA'S ARCTIC, Edited by Brian
MacDonald, (Vimy Paper 2007) at 56-57, available at http://www.cda-
cdai.ca/VimyPapers/Defence%20Requirements%20for/ 20Canada's%20Arctic%20online
%20ve.pdf.
722. See Compulsory Pilotage in the Torres Strait, NEWSLETrER OF THE SEA POWER CENTRE
OF AUSTRALIA, (Apr.7, 2007), http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/semaphore/issue7_2007.html.
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functional jurisdiction over and claimed its right to impose strict national
environmental laws (i.e., Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act) in the Northwest
Passage723 which it treats as 'internal waters.' 724 At least one U.S. Navy legal
officer has disputed this claim while nevertheless recognizing the application of
Agenda 21, Chapter 17 principles. 25  Canada has employed these restrictions
ostensibly because of environmentalist concerns that international tanker traffic
could potentially result in harm to its waters and coastline which are located within
the environmentally sensitive Arctic region.
726
In addition, Canada has threatened to block liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker
shipments that may soon be headed to new terminals being built along Maine's
coastline abutting Passamaquoddy Bay, located along the Canada-U.S. border.
727
The Canadian government, pressured by environmental groups, alleges that it is
concerned LNG shipments transiting Canada's Head Harbor Passage, which is
"narrow and difficult to navigate" and within its 'territorial sea,' 728 could result in
"significant environmental and property damage should an accident (or even a
terrorist attack) occur." 729 Unfortunately, Canada has acted at the expense of the
important UNCLOS 'innocent passage' principle, which applies generally in
'international straits' and 'territorial seas.'
730
And, the facts reveal that the U.S. itself has long engaged in these practices.
Former President Clinton issued several Executive Orders on the Subject of
723. See also Doug Struck, Dispute Over NW Passage Revived U.S. Asserts Free Use by All
Ships - Canada Claims Jurisdiction, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 6, 2006)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/11/05/AR2006110500286.html.
724. See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 8. Internal waters are not subject to the innocent passage
rule.
725. James C. Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, supra note
721, at 36, 52-54, 58.
726. Id. see also Andrea Charron, The Northwest Passage in Context, Canadian Military Journal
(Winter 2005-2006), at 45-46, http://www.journal.forces.gc.calvo6/no4/doc/north-nord-02-
eng.pdf.
727. See Passamaquoddy Bay LNG Terminal Controversy (Not So) Innocent Passage:
International Law and the Passamaquoddy Bay LNG Terminal Controversy, A Panel
Discussion Hosted by the University of New Brunswick and the Canadian Council for
International Law (May 11, 2008),
http://law.unb.calnews/2007lO4/unb to host workshopnot so in.html.
728. UNCLOS, supra note 41, Part 11, sec. 2.
729. See Duncan Hollis, Passing Gas Through Passamaquoddy Bay, Opinio Juris (5/9/07),
http://opiniojuris.org/2007/05/09/passing-gas-through-passamaquoddy-bay.
730. See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 45.
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Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) during his tenure,"' which referenced the federal
environmental laws discussed in this article as well as others. His first E.O. was
issued during May 2000, and it established the U.S. Marine Protected Area
program. It explained the purposes for MPAs and how they were to be established,
protected and managed. The E.O. defines an MPA as, "[a]ny area of the marine
environment that has been reserved by federal, state, territorial, tribal, or local laws
or regulations to provide lasting protection to part or all of the natural or cultural
resources therein. 732 On December 4, 2000, he issued Executive Order 13178, as
later amended by Executive Order 13196, "establishing the Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve (Reserve). 733 At the time, it was
billed as "the largest protected area (either terrestrial or marine) in the U.S. and the
second largest MPA in the world.
7 34
Not to be outdone in this environmental beauty pageant, former President Bush
issued his own Executive Proclamation on June 15, 2006. 735 It designated the
waters of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands a national monument and "effectively
creat[ed] the world's largest Marine, Protected Area." 736 "By declaring the islands
a national monument, Bush... circumvent[ed] a year-long congressional approval
process required in the designation of an area as a marine sanctuary, and will
provide the area the highest regulatory protection possible under the law., 73 7 Most
recently, during January 2009, in an act that environmentalists claim "will
731. See Jeffrey Zinn & Eugene H. Buck, Marine Protected Areas: An Overview, CRS Report
for Congress #RS20810 (Feb. 8, 2001),
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs- 1864:1.
732. See Exec. Order No. 13,158 on Marine Protected Areas (May 2000)
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/eos/eo13158.html.
733. See Exec. Order No. 13,196 (Jan. 18, 2001) 66 FR 7395,
http://hawaiireef.noaa.gov/PDFs/EO 13196.pdf.
734, See U.S. Creates World's Second Largest Marine Protected Area, MPA NEWS VOL. 2, NO. 6
(Dec. 2000 - Jan. 2001), http://www.flmnh.ufl.edu/fish/innews/MPA002.htm.
735. See Establishment of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument: A
Proclamation by the President of the United States of America (June 15, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/20060615-18.html.
736. See Bush Creates World's Largest Marine, Protected Area, U.S. Department of State (June
16, 2006), http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2006/Jun/16-479649.html; see Northwestern
Hawaiian Islands Proclaimed a National Monument, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS SERVICE
(June 15, 2006), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/Jun2006/2006-06-15-03.asp.
737. See Juliet Eilperin, Hawaiian Marine Reserve To Be World's Largest - Bush to Designate
National Park in Pacific Waters, WASHINGTON POST (June 15, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/14/AR2006061402455.html.
7 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I (2009)
establish Bush ['43'] as the leader who has protected more of the oceans than
anyone else in the world," the former President designated as National Monuments
"the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific [a U.S. Commonwealth],738 a chain of
remote islands in the central Pacific [U.S. Wildlife Refuges administered as U.S.
territories], 739 and the Rose Atoll off American Samoa (a U.S. territory] 740 . . . some
195,280 square miles of . . . the Pacific Ocean." 74 1 This designation serves to
protect "pristine coral reefs, vanishing marine species and the deepest places on
Earth" 742 from fishing and energy exploration, thereby placing the region's
economy at risk.743
This all seems to confirm that the United States is in legal competition with
other nations to define the international environmental law of the oceans and
corresponding airspace above and seabed and seafloor below, as well as, the scope
of permissible international and national economic activities within the global
commons and the sovereign areas beyond. At the very least, this means that our
nation's continued functional sovereignty and the international rule of law are in a
state of flux and potentially at risk. What is more, however, is that it appears that
we are also in conflict with ourselves over how to define U.S. domestic
environmental laws and the scope of Americans' domestic rights to engage in
economic activities freely within our own sovereign space, consistent with the
time-honored rule of law principles of private property, free markets, rational
science, individual political and economic freedom and due process, all of which
are embedded within the U.S. Constitution and its accompanying Bill of Rights. In
light of these external and internal challenges, should not the U.S. Congress
738. See "Information About the Northern Marianna Islands"' U.S. District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands, at: http://www.nmld.uscourts.gov/cnmi info/cnmi info.html.
739. See "United States Pacific Island Wildlife Refuges (territories of the US)," Central
Intelligence Agency World Factbook, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/um.html (last updated on 22 January 2009).
740. See American Samoa, Office of Insular Affairs,
http://www.doi.gov/oia/Ilslandpages/asgpage.htm.
741. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Bush Designates Ocean Conservation Areas in Final Weeks as
President, THE GUARDIAN UK (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jan/06/ocean-conservation-george-bush-
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What Goes Around Comes Around
assume its constitutional responsibility and uphold its members' oath of office by
extensively reviewing, in an open, transparent and public manner, the substantive
pros and cons of acceding to what one commentator refers to as "the most
comprehensive and progressive international environmental law of any modem
international agreement"?
7
"
According to one international law scholar who is intimately familiar with the
finer details, nuances and lacunae within the UNCLOS, it has always really been
about how silence is golden and the ends justify the means.
Like many complex bodies of written law, [... the Convention] is amply endowed with
indeterminate principles, mind-numbing cross-references, institutional redundancies,
exasperating opacity and inelegant drafting, not to mention a potpourri of provisions that
any one of us, if asked, would happily delete or change. The trick, as we are fond of
saying in the United States, is to 'keep your eye on the ball.' For those of us for whom
strengthening the rule of law is the goal, and global ratification of the Convention is the
means, it is essential to measure what we say in terms of its effect on the goal.
Experienced international lawyers know where many of the sensitive nerve endings of
governments are and how to avoid irritating them. This does not mean lawyers should
abandon their clients, judges should misstate the law, or the academy should muzzle
debate. What it does mean is that it is appropriate, indeed perhaps obligatory, for each to
bear in mind his or her ethical obligation to consider the effect on the rule of law in
carrying out his or her functions. Good lawyers routinely wam their clients about the risks
of compromising their long-term interests in dealing with the problem at hand. Where
those clients may have an interest in the promotion of the rule of law in international
affairs generally, or in global ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention in particular, it
is entirely appropriate to alert them to actions or statements that may prejudice that
interest.
745
If this characterization of he and his motives is not accurate why, then, does he
not step forward and support popular calls for new explicative congressional
hearings? Although more than a decade has passed since most nations decided to
ratify the UNCLOS without fully understanding its contents or appreciating the
true implications of their decision, the shroud of secrecy around its environmental
articles nevertheless remains. Why? Is it not now time, finally, to open the hood
and kick the tires to show Americans what is inside this treaty vehicle and explain
how it operates? Are not the primary clients in this case, as a matter of law and
ethics, the American people? Do they not deserve to be alerted to an ever-evolving
744. NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA (2005), supra note 233, at 145.
745. Oxman, supra note 20, at 357 (emphasis added).
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international legal instrument that may be used to potentially prejudice their
individual and collective interests, both now and in the foreseeable future?
